KDF Can Only Leave When Somalia Is Stable

Saturday January 23, 2016

Heavy price: KDF soldiers at the Wilson Airport on Monday carry the casket of a comrade serving in the Amisom in Somalia who was killed during the El Adde attack last Friday

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When Kenyan forces went into Somalia on October 16, 2011, it was under the military doctrine of ‘hot pursuit’ of al Shabaab terrorists who were disrupting the tourism industry by kidnapping tourists at the Coast.

Their economic mainstay – piracy in the Indian Ocean – had been disrupted by international coalition forces. The terror group then re-located to Somalia to exploit the lack of a government and built a network that terrorised the population in a vain attempt to create an Islamic state.

The incursion into Somalia was not an invasion. Two objectives to be prosecuted simultaneously were one; to pursue the enemy far from our borders as possible, wipe out its military capability and compatibility by destroying the illegal trade in charcoal and sugar, and local networks in occupied territory and population. Kenya’s intention was not to be an occupation force. It, however, remains hazy whether we had an exit strategy should this initial objective have been achieved.

It may therefore be for lack of an exit strategy that we were happy to remain in Somalia to execute a second objective borne out of the first but fostered on us by regional and international partners. Of course, no one can deny that the second objective of ensuring a working government in Somalia was not going to serve our national interests of warding off terrorists from our territory.

A stable working government in Somalia would take control of security and stave off the insurgents. Hence, in 2012, Kenya embarked on an odious process of helping the people of Somalia establish a government out of the fractious civil wars since the deposed Siad Barre regime in 1991. The second objective, which would anchor the first, thus became political.

But had we accomplished the task we set out in 2011 of neutralising al Shabaab? No. The combination of terrorists mutating into a rag-tag army deploying guerrilla tactics to augment their hold on Somalia, make deadly raids into Kenya and slowing efforts to form a transitional government combined to extend our stay. Al Shabaab mutated into a terror army at home, even as refugees streaming into Kenya postponed and made an early exit an act in defeat.

To make our stay comfortable from the earlier unilateral incursion, the UN, through the African Union, sanctioned the creation of Amisom under which Kenya forces would operate and be funded. Our stay then took longer to take care of newer developments on the military and political fronts.

Suffice it to say that Amisom has been fraught with underfunding and lukewarm cooperation from regional and international interests. This has been the greatest impediment to withdrawing our troops.

The truth, supported by authoritative expert reports, suggests that the political objective has been an abject failure. The international community has kept off the ball on the political front, even as it has underestimated the military threat of the terrorists.

With the latest attack on our troops in Somalia, the question is to quit in ignominy or not? I will not address the allegations of our forces making charcoal and sugar smuggling pacts with the enemy because I do not have the facts. But can the UN, which supervises Amisom, be lying?

The government must get to the bottom of it. That is sabotage and treason if it is indeed happening. However, to quit or not to should be determined by whether the twin military and political objectives have been achieved or not, and what that means for our security.

Kenya continues to shoulder the burden of Somalia, with dire consequences to the economy and social stability. The short of it is that foreign powers have never policed a country forever. As long as instability reigns in Somalia, our military objective will continue to dither and our stay prolonged.

Kenya should leverage on the international terrorism threat. It should embark on an aggressive diplomacy that should see Somalia under a working and stable government. This will relieve us the burden of direct military engagement with our neighbour.

We must tell it to our regional and international partners that experiments with what ought to work in Somalia must be abandoned in favour of what should work. Our partners must get out of their faraway comfort zones of supporting us with cosmetic hardware, relief and theories and soil their hands in rebuilding the state of Somalia.

The first order of business must be to dismantle local, regional and international cartels that see a dismembered Somalia, just like the terrorists, as a business opportunity rather than a burden to Kenya.

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