Somali Civil Society Organizations (SCSO)
Tuesday, September 13, 2011
“The Missing Voice”
As a follow up to the recently concluded Somali consultative meeting held in Mogadishu on
September 4-6, 2011 organized by the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS),
members of the Somali civil society organizations held a follow up consultative meeting of their
own on the 7-8th of September in Mogadishu reviewing and providing input on the outcome of
the UN organized consultative meeting.
After careful review and reflection on their shared
perspectives on peace and stability in Somalia, Somali civil society organizations present agreed
the points listed below. These position statements should not be seen as an outright rejection
of the outcome of the UN organized Mogadishu consultative meeting, but a legitimate input of
a missing voice, a desire to enhance the national framework for peace and reconciliation and
the development of a workable and realistic program to end the transition.
We Welcome
1. The courageous decision to hold the national consultative meeting in the nation’s capital,
Mogadishu;
2. The collective and unanimous decision by the participants of the consultative meeting to
conclude the transition period by August 2012 without further extensions.
The Selection Process
3. For the past two decades, the Somali civil society played a leading role in the pacification of
conflict, provision of sorely needed humanitarian services and the quest for durable peace
throughout the country. As such, we are disheartened by the decision to sideline the genuine
role of the Somali civil society out of the consultative meeting and the deliberate attempt to
silence their legitimate voice.
4. Successful implementation of the outcome of the consultative meeting requires a buy-in not
only from civil society organizations, but the Somali society at large including the Diaspora. The
absence of a credible voice of civil society organizations from the consultative meeting and
their legitimate input in the national roadmap will make the implementation process that much
difficult.
The Process
5. It is our assertion that a meaningful, legitimate, and honest dialogue necessary to achieve a
lasting resolution to the longstanding Somali conflict did not take place in Mogadishu during the
three day meeting on the four major critical areas that form the basis for ending the transition
and establishing a permanent state for Somalia. These are: a) security; b) completion of the
draft constitution; c) national reconciliation; and d) good governance. We were astonished to
find out that a consultative meeting that was to discuss, digest and decide on contested critical
national issues was concluded in the span of few hours during the second day of the meeting.
We remain concerned that the outcome of the consultative meeting may not garner the
necessary public support needed for implementation; and thus may not reflect the true spirit of
peace and reconciliation of the Somali people.
6. Committee documents and reports for discussion and dialogue were tabled for discussion at a
later date without disseminating it to the public. This action creates doubt in the minds of the
Somali people whose buy in and support is critical and indispensable.
Themes and Priority Tasks to End the Transition
7. We believe that a golden opportunity has been lost to seriously and substantively discuss
critical national issues that are key to realistically ending the transition by August 2012
including the following:
a) Tangible parliamentary reform strategies, concrete procedures, assignments of
responsible entities to select members of the new parliament and the setting of
explicit timeline for achieving a more manageable and responsive parliament.
The consultative conference in our view concluded its proceedings without
critically outlining and removing crucial stumbling blocks necessary to end the
transition;
b) Strategies to efficiently conclude the current administration by August 2012 and
the subsequent process to elect or select its successor;
c) A plan to expand peace and reconciliation throughout the country which will
enable the Somali people to come closer together;
d) A careful review and consideration on the numerous commentary and feedback
to improve and finalize the draft constitution so as to produce a permanent
national constitution that embodies the needs and desires of the Somali people.
e) A genuine consultation on strategies to restore peace and security in the areas
controlled by the government and other mechanisms to secure public
participation;
f) A plan to reconstitute and improve the quality of public institutions so as to
insure genuine structural changes in the institutions of government;
g) A plan to expand, empower and reconstitute the political infrastructure of
regional and local government administrations;
Public Engagement
8. Both the agenda of the consultative meeting and the roadmap were not widely disseminated
and explained to the Somali public to ensure their support and buy in. The conference planning
process was limited to politically active individuals and groups. With the hasty planning and
rapid execution of the conference, we are afraid that the only achievement to speak of was the
fulfillment of both the Kampala Accord and the UN Security Council’s stated desire in its Nairobi
meeting to hold a consultative meeting in Mogadishu.
Implementation Mechanism and Unrealistic Benchmarks
9. With little deliberations on the substantive critical national issues by the conferees, we believe
that the roadmap and the associated benchmarks required of the Transitional Federal
Institutions by August 2012 are at best unrealistic. It is highly unlikely in our estimation that the
TFI’s will a) exercise the necessary political capital and show capacity to implement the
benchmarks in a timely fashion and b) the overpowering effects of the famine engulfing the
region and security crisis may become a new excuse to delay implementation process further.
10. The ultimate responsibility for failure to deliver the benchmarks in a timely fashion rests on
the shoulders of the monitoring entities stipulated in the Kampala Accord. We remind the
participants of the Mogadishu consultative meeting that the Somali people will hold them
individually and collectively accountable for the failure to implement Roadmap.
