Somalia: An Opportunity that Should Not Be Missed

I. OVERVIEW

The next six months will be crucial for Somalia. The international community is taking a renewed interest in the country; the mandate of the feeble and dysfunctional Transitional Federal Government (TFG) expires in a half-year; and emboldened troops from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Kenya and Ethiopia are keen to deal the weakened (though still potent) extremist Islamist movement Al-Shabaab further defeats. This confluence of factors presents the best chance in years for peace and stability in the south and centre of the country. To achieve that, however, requires regional and wider international unity of purpose and an agreement on basic principles; otherwise spoilers could undermine all peacebuilding efforts.

The crisis has been climbing steadily back up the international agenda. The one-day London Somalia Conference on 23 February will bring together senior representatives from over 40 countries, the UN, African Union (AU), European Union (EU), World Bank, Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and League of Arab States. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) will participate, as well as the presidents of Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug (regional governments) and representatives of the largest armed group, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a (ASWJ). It should prepare the way for desperately needed greater coordination, especially with Gulf and regional states, as well as between AMISOM and the UN.

Coordination is required because the mandate of the TFG is set to run out in August 2012. Although it has failed to achieve any of its core objectives, many officials desire another extension, such as it received a year ago. But it is unenforceable – too many of its members benefit from the fully unsatisfactory status quo. It must not be extended. Instead, the London Conference should agree on a new political framework and principles for governing Somalia.

This is important, because AMISOM and regional forces have made impressive gains against Al-Shabaab and are poised to renew their offensive. Nevertheless, their greatest challenge will probably be not to drive the militants out of major cities and towns, but rather to secure peace thereafter. Al-Shabaab, though weakened, is far from a spent force; its militant jihadi ideology is radicalising young Somalis at home and abroad; veteran foreign jihadis are exerting ever-greater influence; and recently its emir pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and global jihad. But it is no longer the only threat to stability; the resurgence of inter-clan competition and warlordism is as serious. While there is an understandable inclination to strengthen the central state in Mogadishu (in the form of the TFIs) and its security apparatus, past and present transitional administrations have failed to bring stability, in large part because many clans do not support the reestablishment of a strong central government. A more decentralised political framework and local inter-clan reconciliation are required.

The root cause of Somalia’s many troubles – terrorism, piracy, periodic famine and constant streams of refugees – is collapse of effective governance, with resulting chronic conflict, lawlessness and poverty. The most effective and durable solution to these ills is to build gradually an inclusive, more federal government structure that most clans can support. Otherwise, Al-Shabaab (or some similar successor) and other disparate groups of would-be strongmen with guns will exploit continued dissatisfaction with Mogadishu and innate Somali hostility to “foreign occupation”.

This coming six-month period is a critical time for Somalia. To make the most of the opportunity to end more than two decades of chronic conflict, the international community should:

- increase AMISOM’s force strength and provide more resources. To maintain momentum and consolidate gains, AMISOM should quickly assume full tactical and operational command of the AU, Ethiopian, and Kenyan missions and coordinate closely with Somali allies. Any major offensive should be accompanied by a political strategy to win the support of local clans and social groups and stabilise those areas in which they are present;
- rebuild internal cohesion among core members of the International Contact Group;
- enhance the role of Turkey and other Muslim nations in the stabilisation effort, so as to build Somali confidence in the process;
endorse closer UN/AU cooperation and insure that the two organisations’ Special Representatives work closely together;

endorse the formation of a truly inclusive Somali deliberative body, one that represents all clans and most regions of the country, and can establish an interim government to replace the TFG if necessary;

create a Local Stability Fund to help local administrations that are economically viable, can administer and impose law and order, are committed to peace and renounce terrorism and are willing to engage in an inclusive dialogue and give priority to cross-clan alliances that seek to establish viable administrations;

create a joint financial management board and consider establishing within it a governance and economic management program for the major national sources of revenue, such as Mogadishu port and airport, as well as Kismayo port, based on the kind of partnership between local government and internationals to promote transparency and accountability that lowered corruption in post-civil war Liberia. Once funds enter the treasury, Somalis should transparently decide their use; and

encourage the Somali authorities to indicate continued willingness to negotiate a political accommodation with or incorporate into a national/regional security force Al-Shabaab commanders and fighters willing to renounce terrorism and work towards peace, since this would weaken the group further and could help stabilise newly recovered areas.

II. RENEWED INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION

Somalia has the world’s attention again. Pirates are costing shipowners hundreds of millions of dollars; there are well-founded fears of another international terrorist attack emanating from the country, and the 2011 famine that left 3.2 million people (close to 30 per cent of the total population) in need of life-saving assistance is only slowly relaxing its grip. The UN response alone cost well over $1 billion in 2011 (the 2012 request for post-famine assistance is an additional $1.5 billion). Addressing these challenges, however, will need more than increased security or additional humanitarian assistance. A durable solution requires reestablishing stability, so that Somali local governments can impose law and order on pirates and terrorists alike, businessmen can invest and develop the economy, and ordinary Somalis can pursue their livelihoods in peace.

A. MORE THAN TWENTY YEARS OF STATE FAILURE AND CRISES

Somalia was a failed state long before Siyad Barre’s government finally collapsed in 1991, and clans began to fight for control of Mogadishu, the capital, and other valuable cities and territory. Following defeat in the 1977 Ogaden War, the regime was confronted with multiple rebellions – supported by neighbouring states – that grew, while the government weakened. Drought and internecine conflict triggered a devastating famine in 1991 that prompted the first international intervention. It ended the famine but was unable to reconstruct the central state, in large part because clans feared rivals would seize control and use the state apparatus to gain even greater power and resources. Clan-based warlords became adept at pilfering humanitarian assistance and manipulating external actors to their own advantage. It became apparent that rather than end the war, international aid was helping to perpetuate the conflict. Chastened, the UN Mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) withdrew in 1995.

Somalia dropped from wider international, if not regional, attention, and certain areas began to stabilise slowly. Some, most notably Somaliland and Puntland, gradually reestab-

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3 “Somalia Consolidated Appeal 2012”, UN, 22 December 2011.

