By Ahmed I. Hassan
Sunday, March 04, 2012
Introduction
A Few years ago, I authored an article titled “The Clannish Wailers”. In it, I pointed out to a group of diehard Somaliland bashers and commented on the perverted rationales they employed for their bashing.
|The wailing never stopped. That is not surprising. Always at loss of ways of doing any tangible harm to Somaliland, the wailing is pretty much the only thing they can do.
However, as time went by and Somaliland went from strength to strength, the Wailers were driven to being nothing less than hilariously hysterical. Hardly a day goes by without one or another of the Wailers taking to the pages of the websites with a piece of nearly blind anti-Somaliland and tribal hatred masquerading as intellectual dispensations on, or chronicles of, events taking place in Somaliland.
The Clannish Wailers are too numerous to list them here all. But expect on almost daily basis a one Osman Hassan, a one Ali A. Fatah, a one M. F. Yabarag, a one Ali H. Abdulla, a one Aman H. D. Obsiye, a one Sadia A. Aden, a one Mohamed Awale, a one Mahado Sh. Dahir, a one Ahmed H. Abdi, a one Safi Abdi, a one Faisal Roble or someone posing as the spokesperson for some dubious organizations with names like NSPU and SSC appearing in the byline of some venom—though promoted as a serious op-ed—in major Somali Websites. An obvious fact is that, though all these gentlemen and ladies might swear and plead denial, they are all members of the Wailers‟ Club. Another fact, however, is less susceptible to straight-faced denials. Reading an article written by one of them is as good as having read an article by any other. The subject matter, line of argument, premise, style, substance, theme, tone etc. of one scribe are strikingly similar to those of any other. It would be hard to escape the perceptive reader that the Wailers are on a concerted and well-coordinated mission of spurting defamation, disinformation, envy and deep-rooted enmity all targeted at Somaliland in general and at one of its tribes in particular.
Inconsequential Contradictions
The Wailers‟ arguments against Somaliland have all the while been presented along clannish lines. They have acquired and perfected a self-defeating habit of labeling Somaliland with all sorts of tribal tribulations. They are fond of asserting, with unabated zest, that one-tribal chauvinism is the very foundation of Somaliland‟s existence. Somaliland, they would have us believe, is “a one-tribe secessionist entity”. That tribe is the source and perpetrators of all the troubles that are bedeviling Somalis everywhere. That tribe hates all other Somali tribes wherever they live in. That tribe is a Somalisdiid, i.e. rejectionists of Somali nationhood. All other tribes in Somaliland are under the yoke of armed subjugation and oppression at the hands of that damnable tribe. The Wailers‟ litany of tirades is endless.
With the same persistent doggedness, strangely enough, the Wailers are not beneath employing clannish antidotes in frustrating Somaliland‟s alleged tribal underpinnings. Some incite various clans of Somaliland‟s Sool, Eastern Sanag and what-they-so-call Ayn regions to reject and rebel against the country‟s resurrected
independence solely on clannish grounds. They claim that these clans and any territory in which they may reside should be part of Puntland on the strength of their tribal affiliation with the denizens of Majertenia.
Never mind that if there ever were a truly, purely and chauvinistically clannish Somali enclave, it is Puntland.i
ii Would Puntland ever have a president who is not from the Majerten clan as Somaliland have had a President who did not hail from the Isaac? I would say never. But if you are a brave and risk-taking bettor and believe that it would, I‟m willing to be the other party. And you can dictate the betting amount and other terms.
However, as good-hearted consideration, I have a word of caution for you. My confidence in taking such a potential bet is rooted in precedents on both sides of the coin.
When Abdillahi Yusuf, a Majerten and a kind of warlord capo del capo tutti, was recruited by foreigners as Somalia‟s president-puppet, he had to vacate the Puntland presidency that he had grabbed and held at the time. His vice-president was a fellow Harti clansman but not a Majerten. He was a Dulbahante. Alas, the Dulbahante-man was robbed soon enough of the opportunity to feel either the comforts or the burdens of the presidential seat. Of course, he had to unceremoniously make way for another Marjerten-president. So much for tribal chauvinism.