11. The communiqué from the Mogadishu consultative meeting clearly indicates that the Somali
Government will guide the implementation process of the Roadmap. Even though we support
the Transitional Federal Government, we believe that it is ill-equipped to singlehandedly guide
itself in the implementation process of the Roadmap. We do not unfortunately see signs of
willingness and partnership for peace and reconciliation at the highest offices of the nation. We 4
strongly encourage the participation of the Somali people in the implementation process of the
Roadmap.
Marginalization and Absence of Women Groups
12. As stated above, Somali women groups who are the backbone of the Somali civil society and
the quest for peace and national reconciliation in Somalia were noticeably absent from this
important meeting. It appears once again, that Somali women groups have been shut out of the
peace process and effectively marginalized.
Somali Ownership
13. Even though representatives of the Transitional Federal Institution (TFIs), regional governments
and political entities were included in the planning process of the consultative meeting,
however the Roadmap was drafted and presented by UNPOS staff without the genuine input of
the Somali people, especially the Somali Parliament. Without such critical indigenous input, we
believe the process and the product both lack ownership of the Somali people.
14. There were no official public deliberations in both the Somali parliament and the cabinet on the
merits of the roadmap and the likelihood of its implementation in a timely manner. This will in
all likelihood make it difficult for a public buy in and support.
Monitoring and Compliance
15. Contrary to the organizer’s view stipulated in the communiqué, we believe that the Roadmap
agreed in the Mogadishu consultative meeting does not correspond but rather contradict the
core principles of the Kampala agreement.
16. In a direct contradiction to the Kampala Accord, there is no monitoring role in the Mogadishu
Roadmap for the heads of the East Africa Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental
Authority for Development (IGD) as clearly stated in point number 4 (n) and (o) of the Kampala
Accord.
17. It is worrisome to point out that there is no clearly stated plan or a regional/international or
Somali body assuming full responsibility of the monitoring process of the Mogadishu Roadmap.
This may potentially lead to inaction from those who see benefit in extending the transition
period.
18. Unless these fundamental gaps in the Mogadishu Roadmap are addressed, we are concerned
about the potential failure of what otherwise could have sealed a lasting deal in the
longstanding Somali conflict.
The Role of the Somali Parliament
19. Meeting preparations, planning and the development of the Mogadishu Roadmap were
completed largely without a meaningful input from the Somali Parliament. Few self appointed
parliamentarians representing special interest groups participated the planning process in the
name of the parliament, however the spirit of the Parliament in its totality was mostly absent
from the deliberations. This action alone may lead to a new squabble inside the Parliament if
and when the Roadmap is brought before Parliament for consideration and endorsement.
Accountability and Transparency
20. We remain concerned that the eight member technical committee charged with the
responsibility of securing coordination between the parties to the Roadmap does not have the
full powers or the backing of strong governmental/non-governmental entities to ensure
accountability and transparency requirements for full implementation.
It appears that had the UN sponsored consultative meeting been more inclusive with
opportunities for substantive deliberations and genuine dialogue, the roadmap would have
been achievable and could have garnered the support of the Somali people.
We are discouraged by the absence of a genuine desire on the part of the UN organizers and
the international community to learn from twenty years of failed Somali national reconciliation
conferences.
Recommendations
a) In order to secure the buy in and full ownership of the Roadmap by the Somali people, a
translated version of the Roadmap in Somali should be widely circulated allowing meaningful
dialogue leading to its improvement and public acceptance.
b) Timelines and deliverable should be reasonably aligned. The Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) of Somalia does not seem to have the wherewithal and technical capacity to implement
the Roadmap singlehandedly by August 2012. We believe that this is an unreasonable
expectation that does not in our view guarantee success.
c) The process for ending the transition needs to be clarified, clearly delineated and timed so as
to ensure smooth transition to permanent statehood.
d) The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia cannot be expected to assume full
responsibility of its own replacement process. This is asking the TFG to be the judge, jury and
executioner of its own case!
e) To insure full implementation of the Roadmap and secure public support and buy in, civil
society organizations, Somali Diaspora and women groups should be incorporated into the
technical committees of the implementation process.
f) Ongoing updates and reports on the progress made and challenges faced in the
implementation process should be issued and disseminated publicly.
g) The Somali civil society plans to issue its own independent reports to highlight progress made
on the roadmap and inform the Somali public on potential political roadblocks in the short and
long terms.
h) The international community and funding agencies and organizations should link their support
with significant and tangible progress made on the Roadmap by all of the signatories to the
agreement.
The following Somali civil society organizations cooperated on the release of this statement:
Civil Society Forum (MADASHA) representing six organizations/umbrellas/movements, including
the Somali Women’s Agenda (SWA); Civil Society in Action; Peace and Human Rights Network
(PHRN); Center for Research and Dialogue- Somalia (CRD); Coalition of Grassroots Women
Organizations (COGWO); SONFEX and SOSCESNA, a non-state actors organization in Central and
Southern Somalia