4 Somalia invaded Ethiopia in an attempt to seize the Ogaden region, largely inhabited by ethnic Somalis. It made large initial gains but was routed after its former patron, the Soviet Union, gave Addis extensive military support. The defeat triggered rebellions supported by Ethiopia and other regional states. I.M. Lewis, A Modern History of Somalia (Oxford, 2002), pp. 231-248.

5 The 1993 “Black Hawk Down” incident, in which eighteen U.S. soldiers, as well as 350 to 1,000 Somalis, were killed, prompted President Clinton to withdraw U.S. forces and in effect ended the “peace enforcement” phase of the mission. Since then, Western governments have been unwilling to deploy large numbers of troops to the country.
lished relative peace and stability, but others failed to surmount competing clan interests and regional meddling, particularly after the Eritrea-Ethiopia War (1998-2000) broke out, and Somalia became the renewed theatre of proxy conflict.

Despite the success of some regions and local administrations to stabilise large parts of the country, the international community remained absorbed with reestablishing the central state. International peace conferences endorsed new central governments in 2000 (the Transitional National Government, TNG, under Abdiqasim Salad Hassan), 2004 (the Transitional Federal Government under Abdullahi Yusuf) and 2009 (the Transitional Federal Government under Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed). None could impose their authority widely. The one organisation that was able to stabilise south and central Somalia, albeit briefly in 2006, was the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). It was able to do so, because it tried to transcend clan identity – it projected itself as a broad-based Muslim government – accommodated clan fears by ruling through a Shura (council), with representatives from most clans, and devolved most decisions to local authorities.

It will never be known whether this governance model could have worked for the country. Fears that the group would export extremism prompted Ethiopia to invade in December 2006. It quickly defeated the UIC but was forced to prop up Abdullahi Yusuf’s weak and, for many Somalis, illegitimate TFG. The Ethiopian “occupation” and harsh counter-insurgency operations triggered the broad-based rebellion of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS), spearheaded by Al-Shabaab. In 2008 Sheikh Sharif’s ARS faction joined a reconstituted TFG, thus allowing Ethiopian forces to withdraw the following year, and he was elected the new president by the enlarged Transitional Federal Parliament. However, he was unwilling or unable to accommodate other Somali centres of power; the war continued, and Al-Shabaab and Hizb al-Islam seized control of most of south and central Somalia. The TFG, beleaguered in Mogadishu, was barely saved by AMISOM, whose mandate is to protect the transitional federal institutions (TFIs).

The only other area of south and central Somalia able to resist was controlled by ASWI, the alliance of clans that developed when Al-Shabaab tried to ban traditional Sufi religious practices. In 2009 it obtained military support from Ethiopia and started a campaign to expel Al-Shabaab. By late that year, it was the largest TFG-allied force in the south and centre. It was also directed by a Shura, but in 2010, it fragmented into several regional groupings, after one faction joined the TFG.

B. AMISOM AND REGIONAL MILITARY ADVANCES

Three years on, the situation has changed significantly, leaving Al-Shabaab increasingly on the defensive. Over the past year, AMISOM and allied forces have been able, at great cost, to slowly push most Al-Shabaab forces out of Mogadishu and are poised to capture the city’s outskirts. The AU’s success is due in part to deliberate efforts to gain

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9 For more on how the UIC ruled, see Crisis Group Briefing, Somalia’s Divided Islamiists, op. cit.

10 For more on the fall of the UIC, see Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°45, Somalia: The Tough Part Is Ahead, 26 January 2007.

11 Adullahi Yusuf’s TFG was thereafter perceived to be an Ethiopian puppet. Hawiye from central Somalia also feared that Yusuf’s clan, the Darod, would try to dominate them. Ibid.

12 Al-Shabaab started as a single court militia but grew in size and prominence after 2006, because it was seen as the most effective group fighting Ethiopian “occupation”.

13 For more on the TFG’s failure to reach out, see Crisis Group Report, Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support, op. cit., pp. 5-6. Hizb al-Islam was founded by Sheikh Sharif’s ARS rival, Hasan Dahir Awes. Following a costly attack in Mogadishu in 2009, it went into terminal decline and was eventually merged into Al-Shabaab. See Crisis Group Briefing, Somalia’s Divided Islamists, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

14 AMISOM was sent in to replace Ethiopian forces supporting the TFG.

15 For more, see Crisis Group Briefing, Somalia’s Divided Islamists, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

16 AMISOM has lost more than 500 troops since 2009. In 2011 the mission cost $247 million, mostly paid by non-AU donors. Fred Olwoch, “UN unveils new look Amisom as Kenya joins up”, The East African, 11 February 2012. The bulk of the heavy fighting is done by Ugandans and Burundians; disparate TFG units reinforce AMISOM positions and provide security. The Somali units, while nominally TFG, are often more loyal to individual commanders and sometimes fight one another over loot and control of lucrative checkpoints.
the support of district leaders and militias.\textsuperscript{17} However, Al-Shabaab fighters and sympathisers remain in the city and carry out almost daily attacks.\textsuperscript{18} At the same time, Kenya and Ethiopia have directly intervened. In October 2011, Kenyan troops and allied militias moved to take control of some border areas; they now appear to be preparing to take Afmadow town, as a prelude to moving on Kismayo.\textsuperscript{19} Ethiopian forces, with their own proxies, captured the strategic town of Beledweyne (Hiraan), at the end of December 2011 and may be preparing to attack Baidoa, the largest city controlled by Al-Shabaab.\textsuperscript{20}

These campaigns force Al-Shabaab to fight on multiple fronts, inflict heavy casualties and impose a serious financial toll the group can ill afford.\textsuperscript{21} It no longer controls entire districts of the capital, is unable to directly tax Mogadishu markets and businessmen and has been forced to raise onerous taxes from the population it still controls. There are credible reports it is relying on forced recruitment to fill its ranks.\textsuperscript{22} Increasingly unpopular, the group appears divided. The recent announcement that Al-Shabaab has formally joined al-Qaeda may have been a tactic by some of its leaders, including Ahmed Abdi Godane, to acquire greater international financial support, but could alienate more nationalist Somali factions not interested in jihad or supportive of international terrorism.\textsuperscript{23}