Compare that with when Somaliland‟s late President M. I. Egal, an Isaac—the chauvinistic and domineering tribe of Somaliland, if the Wailers are to be believed—died. The Vice President was not a fellow Isaac. He was from the Samaron tribe. Without fear, opposition or hesitation—in fact much to Isaac‟s gratitude and blessings—he assumed the Presidency as the country‟s constitution obligated. This honorable man, Dahir Riyale, went on to win the Presidency in his right in a multiparty election later. His honor is now reinforced and cast in granite when he conceded defeat and handed over power in a willing, peaceful and constitutional manner after a subsequent Presidential election.
The Wailers, as a matter of course, either do not mention this glorious juncture of Somaliland‟s recent history or, if and when they do, they belittle it.
ii The „s‟ that is denoting the plural is an indication of the number of times these governments that have been installed in Villa Somalia in Mogadishu by foreigners. They never served Somalis well. It is debatable that they served their creators well either. Or if they did, it is only for the short term. Time will tell. And time is ticking faster than most think it is.
iii The 4.5 tribal power sharing system was forwarded as a mechanism to ensure broad inclusiveness in governmental affairs by all Somali tribes. I have no issue with that laudable objective. However the 4.5 tribal classification is a figment of imagination as much as it is an exercise in disingenuousness. It dreamed up by Ismail Omar Gelle, of Djibouti, Abdillahi Yusuf, of Puntland and other Somaliland haters. Its whole purpose was to politically disenfranchise the Isaac in a potential resurrection of the erstwhile Union of the Somali Republic.
If there is a Dir tribe, the Isaacs are not part of it. The Dir scheme was hatched so that in a potential Somalia that would include Somaliland, the Isaac, the Samaron and the Isa of the North as well other tribes in the South will be deficiently represented in
Others of the Wailers egg certain tribes of Somaliland—or themselves have been active in efforts—to establish their own purely clannish nay, sub-clannish mini-states within Somaliland proper.
When the Wailers, in an occasionally feeble and unconvincing effort, make attempts to present themselves as pan-nationalist Somali patriots, it is the numerically growing and utterly comical TNGs (Transitional National Governments) later renamed the TFGs (Transitional Federal Governments) that they promote as the legitimate governments that should lord over all Somalis.ii Never mind that the TNGs/TFGs were and still are being instituted on basis of the notoriously shameful 4.5 tribal power-sharing mechanism.iii No need to mention that the TNGs/TFGs were and still are always being constituted on foreign soils and by foreigners. No big deal that the TNGs/TFGs have from their advent and up to now been on foreigners‟ lifeline. No matter that the TNGs/TFGs are always imposed on the Somalis. And of no consequence is Somalis‟ opinion on the TNGs/TFGs‟ legitimacy or on whether the TNGs/TFGs enjoyed the consent of the supposedly governed i.e. the Somalis.
government in disproportion of their actual numbers. As a matter of fact, Abdillahi Yusuf is habitually fond to brag, that one of the major achievements of his political career is the eradication of the name „Issac‟ from the Somali political and social lexicons.
iv Just as Somaliland and Somalia did in 1960 in creating the Union, any of the three missing Somali territories, in the event of gaining freedom, no matter how, was assumed to embrace the Union and become a part of it automatically and unquestionably. Djibouti happened to be the first and so far the only of the three to which such an opportunity passed its way when it attained its independence from France in mid 1977. To the chagrin of a great many Somalis however, Djibouti chose to have nothing with the Union and opted to be a separate and a fully sovereign country. That decision constituted as the first devastating blow to the concept Pan-Somalism.
Nonetheless, with the wisdom of hindsight and in all fairness to Djiboutians, it is hard to find fault with the Djiboutians for having taken that separate route. Having been keen and perceptive observers of how things were unfolding in the Union—in practice as opposed to the expectations of all Somalis within the Union and without alike—since its inception, that course of action must have been the only sensible option at their disposal. No doubt in so doing, they have spared themselves a great deal of trouble. Looks like congratulations are in order
If there are glaringly unmistakable contradictions in subscribing to these blatantly inconsistent views, the Wailers are strangely oblivious to them. Or perhaps, after all, they are not. I suspect that they consciously and intentionally choose to ignore these illogicalities. They are on a single-minded vendetta mission and in accomplishing this all important task, the Wailers would not, with all due respect, allow contradictions, incompatibilities, inconsistencies, incongruities, distortions, discrepancies and weirdness to be on the way. One way or another, the end result is only a source of ridicule that is amusing as much as it is amazing.
