Strategy Page
Tuesday, November 26, 2013
Al Shabaab is still active,
having largely settled an internal power struggle and found new sources
of income by more aggressive use of extortion. This is done via
widespread use of terror out in the countryside.
Anyone with money
(businesses and large farming operations) are expected to pay or face
attack (beatings, death or taking family members as hostages).
The loss
of Kismayo last year was a major blow to al Shabaab finances because
that port could be used to smuggle illegal goods (especially ivory) out
of the country. Al Shabaab also collected fees on anything leaving or
entering via Kismayo.
Now al Shabaab has limited, and irregular, access
to smaller ports on the coast. The sudden loss of income from Kismayo
led to many desertions and the inability to make attacks. But not all of
the Islamic terrorists were gone and the hard core fought each other in
June and July to decide who would control the organization and what the
post-collapse strategy would be. Young men were still willing to join
for religious, nationalist or financial reasons.
Living off extortion
and other criminal enterprises has always been popular in Somalia where
warlords who could cobble together and maintain a private army were
respected. The difference this time is that al Shabaab considers itself
part of an international Islamic terrorist movement (al Qaeda) and
welcomes foreign recruits. Generally, foreigners are not popular in
Somali culture and are looked on as source profit not a welcome guest.
These Islamic terrorist foreigners are often used for suicide attacks
because they are more fanatic and not experienced fighters (and can’t
speak the local languages). These foreigners boost morale among the
Somali members because it indicates international support for their
cause.
On the down side the terror attacks kill more civilians than
peacekeepers, police or local soldiers and makes the Islamic terrorists
unpopular with most Somalis. That is not a concern with al Shabaab right
now as they would rather be feared than loved. This is especially true
within the organization, where there are still many Somali men who
consider themselves al Shabaab but disagree with the current leadership.
Paranoia and ready recourse to violence still defines the organization,
which now considers itself part of an international movement.
This year Kenyan police have arrested 10-20 (or more) young
men at the Somali border each month because the non-Somali travelers
were suspected of heading north to join al Shabaab. Background checks
often proved this to be the case and the men are deported. Most of those
stopped at the border are from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.
Al Shabaab continues to try and impose lifestyle restrictions,
even though they do not have day-to-day control in many areas. The
latest annoying edict is to ban smart phones. That’s because you can use
these devices to get on the Internet and find porn. According to al
Shabaab this means any picture (especially videos) of a woman showing
skin. Not all, just a lot of more than al Shabaab allows on the street.
Previous attempts to ban cell phones in general failed, because these
devices are too popular but al Shabaab persists, if only because many
Somalis will use their cell phones to let the security forces know what
the Islamic terrorists are up so.
Kenya wants over 500,000 Somali refugees in the Dadaab refugee
camp to go home as soon as possible, The UN, which runs the camp, says
this could take up to ten years. Kenya is now talking about ignoring the
UN and speeding up the repatriation process a lot. The Dadaad
population is a source of crime and economic disruption in northern
Kenya. Islamic terrorists are known to live there and were often
recruited there to begin with. Kenya already plans to force foreign aid
agencies to move to Somalia, believing the refugees would be inclined to
follow. About 50,000 Somali refugees have left Dadaab and gone back to
Somalia this year, but even more have arrived at Dadaab from Somalia.
There are over 500,000 additional Somalis in Kenya illegally, often
using false documents. These will be harder to find and sent back to
Somalia.
Kenyan police have identified the four Somali men for helping
plan and carry out the Westgate Mall attack in September. All four of
the attackers died, but police have uncovered a network of Somalis and
non-Somalis in Kenya who aided the attackers and traced the movements of
the four men in the months prior to the attack. The four crossed into
Kenya in June and went to live in a Somali neighborhood in Nairobi.
There they made their final preparations, including many visits to the
mall to familiarize themselves with the place. The four days of shooting
and explosions inside the mall were largely the result of incompetent
leadership from the security forces. At least 67 people died in the mall
and 27 remain unaccounted for.
November 21, 2013: In the central Somali town of Beledweyne
police arrested over 200 people in the wake of an al Shabaab attack on
the 19th.
November 19, 2013: In Beledweyne al Shabaab attacked a police
station killing four policemen and ten civilians. At least ten of the
attackers were also killed or wounded.
November 17, 2013: In the southeast (lower Shabelle region)
local clan militia fought with government forces leaving 15 dead and two
dozen wounded. Many clans are hostile to any sort of central
government.
November 15, 2013: The UN has authorized a temporary increase
in the peacekeeper force to 22,000 troops (from the current 18,000).
This would allow a more intense and persistent effort against al
Shabaab. The belief is that if enough damage can be done to the Islamic
terrorist organization, Somali security forces and local clan militias
can deal with the al Shabaab remnants long term.
November 10, 2013: Kenya and Somalis signed an agreement
whereby Somalia agreed to take back over a million ethnic Somalis in
Kenya over the next three years. In return Kenya agreed not to forcibly
expel Somalis during that time as long as Somalia accepts the returnees.
In the southeast (lower Shabelle region) two al Shabaab factions fought, leaving at least ten of the Islamic terrorists dead.
November 8, 2013: In Mogadishu a suicide car bomber attacked a hotel, leaving five dead and 15 wounded.
In the north (Puntland) some twenty al Shabaab men attacked a
prison to free some fellow Islamic terrorists. While three prison guard
and an undetermined number of attackers were killed, the breakout
attempt failed.