To maintain momentum and consolidate gains, AMISOM should quickly assume full tactical and operational command of what are still poorly-coordinated efforts by the AU mission, Ethiopia, Kenya and Somali allies.\textsuperscript{24} This may require an expansion of its limited mandate (peace enforcement and stabilisation) and greater resources. Yet, with the arrival of a Djiboutian contingent in December 2011 and other potential troop contributing nations likely to follow, AMISOM’s resources, command structure and internal cohesion will come under greater strain.\textsuperscript{25} Kenya’s decision to join the mission is positive, because it may bring it closer in line with the broader aims of stabilising Somalia. But if not handled with tact, it could cause bilateral friction with Uganda, which has the largest contingent and dominates the mission’s command.\textsuperscript{26}

Ethiopia appears keen to improve its coordination with AMISOM but is unlikely to join the mission.\textsuperscript{27} It is possible to improve the military coordination and forge some form of partnership, but a renewed large-scale Ethiopian military involvement, whether unilateral or part of a wider effort, would be unwise, because it could galvanise popular opposition and prove counterproductive.

So far, Al-Shabaab’s attempts to rally Somalis into a new jihad against the array of foreign armies advancing on its southern strongholds have failed to gain traction. Though this may change if the war is protracted and civilian casualties mount,\textsuperscript{28} the shift in its military fortunes suggests this

\textsuperscript{17} Crisis Group email communication, Somalia expert, 10 February 2012.

\textsuperscript{18} These include small assaults, attacks with improvised explosive devises (IEDs) and suicide bombings. Crisis Group email communications, NGOs and security experts, Nairobi, Mogadishu, January-February 2012.


\textsuperscript{20} Ethiopia supports a number of ASWJ factions and the Shabelle Valley State militia drawn from clans along the border.

\textsuperscript{21} Defections from Al-Shabaab have reportedly increased because the group can no longer afford to pay all its fighters. Crisis Group email communication, AU official, 16 February 2012.


\textsuperscript{23} Tristan McConnel, “Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda co-produce video”, Global Post, 10 February 2012. Godane, from northern Somalia, is nominally the “emir” of Al-Shabaab and the leader of a hardline faction supported by its foreign fighters; see Crisis Group Briefing, Somalia’s Divided伊斯兰ists, op. cit. He made the announcement with Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s successor as leader of al-Qaeda.

\textsuperscript{24} The AU and UN released a strategic concept “aimed at joining all ongoing separate military operations in Somalia into a coordinated and coherent effort against Al-Shabaab”. The UN Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council increase the AMISOM force strength to 17,701 uniformed personnel from its current 12,000 and authorise an expanded logistical support package. “Special Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia”, S/2012/74, 31 January 2012, p. 3. This would need to be approved by the Security Council, which is apparently concerned about its cost: the current cost of supporting the mission, $310 million per year, would rise to $510 million per year. Crisis Group interview, AU official, Nairobi, 16 February 2012.

\textsuperscript{25} Sierra Leone has promised to contribute troops; a number of other African states are reportedly considering support.

\textsuperscript{26} Crisis Group Report, The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{27} The AU-UN strategic concept envisages deployment of 2,500 Burundian and Ugandan troops to Gedo, Bay and Bakool (Sector 3), supported by Ethiopia. “Special Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia”, op. cit., pp. 4-6. A long-term Ethiopian presence would be deeply unpopular, because of historic enmity between Ethiopia and Somalia. As noted above, the Ethiopian “occupation” at the behest of Abdullahi Yusuf’s TFG led to the rise of Al-Shabaab.

\textsuperscript{28} The Kenyan military in particular runs the risk of alienating the public by use of aerial bombardment. An airstrike on an alleged Al-Shabaab target reportedly killed five young siblings in Jilib in November 2011, triggering protest across Somalia. The
is a ripe moment when elements within the organisation could be open to meaningful negotiations.

C. THE LONDON CONFERENCE

The UK’s decision to convene a special international conference on Somalia in London, on 23 February 2012, reflects growing Western concern over the protracted crisis and anxieties about its local, regional and wider international implications. 10 Downing Street’s initiative seeks to develop a new consensus on how to tackle the multiple challenges. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department for International Development (DFID) have since November been at the forefront of a well-choreographed, multi-track diplomatic effort. Senior officials were dispatched to Somalia and the region to explain the initiative, test ideas and gather opinions.29

A key objective is to rebuild internal cohesion among core members of the International Contact Group, a collection of states (most long-serving members such as the U.S., UK, Norway, Italy, Sweden, Tanzania and the EU but now including also Kenya, Uganda, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and Turkey), the UN and AU.30 The UK’s bid to invigorate the Contact Group, inject fresh thinking and encourage innovative approaches appears to have been broadly welcomed. Although some countries are only lukewarm about the London Conference itself, the deliberate strategy to raise the profile of the new actors in the Muslim and Arab world keen to enhance their role in Somalia is positive and popular.31

Yet, the British have undertaken a complex mission. The Contact Group is a collective of nations and organisations with diverse – and sometimes competing – views and interests. For example, a public dispute between Italy and the UK has reinforced old fears of crippling dissonance within what is called its core group. In preparation for the conference, Italy produced a “non-paper” that contains some good policy points, in particular the need to thwart any attempt to extend the TFG’s mandate.32 Yet, Rome’s idea of local authorities – based on the eighteen pre-war administrative regions – differs from that of the other Contact Group members, who favour more organic units. The most controversial element of the paper is its call to create a joint “UN/AU international administration” under a Joint Special Representative and with a mandate to govern for one year from August 2012. This has been widely interpreted as a call for international trusteeship.33

The entry of new actors increases the difficulty of creating consensus. There is concern that Turkey’s alleged direct financial support for the TFG and suspected intent to open back-channel negotiations with Al-Shabaab could complicate matters.34 Any fears Turkey could become an inadvertent spoiler are likely misplaced, but they might turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy if Ankara were to feel its ambition was being actively thwarted or undermined. A rumour that the conference is a British ploy to undermine Turkish initiatives on Somalia – or, as a diplomat put it, “pull the rug from under the feet of the Turks” – has given extra mileage to these fears.35 The British are right in trying to enhance the role of Turkey and other Muslim nations in the renewed stabilisation effort.36 This sends the correct message to Somalis and is the best way to restore their confidence in international peacemaking efforts and counter radical narratives and conspiracy theories.