Crossing Fine Lines
M
oreover, the Wailers have abandoned any resemblance of decency and objectivity in presenting their harangues against Somaliland and the “secessionist tribe”—though decency and objectivity were in short supply with them to start with. There was never any doubt on which “tribe” they had in mind. But, throwing all decorum and civility to the wind, they not only openly name Isaac as the culprit tribe, but also the crimes the Isaac is guilty of are growing by leaps and bounds. No sin, no offense, no atrocity, is far-fetched or ridiculous enough for the Wailers to accuse the Isaac to have committed and still perpetuating.
Somaliland is home to my many tribes. All tribes in the country must have equal rights as well as equal duties and responsibilities. I want my Somaliland to be a country of laws and institutions instead of a country of personalities or of one tribe or another. It is the only way Somaliland can be a truly viable country.
Like every patriot, I consider it an integral responsibility on my part to promote popular justice, equality and inclusiveness in my country. If my country goes wrong in any way, I would rather be the first person to point it out and strenuously strive to rectify such wrong. By the same token and with equally zealous determination, I would be in the forefront in resisting and making every effort to defeat any attempt of maligning—or of physically visiting harm on—my country.
We Somalis are a tribal people whether we like it or not. It would be a blissful day when a Somali would not, under any circumstance, identify him/herself—and is dealt with by fellow Somalis not—on basis of the tribe he/she belongs to, but on the content of his/her character and ability. Until such a time comes, it would suffice if, for one, tribal affiliation would be only a means of knowing who others are i.e. a means of knowing others more intimately, but not a means of harboring ill-will or malice towards them.
This is, in the least, what our Religion, Islam, preaches to its faithful. In other words, tribal membership is acceptable, but tribalism, that is inter-tribal hatred or conflict, is ruinous and therefore should be avoided as much as possible.
In the Somali nomadic traditions, it is normal, natural and understandable for tribes to have rivalries of some sort or another. In extreme cases, such rivalries can lead to intertribal skirmishes over water sources and pastures or to raids to dispossess camels from a rival tribe. However, there used to be civilized, through unwritten, rules of engagement that governed tribal contentions. Blind hatred or prolonged attrition or suchlike between tribes was never part of these rules because such behavior was deemed distinctly un-Somali.
I am afraid the Wailers in their dogmatic Isaac-bashing diatribes have crossed the fine and solemn lines of the said rules of engagement.
Neither I nor, to the best of my knowledge, any other Somalilander have until now made any attempt to rebut the Wailers along the lines of the same blunt tribal context that they are so fond of presenting their arguments. By instinct, using tribal names publicly in debate has always been repulsive to me. Perhaps other Somalilanders, who are equally offended by the Wailers‟ rants, harbor the same abhorrence towards tribe name-calling. Perhaps, this self-imposed restraint has robbed the Isaac of legitimate defense. And perhaps, this docility has encouraged the Wailers to persist in—and intensify—their invectives against the Isaac.
Thus, characteristically, I will attempt hereunder to set the record straight. Untypically this time, however, I intend to mention the names of tribes where I find it pertinent to do so. No offense or malice is meant. If offense is taken, all I can say is sorry. It is only the necessity of calling a spade a spade, which the Wailers made incumbent on me that have forced my hand.
Myths and Facts
L
et me start by pointing out to some of the myths that the Wailers routinely present as facts and then state the real facts:
A Wailers-Propagated Myth: The Isaac is a Somalidiid, i.e. rejectionists of Somali nationhood
The Fact: Wrong. The Isaac has always been at the forefront in the quest for a Somali nation that encompassed all the territories inhabited by the Somalis, the concept known as Pan-Somalism.
In June 26, 1960, Somaliland became independent from Britain. Five days later, Somaliland, under a leadership whose top members were Isaacs, sacrificed that independence and without conditions or reservations delivered it to Mogadishu on a silver platter. This was the act that created the Union of the erstwhile Somali Republic.
Granted, the other tribes of Somaliland espoused similar Pan-Somalism aspirations. However, no one can deny that without the wholehearted wish, consent and enthusiastic efforts of the Isaac, the union with the South could not have taken place.
T
oday the concept of Pan-Somalism, which seemed so achievable in 1960 and in subsequent years, is alive only in the daydreams of the delusional of mind. The first blow to that idea was served by Djiboutiiv when, on gaining independence from France in 1977, it opted for stand-alone nationhood rather than merge with the erstwhile Somali Republic. It is unlikely that Djibouti will change its status now or in the future if it did not in 1977, when the Pan-Somalism fervency still had some steam left.