29 “Italian ‘Non Paper’ to end the Somali transition”, 1 January 2012, in possession of Crisis Group. This signals a shift in Rome’s traditional support for a strong central state in a united Somalia. The shift has been under way for some time, as evident by Italy’s financial and other support for ASWJ.


31 “Turkey’s entry into Somalia has raised speculation and comes against the backdrop of its newly assertive policy in the Middle East and the Muslim world – uncharitably dubbed “neo-Ottomanism” by critics. Much of the concern revolves around its unilateral character. At the height of the famine in late 2011, it mounted an impressive but solo aid effort, bypassing traditional systems. According to critics, local actors diverted a large part. Crisis Group interviews, UN officials and Somalia analysts, October 2011-1 January 2012; TFG minister, EU official, Nairobi, December 2012. For its part, Ankara is apparently annoyed that the recently appointed EU Special Representative to Somalia (EUSR), Alex Rondos, is from a member state (Greece) with which it has had a long tense relationship.

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Somalis, however, are concerned. Some have read darker motives into Italy’s proposal, suggesting, for example, its aim may have been to foment opposition to the conference. Somalis opposed to the UK initiative have used it to step up criticism of what they see as an attempt to re-colonise their country.37 The TFG itself was rattled; its prime minister visited Italy in late January to raise the matter.38 Somaliland officials appear intent on using their presence at the conference to make a pitch for recognition. London is not the ideal forum for this, since its desire for independence is very contentious with other Somalis and can only complicate efforts to stabilise south and central Somalia. Somaliland must go slow on this; otherwise it could trigger a side battle that may overshadow the conference.

The divergence of views is neither new nor surprising, considering the complexity of the crisis and Somalia’s geopolitical importance. The immediate need is to keep the focus on strategic goals, while simultaneously seeking to narrow differences and build consensus incrementally over the outstanding issues and potential solutions. To take advantage of this opportunity to advance peace and stability, consensus should coalesce around:

- no further extension of the TFG;
- the challenges of the areas recovered from Al-Shabaab and other regions;
- a mechanism for dealing with spoilers and corruption; and
- improved international cooperation.

III. NO MORE EXTENSIONS

The priority of the transitional federal institutions is not reform, as many hope, but survival. Their officials do not intend to work themselves out of jobs, much less take up generous retirement offers. The TFG has agreed in principle to a new government in August 2012, but words will need to be met with deeds – and they have not been in the past. It is still likely that timetables will continue to slip, and the laws and mechanisms for an orderly transition will not be in place. The president seeks yet another mandate, the parliament is too crisis-ridden and factionalised to legislate, and the administration in general is unwilling to share sufficient power and resources to bring other regions and factions into the government.

A. A FLAWED SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

The government is structurally flawed and resistant to reform. The executive is badly divided between the president and prime minister; the cabinet and federal government are unwieldy, lacking capacity and riddled with corruption; and the parliament is too large and divided.

A key structural problem is the Transitional Federal Charter’s failure to properly demarcate the powers of the president and prime minister.39 Since the hybrid power structure was first inaugurated, with the TNG, Somali administrations have frequently been debilitated by prolonged, acrimonious leadership splits.40 The bloated transitional parliament is also beset with periodic leadership crises that render it incapable of performing the simplest legislative functions.41 The endemic wrinkles, especially between the president, prime minister and speaker, as well as within parliament, are to a large extent why there has been little progress in the last three years. The need for reform is acknowledged, but never implemented. The will to find a permanent solution does not exist. Powerful vested interests are served by and benefit from the shaky status quo. Replacing those nominally in charge or pushing for reform from the outside will not change the structure or incentives that stymie efforts to stabilise the country.

Though the Transitional Federal Charter commits the TFG to a “decentralised system of administration based on federalism”,42 the government has paid only lip-service to devolving power. It refused to share sufficient authority and resources to bring its major ally, ASWJ, fully on board.43 It has publicly re-committed to greater federalism, in both the Kampala Accord (June 2011)44 and the Garowe

37 Al-Shabaab’s spokesman, Ali M. Rage, tweeted that the conference is “another attempt to colonise Somalia”, HSM Press Office, @HSMPress, 13 February 2012.
38 The Italian government’s official statement said it believed the conference to be a side battle that may overshadow the conference.
40 The most notable was between President Yusuf and Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Gedi, when the government split into hostile camps (2004-2005); Yusuf’s based in Baidoa, Gedi’s in Mogadishu (Ghedi). It was only resolved when the prime minister was forced to resign. Ibid, p. 8.
41 There are 550 seats in parliament, but not all are filled, because some members have died and others live abroad. After a parliamentary revolt against Sharif Hasan’s leadership as speaker in December 2011, there are two speakers, though because of the June 2011 Kampala Accord, the TFG, AMISOM and UN officially recognise Sharif Hasan.
42 Article 11.
44 “Agreement between the President of the [TFG] and the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament ... “, 9 June 2011. The key protagonists – President Sharif and Speaker Sharif Ha-
Principles (December 2011, see below), but not followed those assurances with deeds.

B. THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTIVE ASSEMBLY

The most promising local development is the agreement at the Somali National Consultative Constitutional Conference (21-23 December 2011) on “The Garowe Principles”, meant to guide finalisation of the draft federal constitution and the process for ending the transition when the TFG’s mandate expires in August 2012.45 The agreement includes an extremely ambitious timeline to complete the final draft of the constitution no later than 20 April.46 The participants also nominally agreed on a post-transition parliamentary structure, including a bicameral federal legislature with an upper chamber “comprise[d] of members of federal states and regional administrations”. The number of parliamentarians is to be more than halved, to 225. The proposed bicameral structure was reaffirmed at the so-called Garowe II session, 15-17 February.47 The second meeting in Garowe represents measured progress in guiding the drafting of a permanent constitution, but more important will be selecting representative and acceptable delegates of the constituent assembly that will debate and ratify the document.

san – were summoned to Kampala in June and told to reach a deal. Mediators from the Contact Group, led by UN Special Representative Augustine P. Mahiga, worked around the clock to break the deadlock. At a late stage, when the talks appeared headed for collapse, help was sought from Uganda’s President Museveni. His barely concealed anger and strong language, combined with the explicit threat to pull his troops from AMISOM, did the trick. The principals and the chief mediator signed the Kampala Accord, which extended the TFG for a year and deferred election of a new speaker and president; the then prime minister was told to resign in 30 days to make way for a new government.

45 The consultative conference, in Garowe (Puntland), was attended by the TFG’s prime minister, Puntland state’s president; Galmudug state’s president; and representatives of pro-government groups, including a faction of ASWJ and civil society. 46 This will most likely mean that the draft constitution will be rushed and lack consultation with the Somali people. In December 2011, TFP Constitutional Committee Chairman Abdikadir Sheikh Ismail accused the government of drafting a constitution that would not serve the nation and was not in accordance with the Federal Charter. He was responding to the federal constitution and reconciliation minister, who said the drafting process was continuing in accordance with the September 2011 roadmap to end the transition (the agreed timeline and benchmarks for ending the transition). “Somali committee on constitution accuses UN envoy, speaker of blocking work”, 27 December 2011, at http://somaliamedianmonitoring.org.


Close consideration should be given to returning to the original size of the parliament, 275, since a relatively established formula for allocating seats has been developed over the last twelve years. 225 would require extensive renegotiations between and within clans.48

Since the security situation still makes direct elections impossible, it was agreed that the first members of the lower house would be selected using the “4.5 formula” of clan representation and that thereafter members would be elected by direct universal vote.49 Most importantly, the participants agreed to establish a national constituent assembly, with a maximum of 1,000 delegates, no later than 15 May 2012, to discuss and adopt the new draft federal constitution. Consideration also should be given to making the number of the national constituent assembly delegates a multiple of 275, eg, 550, 825 or 1,100, to ease negotiations over clan representation.50

This presents an opportunity to create a truly inclusive deliberative body that represents all clans and most regions of the country (the current parliament was largely self-selected and is not considered representative by many Somalis). The assembly should reserve, but not fill, seats for clans or regions that, for whatever reasons, do not participate from the outset, so as to encourage them to join the process. If the constitution is delayed, it could also negotiate and establish an interim administration and serve as the interim legislative body once the TFP is dissolved in August 2012.

IV. THE CHALLENGES OF THE RECOVERED AREAS AND OTHER REGIONS

While the bulk of non-humanitarian support for Somalia has gone to AMISOM and the TFG’s security services, the country will only truly be stabilised if there is a political framework that addresses regions’ fears of domination by the centre and creates incentives for clans to withdraw their support for Al-Shabaab.

48 Crisis Group interview, Somalia expert, New York, 3 February 2012.
49 The 4.5 formula allocates an equal number of seats in parliament to each of the four major clan-families – the Darod, Hawiye, Dir and Digele-Mirifle – and half that number to remaining minority groups. It has been a workable compromise because it distributes decision-making power fairly evenly among the largest and most powerful clans.
50 Crisis Group interview, Somalia expert, New York, 3 February 2012.
The string of important military victories over the last year against Al-Shabaab in Mogadishu, central Somalia (Mudug, Hiraan, Galguduud) and southern Somalia (Gedo, Shabelle and Juba) has expanded the number of “recovered areas”.51 This has boosted government morale but also highlighted a major weakness in the overall military strategy: the TFG’s lack of a parallel political plan to extend and consolidate its writ. Administering these areas could prove very complicated. The TFG lacks the grassroots political networking and negotiating skills to create credible local/sub-national administrations. Equally important, it is doubtful it can muster sufficient security forces, especially police, to respond to the law enforcement challenges.

The emerging picture in the recovered areas is deeply disconcerting. The alliance against Al-Shabaab painstakingly stitched together by Ethiopia since 2009 in central Somalia and led by the ASWJ has practically disintegrated. Common enmity toward Al-Shabaab had its utility but has now run its course. It was the element that helped the clans cooperate, but it is not a strategy. Once the threat receded, inter-clan animosities, rivalries and territorial competition resurfaced. Ethiopia’s attempts to keep a lid on these developments failed. At the same time, the TFG is deeply distrusted and lacks influence and credibility to mediate. Clan leaders and diaspora leaders with family and clan connections in these regions must take urgent steps to contain the situation before it develops into a full-blown crisis.

Rather than a grand bargain for all of Somalia, the focus for the next six months should be to stabilise the south and centre. This will probably need to be a gradual and patchwork process of slowly bringing local administrations (sub-national entities) into a quasi-national governmental framework that respects their suspicions Mogadishu will try to assert direct control.

A. DECENTRALISATION AND LOCAL STABILITY

There is growing agreement that some form of decentralisation52 and direct international support for emerging administrations (sub-national entities) is necessary to stabilise south and central Somalia.53 To support this, the London Conference organisers have called for establishment of a Local Stability Fund to help these local governments gain capacity and rapidly provide services.54 There is also some consensus on objective criteria for supporting emerging local administrations that must be economically viable; have the capacity to administer and impose law and order; be committed to peace and renounce terrorism; and be willing to engage in an inclusive national dialogue to create a stable state.55 These are important benchmarks, but there are two important omissions.

Fragile and unstable local administrations not able to stand on their own must demonstrate willingness to engage in dialogue with other entities (in effect other clans and sub-clans) to create bigger, self-sustainable multi-clan entities. This would incentivise viability and potentially weaken the negative tendency to create single-clan, or even sub-clan, enclaves. Galmudug and Ximian and Xeeb are two cases on point of single-clan-based administrations that should ultimately merge, or join with other administrations.56 Regions that demonstrate willingness to forge such cross-clan alliances should be given greater priority and access to the proposed Local Stability Fund.

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51 This is the term the UN prefers. The term “liberated areas” is also used.
52 Calls for decentralisation are not new. In 1995 the London School of Economics analysed how authority could be devolved in Somalia and presented four models: a confederation (a union of separate but equal states), a federal system (with three ways of organising federal-provincial relations), a decentralised unitary state with guarantees of regional or local autonomy, and a consociation (a non-territorial option). It explicitly offered no preferred option, arguing it was up to the Somalis to determine the most appropriate solution. I.M. Lewis and J. Mayall et al., “A Study of Decentralised Political Structures for Somalia: A Menu of Options”, commissioned by the European Commission Somalia Unit, with assistance of the UN Development Office for Somalia, August 1995; also, Crisis Group Report, Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support, op. cit.
54 UK DFID recognises that each region will require a differentiated approach that integrates political, security and development elements, as well as incentives to engage in a national political process. “Local Stability in Somalia”, DFID Somalia, 18 November 2011. Without a thorough understanding of the regions, additional assistance may increase short-term conflict, as clan segments, elites and spoilers compete for control of the resources.
56 Unfortunately, the second Somalia consultative conference called for the recognition of Galmudug as a full federal state, like much larger Puntland, probably because Galmudug was one of the few regional administrations to send representatives. “Second Somali National Consultative Constitutional Conference”, Garowe, Puntland, Somalia, 15-17 February 2012.
There is a fundamental conflict between the federal model envisaged in the constitution being drafted (as well as in the Transitional Federal Charter) and facts on the ground. Like it or not, the government and the international community must work with organic constituencies, in this case clans. Conversely, the administrative units (regions and districts) created by Siyad Barre’s government in 1990 often bisected clans. Unless this is resolved, territorial disputes and contestation are inevitable. This is a tricky and sensitive issue it would be unwise to try to resolve now, but planning for a sound federal model should start now, and the next government will need to be flexible.

Lastly, Al-Shabaab is no longer the only threat facing emerging and potential local administrations. Another is the resurgence of inter-clan animosities and competition and the re-emergence of warlords, both former and aspiring faction leaders. Urgent efforts are required to initiate local inter-clan reconciliation processes, criminalise new spoilers and use the Local Stability Fund also to support local mediation.

B. DEVOLVED SECURITY

The same problem with recreating a central government exists with reconstructing an integrated national army and police force. Many Somalis fear that national security services would be dominated by a single clan and used to enforce its rule. Serious consideration should be given to providing support for security sector reform along regional/local lines. The U.S. National Guard, which is recruited and commanded along state lines, provides one possibly helpful template. Rather than concentrating on the military and intelligence services, donors should focus more on building small and effective local police forces.

C. BE WILLING TO NEGOTIATE WITH AL-SHABAAB ELEMENTS

Al-Shabaab has been weakened but cannot be militarily eliminated. Even in much more secure and relatively stable Somaliland and Puntland, the group and its sympathisers remain a serious security threat. It makes sense to continue the military campaign against Al-Shabaab and especially commanders who plan and approve suicide bombings and terror attacks. However, the possibility of negotiating a political accommodation or incorporating into a national/regional security force commanders and fighters willing to renounce terrorism and work towards peace should be on the table, not least because it could weaken the group further. The international community should also recognise and try to address the fears and grievances of clans that support the group, by assuring them it will not allow the TFG to dominate negotiations, and power and resources will henceforth be shared more equitably. Once they have switched sides, it is local clans that are best positioned to address the residual Al-Shabaab threat.

D. FLEXIBLE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT AND EQUAL PARTIES

The international community made a mistake in recognising the TFG as the national government, representative of all Somalia. The parliament is self-selected by those who had the means or connections to participate in the endless peace conferences in Arta (Djibouti, 2000), Mbagati (Kenya, 2002-2004) and Djibouti City (2008) that led to the formation of the last three transitional governments. Many legislators have few, if any, real ties to the local people they claim to represent. The president was then “elected” by this non-representative institution. The government has failed to win the trust of most Somalis.

The TFG should not be allowed to hijack the agenda or dictate terms in negotiations about Somalia’s future. It should be treated as one party among many in the development of the constitution and creation of the post-August 2012 government. Moreover, any agreement about the future of Somalia cannot dictate terms for local administrations and regions that remain outside the process or refuse to join a new government right away. Somaliland remains committed to independence, and it is doubtful

57 However, the international community should advocate the principled position that administrations and municipalities ought not to deny any Somali full rights to live, work, own property and operate a business.
61 This was apparently debated prior to the London Conference, with Qatar, Turkey, the UAE and Scandinavian countries favouring engagement, the UK and some other European countries interested, and the U.S. and IGAD (in which Ethiopia is very influential) firmly opposed. “Somalia/Britain: No great expectations”, op. cit.
62 Somalia legislators claim votes were purchased. Crisis Group interviews, Djibouti, Nairobi, 2009-2011.
that Puntland will agree to join any federal government in the near term. Likewise, local administrations may only emerge slowly in the south and centre of the country, and they will need to be accommodated once they have developed into viable governments. Many states grant unique rights to local authorities, and it would be unwise to push all of Somalia’s disparate regions into a single framework.

V. WHAT TO DO ABOUT SPOILERS AND CORRUPTION

Dealing with individuals who benefit from the status quo presents a significant problem. Many businessmen and officials profit from the war economy and are able to divert government and humanitarian resources for personal gain. They do not wish to see an end to chronic conflict, will likely block attempts to share power and resources and do not necessarily want a less corrupt and nepotistic and more efficient government.