B
ut the three most fatal setbacks to the concept resulted from inexcusable treasons on Siad Barre Regime‟s part. The first was that regime‟s pact with Kenya in early 1977.
In late 1976-early 1977, Siad Barre had been putting the finishing touches on the war and battle plans of his intended invasion of Ethiopia on the pretext of wresting the Somali inhabited territories from that country. In his scheme of things, he saw one issue as a major hurdle or as a potential complication. Thus he determined to neutralize it.
In the prelude to his imminent war on Ethiopia, the Siad Barre regime concluded an agreement with the government of Kenya in which the Somali Republic for the first time in its history officially relinquished its claims on a missing Somali inhabited region i.e. the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya.
Kenya and Ethiopia had, years earlier concluded a treaty which obligated both countries to come to the aid of each other should Somalia attacked either of them. By mid-1970s, however, Kenya, traditionally the staunchest Western ally in East Africa was becoming increasingly leery about Ethiopia‟s newly found passion with communism. For his part, Siad Barre in about that same time was also changing his ideological colors to hues more amenable to the West especially when he realized that his hitherto patron, the Soviet Union, had placed its sponsorship preferences on the bigger and more populous Ethiopia rather than on Somalia.
Now, he thought, Kenya would be willing to see Somalia as a kindred nation, ideologically, that is—replacing Ethiopia, which had gone haywire. With his decision to invade Ethiopia in the bag, Siad‟s purpose for concluding this lopsided agreement with Kenya was to neutralize the said Ethiopia-Kenyan common defense pact and forestall potential Kenyan support for Ethiopia when his army actually crossed into Ethiopia.
As history would have it and like his decision to invade Ethiopia in the first place, Siad‟s typically amateurish Kenyan strategy turned out to be yet another of his characteristically colossal miscalculations. Kenya, while keeping all the benefits it had derived from the agreement with Somalia, promptly and in no uncertain terms condemned the Somali invasion of Ethiopia and, contrary to Siad‟s silly expectations, rendered Ethiopia both moral and material assistance.
Siad Barre committed the second of his great betrayals in 1988. His regime had been battling the Somali National Movement (the SNM) insurgency in Somalia‟s northern regions for nearly a decade. Lately, the despot‟s forces had been getting the sharper end of that conflict. To complicate matters further, other anti-regime rebellions had been coming into steam in other regions of the country.
By this time, the regime had felt so threatened that its only concern became its own preservation. Aware of the utter failure of its hitherto applied countermeasures, it realized that as long as SNM insurgents were enjoying sanctuaries in Ethiopia, it was impossible to defeat or contain them. Throwing to the wind all pretenses of national interests and principles in an effort to entice that country to evict the SNM their behind-the-border bases, the regime made Ethiopia an offer it could not refuse.
Somalia would forfeit all territorial claims on Ethiopia and would officially recognize the inviolability of the hitherto disputed borders between the two countries. As a sweetener, Somalia would also expel all anti-Ethiopian rebels that had been operating from within its country and would deny them any further sanctuaries or assistance.
In return, Ethiopia should oust the SNM and all other opponents, whether armed or unarmed, of the Somali regime from its territories and cease all assistance, in any form or shape, which it had been conferring to them.
The regime already had under their belt a rewardingly (for the regime) operative and reciprocal no-opponent-in-either-country pact with Djibouti. (Under that pact, Djibouti had been regularly handing over to the Somali regime scores of suspected SNM supporters at the border—international human rights laws be damned; simply thereafter, the procedure was nearly always summary executions of the deportees within a few hundred meters away from the border crossing.) Now, if cemented and rounded with this far more comprehensive and foolproof treaty with Ethiopia, Siad Barre confidently calculated, it would mean the inescapably certain annihilation of not only the stubborn SNM insurgency in particular, but also the final solution of what he had perceived as the Northerners‟ inherent irritations and threats to his regime in general.
Such an agreement with Ethiopia, went on Siad Barre‟s reasoning, would flush out the SNM combat troops out of their Ethiopian hideouts and into the open. With their superior firepower and resources—in fact the resources of an entire country arrayed against an essentially ragtag, though motivated, rebels—all that the regime‟s army had to do was finishing off defenseless sitting ducks. The regime only had to pull the noose, which it had ingeniously custom made for SNM‟s exposed neck.