A. SPOILERS

The UN Security Council is aware of the spoiler problem and determined to “take measures against those who seek to prevent or block a peaceful political process, or those who threaten the … TFIs or … AMISOM by force, or take action that undermines stability in Somalia or the region.” It should do more to signal to spoilers that they are being watched by the Somalia Monitoring Group and will be targeted for sanctions if they continue to obstruct the peace process. Governments should complement this with their own measures against offending Somali leaders who may have citizenship or assets in their territory.

The international community should also consider creating a commission of inquiry into war crimes and crimes against humanity, with a view to eventual prosecution. The lack of justice and accountability is a serious impediment to peace and stability; the prospect of prosecution may deter some spoilers.

B. CORRUPTION

The International Contact Group expressed its concerns about corruption in the TFG in 2010. It encouraged the TFIs to focus on governance, fight corruption and promote accountability, transparency and delivery of basic services to the population. The TFG acknowledged gross financial mismanagement and corruption in its 2010 roadmap towards building durable peace and a functioning state and promised to create an Anti-Corruption Commission.

The June 2011 Kampala Accord also included a renewed pledge to create such a commission and agreed that international partners could impose sanctions on spoilers, to ensure compliance with timelines and benchmarks by the TFIs. The prime minister is reportedly consulting with donors to secure funds and other aid for an anti-graft “task-force”. The Security Council also included investigations into misappropriation of public funds in the new mandate it gave the UN Arms Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea in July 2011. A joint financial management board, which would go beyond sharing information and transparency, is under discussion, but it is neither clearly defined

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63 For example, the City of London has special rights granted it long ago; Zanzibar enjoys unique rights in Tanzania. See “History of City of London”, at www.cityoflondon.gov.uk; “Public Administration” at www.tanzania.go.tz.
64 Resolution 1814 (2008), para. 6.
65 Many Somali elites have dual citizenship and businesses, real property or other assets abroad.
67 This was the first time concerns about corruption were raised publicly. “Final Communiqué”, International Contact Group on Somalia, Madrid, 28 September 2010. It also encouraged the TFG to map the main illicit economic activities, including the charcoal and khat trade.
68 “Roadmap towards building durable peace and functioning state in Somalia”, October 2010, copy in possession of Crisis Group. The only action was an audit by the prime minister’s Public Finance Management Unit (PFMU). It reported gross public financial mismanagement; large-scale misappropriation of public and donor funds; unethical and unacceptable professional negligence; financial intimidation at the executive’s office compromising transparency and accountability; and concealment of actual resource flows. Abdirazak Farraag (head of PFU), “Audit Investigative Financial Report 2009-2010 (AIFR)”, May 2011.
70 Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Nairobi, February 2012.
71 Resolution 2002 (2011) considered that actions threatening the peace and security of Somalia, as well as those that threatened the 2008 Djibouti Agreement, could include “misappropriation of financial resources, which undermines the Transitional Federal Institutions’ ability to fulfil their obligations in delivering services … ”, para. 2.
nor agreed between the main stakeholders in and outside Somalia.72

Somalis and the international community may also want to consider a Governance and Economic Management Program for the major national sources of revenue, such as Mogadishu port and airport, as well as Kismayo port. Such a partnership between local government and internationals to promote transparency and accountability was successful in lowering corruption in post-civil war Liberia.73 Once funds enter the treasury, Somalis should transparently decide their use.74

VI. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The main goal of the London conference is greater international coordination on Somalia, especially with Gulf and regional states, since the West has traditionally taken a leading role, as well as greater cooperation between AMISOM and the UN. Both aspects have become greater challenges, as more external actors have become interested in the country, and the UN and the AU are exercising key responsibilities for ending its conflicts.

A. MULTIPLE PLAYERS AND MYRIAD INTERESTS

Renewed interest in Somalia has also brought renewed jockeying for influence. The U.S., UK and France remain important, but other external actors are equally significant. Most immediate are the regional states, Ethiopia and now Kenya, with profound security interests in the country that appear to be converging but could rapidly diverge again. Uganda, which has become an important regional actor by virtue of its dominance of AMISOM’s command, appears loath to cede its lead role to regional rivals.75

The newest serious entrant is Turkey, which came to Somalia in 2011 with noble, if naive, intentions to end the famine and provide the necessary support and guidance to make the TFG more effective and acceptable. It has quickly learned to be distrustful of Somali elites but remains committed to helping the country. It is suspicious of Western motives, however, and wary of bureaucratic coordination.76 Turkey has recently launched a very substantive initiative that extends from humanitarian aid to military cooperation and was put together largely outside the existing coordination frameworks of international assistance.

Representatives from the Arab League, OIC and various Islamic countries protest that the process is driven by the AU and IGAD, which they claim is dominated by Ethiopian and “Western” agendas at the expense of Somalia’s other partners in the Middle East and the Arab/Islamic world. Several donors from the Middle East, particularly Qatar, and elsewhere have given assistance directly to the TFG or individuals.77 In spite of efforts by the UN Office of the Resident Coordinator, there is no reliable database covering all development funds.78 Financial help from the Middle East, particularly Gulf states, is vital, but there needs to be more transparency to financial flows.

The International Contact Group has a key responsibility, but as a UK official noted, “It’s a great talking place; they talk a great deal, but it has no working parties to take it

72 The concept was first raised at the September 2011 IGAD and East African Community (EAC) heads of state summit, which called for a “Joint TFG-Donor Financial Management Board” for internal and external revenue, in essence joint-controlled management. “Joint Declaration”, Summit on the Horn of Africa Crisis, Nairobi, 8-9 September 2011. It has been further discussed at the International Contact Group meeting in Copenhagen, “Final Communiqué on Somalia”, 30 September 2011, and in the run-up to the London Conference; Crisis Group email communication, diplomat, 15 February 2012; Crisis Group interview, international financial management expert, Nairobi, 16 February 2012.