All that remained for Siad Barre was to sign the dotted line with his Ethiopian counterpart, Mengistu Haile Mariam and how eager was the Somali dictator to do exactly that without wasting another moment or allowing trivial matters like national interests, principles, honor or simple human decency or suchlike to be on the way.
The Ethiopians could not believe their stroke of luck. To them, Siad Barre‟s proposal amounted to all their wishes and dreams served to them on a silver platter. They had everything to gain and nothing to lose by agreeing to the Somali dictator‟s offer without delay. Why would they care if the deal would essentially mean the near certain slaughter of the Somali rebels both governments had been hosting—i.e. the SNM in Ethiopia and the anti-Ethiopian WSLF Somali rebels in Somalia? The slaughtering would befall on Somalis alone and no harm would come to a single Ethiopian. And would such a treaty not be the merciful end, at long last, of the sharp and painful Somali thorn that had been pricking their sides for so long.
Of course, Ethiopia readily accepted the offer. Subsequently, much to both dictators‟ unimaginable jubilation and somewhat relief a formal treaty was duly signed and sealed by Siad Barre and Mengistu Haile Mariam in Djibouti in June 1988. Furthermore, both countries started immediately to implement the terms of the agreement in both spirit and letter.
Now, so confident the was Siad Barre of the validity and ingeniousness of his final solution, that he felt no need to offer amnesty to the SNM and other opponents or consider other ways to promote reconciliation with them. To him, the safest SNM insurgent or, for that matter, any opponent was simply a dead one.
It was on account of this agreement‟s enforcement that the SNM was forced to abandon its bases in Ethiopia. For them, surrender to the regime was not an option as a matter of principle as well as for practical reason, the absence or availability of amnesty notwithstanding. Nor did the SNM, to the regime‟s dismay, become sitting ducks as it had expected. In fact, if nothing else, the freedom fighters‟ expulsion from their sanctuaries in Ethiopia rather hastened the demise of Siad Barre‟s regime. In less than two and half years, he was no more.
Sadly, the same, i.e. „no more‟, could also be said of the fate of the Pan-Somali Concept as a direct consequence of the dictator‟s futile and dishonorable endeavors at self-preservation. Siad Barre is certainly no more, but the formal documents, which he had put his signature and seal in his official capacity as the Head of State of Somalia are very much in existence in the National Archives of Kenya and Ethiopia respectively. They are bi-national treaties that are binding on their signatory countries. Thus the possibility of the Ethiopian-ruled Haud and Reserved Area and Ogaden as well as Kenyan-administered NFD seceding from these countries to join hands with another Somali entity is as remote as ever, if not—as Siad Barre had so selfishly relegated it to—entirely no more.
The third of Siad Barre‟s demolition process of the pillars of the Pan-Somali Concept involved the unmatched and multidimensional persecution, which his regime had subjected to the people and regions of the North of the erstwhile Somali Republic. True, the Northerners had been somewhat convinced—before the advent of his regime—that they were not getting a fair deal in the Union they had entered with the South earlier. But it was during his tenure as the ruler of that country that the scope and severity of the prosecutions reached the stage that left most Northerners with no credible option but to end their association with the Union. This perversely unnecessary oppression could arguably qualify as the straw that broke the camel‟s back—the camel being the Pan-Somali Concept.
Thus, Siad Barre succeeded not only in premeditatedly and intentionally giving away two of the missing Somali territories but also he inadvertently managed to push one territory that had been already a member of the Union to secession. (Nay, actually not so inadvertently; he had been counting on his efforts to eliminate anyone in the North who might have been contemplating secession or even mere opposition to his regime.) To all intents and purposes, Siad Barre was the person who demolished the Pan-Somali Concept—and perhaps irreversibly so.
Whoever the blame resides with, the fact of the matter is that today the five Somali territories that had been at the heart of the Pan-Somali Concept, are effectively either separate entities in their own right or sub-entities that are part of other countries.
It is not the Isaac that has brought this laudable Somali ambition to an ignominious improbability. If the Isaac had been so instrumental in initiating and undertaking so selflessly the first concrete steps in achieving that goal; if the Isaac had done more than its fair share in subsequent endeavors to advance it and if the Isaac is arguably the tribe that had sacrificed and suffered most in pursuit—or on account of the mismanagement—of this policy, how could the Isaac be guilty of being a Somalidiid?
The real Somalidiids are those who betrayed the ideals and hopes of a Pan-Somalism that could have been established on foundations of brotherhood, inclusiveness, justice, democracy and the rule of law.
They did so by miserably mismanaging the first pilot project of this grand strategy—a pilot project that could have served as an initial showcase; as a practical demonstration; as an exemplary precursor and as an indicative illustration of the beauty of The Promised Land and the great benefits that could have been had therein. They did so by turning that first pilot project not into a magnet that could have affectionately attracted the Somalis outside it and made them eagerly aspire to joining it, but instead into a gutter the missing Somalis would rather shun. They did so by the ineptness and counter-productiveness of the policies and actions, with which they chose to advance the Pan-Somali Cause—policies and actions, which only achieved outcomes to the contrary.
Most damagingly of all, they did so by victimizing the Isaac in particular and many other Somalis in general, the very people whose Pan-Somali credentials were indisputable and without blemish.
If other Somalis, say those in Djibouti, in Ethiopia and in Kenya, who were naturally keen observers of that pilot project—on account of themselves being part of the Pan-Somali Cause—got cold feet; if doubt and second thoughts went through their heads; if wait-and-see stands were adapted; if contingency plans and other options were entertained and, if at the end of the day, a course totally in contravention with the Pan-Somali Cause was chosen by, say again the Djiboutians, by the Somalis of Ethiopia, by the Somalis of Kenya and ultimately by Pan-Somali Cause stalwarts-turned-victims Somalilanders, then who, pray please tell me, is to blame?
Is it the Isaac, as the Wailers would have us believe? I beg to differ. Besides, I propose to suggest another tribe as arguably the more deserving culprit. It is the Darod.
I say this on the grounds that the Darod was at the helm of Somalia‟s affairs and the primary drivers of its destiny from 1960 to 1991. And it is during this period that Pan-Somalism died its rather painful death.
Furthermore, I say this because, if for nothing else, the Late US President Harry Truman‟s epic quote is so relevant here. He famously said that “The buck stops here [with me].” The Saying means that whoever is at the top of an administration bears the ultimate responsibility, praise or blame for the events and the final outcomes thereof that take place at his/her watch.
Who am I to argue with that truism? And, may I venture, who would the Wailers be to challenge it?
At any rate, if Pan-Somalism could be resurrected, would the Isaac be in the way? I believe that most Isaacs would have no problem with such a proposition itself. But nearly all Isaacs and most other Somalilanders would be very cautious with the means and processes that might be employed towards achieving it. While no Somali worth his/her salt can argue with the desirability of the aspiration, the means to that end could, as in the last time, go miserably wrong. If that happens, not only will, again, the objective be scuttled, but, also again, more harm than good might be caused to all Somalis and perhaps, yet again, some sectors of the Somali populace might suffer unreasonably more than others, just as was the misfortune of the Somalilanders during the last attempt.
Lest history will repeat itself, any meaningful revival of the idea must be well thought of, well planned and well executed. It must be driven not by unreasonable emotions but, in all its stages, by level-headed objectivity, pragmatism and, as and when necessary, flexibility. Though making some sacrifices along the way would be inevitable, they must be evenly and proportionally shared as much as possible. After all, any potential sacrifices must never be allowed to outweigh the possible benefits that could be derived from an eventual achievement of the goal.
In my opinion, the starting point of the process must be the realization, acknowledgement and acceptance by all Somalis of their statuses quo today as is and where is. Today the five Somali parts that are at the heart of the idea are essentially separate political entities. Two of them are still parts of the neighboring countries. The other three, Somaliland, Somalia and Djibouti are independent and self-governing countries (though Somalia presently has some problems with self-governing; lets us all pray that they will be able to sort out these problems as soon as possible). The fiction that the union, which was known as the Somali Republic, still exists is a fallacy that resides with those entertaining delusional thoughts.
The next step is for all of us to promote and strive establishing all the elements of good governance i.e. peace, security, respect for human rights, democracy, inclusiveness, justice, rule of law and transparency in all of our countries. This should be done while we are still staying in our separate, though fraternal, statuses.
Then should come open borders between our countries. For the three of us that are self-governing, that should prove to be straightforward. Including the other two might turn out to be a bit trickier. At any rate, the three sovereign states should not hesitate opening up their borders to each other as soon as good governance in our respective countries has gained solid roots.