73 See Crisis Group Africa Report No. 87, Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, 8 December 2004. The goal was to prevent large-scale corruption in revenue-generating institutions, including the port. International experts were seconded in revenue and finance departments, as well as the port, to provide oversight and capacity development. A senior oversight body (Liberian and international) was supported by a technical committee. See also Crisis Group Report, The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, op. cit., pp. 15-16. Somewhat similarly, the International Civil Aviation Organisation controls Somali airspace, including collecting overflight fees, and, with input from Somali civil aviation ministers, invests the money in airport maintenance and air traffic control. Crisis Group interview, Somali aviation expert, Washington, D.C., 2 February 2012.

74 International organisations and donors should also be more transparent about distribution of development aid. This would help rationalise international aid and allow the national and subnational governments to allocate resources more efficiently.


76 Crisis Group interviews, senior diplomat, Mogadishu, 19 November 2011; Western diplomat, Nairobi, 25 January 2012.

77 Qatar has been a particularly active Arab partner of the TFG. Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, 2010-2012. There are reports Qatar may be moving towards direct negotiation with Al-Shabaab in the absence of any international framework. “Somalia/Britain: No great expectations”, op. cit. Iran is also interested in Somalia and is considering opening an embassy in the capital. “Salehi: Iran considers opening embassy in Somalia”, Islamic Republic News Agency, 23 August 2011.

78 Crisis Group interview, UN official, New York, 3 February 2012.
forward; we want to take it forward. It needs to strike a balance between being inclusive and giving meaningful direction. If no one wants to be the lead nation, members should identify who is willing to lead on specific issues, such as financial assets management, monitoring the Local Stability Fund, supporting a national political process and international cooperation.

Follow-up to the London Conference is essential; the international community should use the Istanbul Conference in June to take stock of progress and adjust if necessary.

B. THE UN AND AU

There is a serious disconnect between the UN, in particular the Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), and AMISOM. The AU wants to ensure it has significant influence on the political process, but the Security Council is unlikely to cede control of it. A mechanism or special process is needed to promote greater coordination.

Many critics consider UNPOS politically bankrupt and riddled with personal agendas. There is a grave lack of coordination between it and the UN Development Programme (UNDP), making collaboration very difficult. In the short term, UNPOS needs to develop more coherent policy, but it is a political office and in the long term a more robust peacebuilding mission should replace it. While the Al-Shabaab threat has galvanised local and international efforts and brought a degree of unity, the challenge is now to transform this into a unity of vision for Somalia’s future and to rebuild the state.

The UN should undertake a multi-sector assessment and planning mission to review existing arrangements and develop an integrated, multi-disciplinary peacebuilding mission (using UNPOS and elements of UNDP and other UN agencies) for recovered areas to complement AMISOM’s strengths and minimise overlapping responsibilities. The design of the UN’s future engagement should be determined by the situation, rather than copied from existing models.

At the least, UNPOS and the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which provides logistical help, should be merged to place UN support for the mission firmly under one political leader and facilitate cooperation with the AU. The UN should also consider transferring security sector development and reform to AMISOM, which already gives some training to the military and police and is well placed to coordinate their reform and related assistance. This would allow the UN to focus on the political process, reconciliation and rule of law.

Another option discussed is a hybrid AU-UN mission. However, the experience of the first hybrid mission (Darfur) indicates this would be difficult to supervise and manage. If it is created, the UN and AU must identify leaders who can work well together and have experience running large and complicated organisations.

As AMISOM grows, consistent funding will become even more important. If the Security Council authorises a higher force level, as is likely, it needs to also identify steady financial support, perhaps through assessed contributions, and provide the mission with equipment (such as helicopters), communications and logistical capabilities more commensurate with its responsibilities.

VII. CONCLUSION

Renewed international interest in Somalia has created a rare window of opportunity. The next six months will be crucial. If the international community can agree on but a few core policies, it can be an engine for peace, but if it cannot, Somali spoilers, who benefit from continued conflict and lawlessness, will exploit those divisions to maintain the status quo.

Al-Shabaab has been weakened but not eliminated. It can be weakened further, but unless the right political framework and incentives are created, the vacuum behind AMISOM’s front lines will be filled by the ineffective TFG and clan warlords it cannot control. It was this predatory environment that bred Islamic extremism and drove many to welcome the UIC and subsequently Al-Shabaab.

Al-Shabaab and its leaders are resilient and will seek to regain strength by exploiting popular discontent with the TFG, its lack of progress, corruption and unwillingness to genuinely reach out and reconcile with other groups and sub-national entities. The movement gained grudging acceptance from clans because it was less crooked and more effective at creating peace and stability than the TFG, even though its fundamentalist ideology was never popular.

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80 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Nairobi, 25 January 2012.
82 Crisis Group interview, UN official, New York, 3 February 2012.
83 The Security Council is expected to debate the issue in February 2012.
Unless a more appropriate political framework is developed for Somalia, Al-Shabaab or its successor will remain a regional and wider international concern for many years to come.

Nairobi/Brussels, 22 February 2012
APPENDIX B

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 130 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former U.S. Undersecretary of State and Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.

Crisis Group’s international headquarters is in Brussels, with major advocacy offices in Washington, D.C. (where it is based as a legal entity), New York and a smaller one in London, as well as liaison presences in Moscow and Beijing. The organisation currently has field offices or analysts based in 27 locations: Abuja, Bangkok, Beirut, Bishkek, Bogotá, Bujumbura, Cairo, Dakar, Damascus, Gaza, Jerusalem, Kabul, Kathmandu, Islamabad, Istanbul, Jakarta, Johannesburg, Nairobi, Port-au-Prince, Pristina, Rabat, Sanaa, Sarajevo, Seoul, Tbilisi, Tripoli, and Tunis. Crisis Group currently covers some 70 areas of actual or potential conflict across four continents. In Africa, this includes, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Afghanistan, Burma/Myanmar, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Strait, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in Europe, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, North Caucasus, Serbia and Turkey; in the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Gulf States, Iran, Iraq, Israel-Palestine, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen; and in Latin America and the Caribbean, Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti and Venezuela.


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