The benefits of open borders are endless. Open borders policy is a practical stopgap that could culminate into a full merger between states. While some form of political sovereignty would be retained, an open borders policy will mean nearly full economic and social integration in the countries that embrace it. It will facilitate free and unfettered movement of people and goods, unhindered commercial and investment opportunities, easier access to inter-state educational and health facilities and other advantages that are beneficial to all. Just about the only thing that citizens of one country cannot do in another is the right to vote in elections.
If this stage of political, social and economic development is reached—and with time proven to be viable—in all the Somali entities or at least in the three presently self-governing ones, then forming a political union of them as a single State is a feat that would be clearly visible on the horizon.
If, on the other hand, a thorough achievement of the concept is prevented by fate or circumstances, then Somalis will still have gained nearly 95% of the benefits they could ever aspire to find in a single Pan-Somali State. After all, is not the whole purpose of Pan-Somalism to attain the best possible and dignified standard of living and freedom that could uniformly be enjoyed by all Somalis or at least by most of them? To be hanged up on the remaining 5% would be a vanity that could only be attributable to insanity.
In any case, let everyone be reassured that most Isaacs would be willing to discuss and explore with fellow Somalis any feasible and achievable plan aimed at resurrecting the search for a Pan-Somalism that would be true to the ideals of the concept and the best ways and means of achieving this worthy aspiration.
A Wailers-Propagated Myth: The Isaacs are Secessionists.
The Fact: Partly Right. I am not afraid to give credit where it is due. The Isaacs are the most secessionists of all the tribes that call Somaliland home.
But let‟s all be clear about what the word Secession means: Merriam Webster says it is a “formal withdrawal from an organization”.
In the Somali context, and certainly in what the Wailers‟ allegation alludes to, the “organization” is the Union that used to be the Somali Republic. Somaliland‟s reclamation of its independence in 1991 was secession primarily led by the Isaac. As I conceded at the outset, the Wailers are partly right.
But only partly. First, other tribes in Somaliland were willingly part and parcel of the decision to reclaim the independence that Somaliland had foolishly squandered in 1960. Nonetheless, since they are apt at rewriting history, do not expect the Wailers to accept or advertise this irrefutable fact.
Second, secession should not be confused with dismemberment. Somaliland‟s reclamation of its independence was not an act of dismemberment of a unitary country of longstanding i.e. a country that had been one single entity from its beginning until the day it was dismembered. Somalia had not been a united State before 1960. It had been a separate country; a distinct political entity. It was known as United Nation Trusteeship of Somalia.
Then a willful merger by two separate entities, namely former British Somaliland Protectorate and former UN Trusteeship of Somalia, took place in July 1, 1960. That merger gave birth to an entirely new organization; an entirely new entity that became the Somali Republic.
Note the word “withdrawal” in the Webster‟s definition. One can withdraw from what one joined with in the first place—it does not matter whichever manner the initial joining and the eventual withdrawing took place. By seceding from the entity of the Somali Republic, Somaliland just withdrew from that “organization or entity” as willingly as it had joined it earlier. In doing so, Somaliland did not dismember Somalia. Somalia, for the information of all and sundry, still exists in the defined borders that it had before it made a union with Somaliland in 1960. Not a single square inch of Somalia‟s territory at this juncture is either occupied or claimed by the Republic of Somaliland.
This was like a divorce. Two partners parted ways, with each partner intact in one piece.
Third, even if we for a minute considered secession a cardinal crime, should not we look for a motive? Never in the Wailers‟ harangues against the Isaac is an effort made to examine, to mention, to understand, to
acknowledge, to regret, to decry, to express sympathy or an attempt made to help heal the unspeakable events that drove the Isaac to secession. To them, the Isaacs are simply and by their unique nature secessionists, period!
But this is the tribe, which singularly in the annals of Somali history was subjected to mass genocide, ethnic cleaning and disenfranchisements of all sorts. The Wailers, sometimes in a pathetic attempt to deflect blame, point a feeble finger at the Siad Barre‟s regime. All the same, that regime had been a Darodist establishment. Its leaderships, commands, strategies, objectives, policies and decision-making processes had enjoyed Darod‟s overwhelming moral and practical consent and participation.
It is of high note that not a single Darod elder, traditional leader, intellectual or statesman, at the time or later, ever felt the need, the desire, the decency, the courage or the wisdom of audaciously acknowledging and categorically condemning that regime‟s un-Somali exploits. Instead all one hears is Isaac this and Isaac that and neither this nor that is charitable.
If the Wailers‟ purpose, in their smear campaigns against the Isaac, is to egg them to entertain second thoughts with regards to secession, they not only counterproductively succeed in further solidifying Isaac‟s secessionist sentiments, but also they unnecessarily create avoidable further resentment by the Isaac towards the Wailers‟ tribe. Adding insults to injury is plain sadism.
A Wailers-Propagated Myth: The reclamation of Somaliland‟s independence or rather in the Wailers‟ parley “The secession of Somaliland” in May 18, 1991 was entirely an Isaac act. All other tribes of Somaliland were and still are kept in line by the Isaac at the point of the gun.
The Fact: Wrong. Though the Wailers have turned rewriting Somaliland‟s history in general and the chronicle of this event in particular into an art of sorts, the fact of the matter is that all tribes of Somaliland were represented in the Burao Conference where the resolution to withdraw from Union of the Somali Republic was adopted. All tribes were represented by their traditional leaders, elders, clerics, intellectuals and statesmen—just about all the available personalities who, at that immensely critical time, could claim possessing both moral and tangible authority and credibility with their respective kinsmen.
This was equally true with regards to all other subsequent conferences where the foundations and pillars of Resurrected Somaliland were set and built.
To say, as the Wailers claim, that non-Isaac tribes were railroaded into endorsing that momentous resolution against their free will by the Isaac is a disingenuously treacherous insult to all the tribes concerned without exception. Worse still, such an insult would especially qualify as an undeserved indictment of the none-Isaac tribes—the very ones whom the Wailers pose to be ostensibly representing and defending.
In Somaliland, no tribe—in past or at present—is ever known to be afraid of the Isaac as to say “Yes” in word what they do mean “No” in heart and mind. Similarly, the Isaac—in past or at present—is never known to demand, or if insincerely offered fall foolishly for, such hypocrisy coming from another tribe.
If, indeed, hypocrisy were committed, inadvertently or otherwise, in this matter by any tribe then that sin rightfully resides with that tribe alone. The Wailers would have done us all some good if they identified such tribe, provided indeed it exists.
A Wailers-Propagated Myth: The Isaac was and still is the bane of the Somalis. All troubles that have been haunting the Somalis all along originated with, and are perpetuated by, the Isaac. They are a maddeningly chauvinistic lot.
The Fact: Wrong. The Wailer-in-Chief, Mr. Osman Hassan writes in one of his all too numerous Isaac bashing, “True to their distinguishing nickname [Iidoor], the one-clan secessionists in their enclave in north-west Somalia, otherwise calling themselves „Somaliland‟, have always excelled in salesmanship and self-promotion. The business of salesmanship, as we all know, is often based on the delicate balancing of truth, exaggerated claims, showmanship, persuasion, misinformation and sometimes downright lies meant to be guile the impressionable and uniformed.”
“What is striking about the prevailing governance in the enclave” Continues Mr. Hassan “is the gaping gulf between the intolerable indictable realities on the ground and the false positive image portrayed abroad. In the secessionist's heartland, detentions without trial, prohibition of political parties other than those belonging to the ruling clan, abuse of minorities, trading in the abduction of Ogadeni refugees or residents and handing them over to Ethiopia contrary to international law, are all common daily occurrences. While the occupied SSC and Awdal regions share all these abuses in good measure, they are also subjected, in addition, to frequent collective punishment, atrocities, closures and curfews.”
This is one of the mildest of the Wailers‟ incessant attacks on the Isaac. However, we are all fortunate to be alive in the twenty-first century. In this era of the open Information Highway, almost nothing can be concealed from public knowledge. These days, the kind of atrocities, which the Wailers claim the Isaac commits daily against their fellow Somaliland tribes, could not go unnoticed, condoned, un-condemned, or unchallenged by the universal powers that be. The Human Rights groups, both from within and without, would have raised alarm bells and their screams would have been too deafening to ignore.
If the Isaac were guilty of a fraction of these allegations, they would have distinguished themselves as nothing but unspeakable savages. The ICJ or the ICC Tribunals in The Hague would have been the right place for their leaders.
The reason why Isaac‟s savagery against Somaliland‟s none-Isaac tribes exists only as the Wailers‟ vocation is because reality differs. The Isaac has never perpetrated any appalling atrocity, oppression, dispossession or disenfranchisement against any other Somali tribe anywhere and at any time in history.
True, the Isaac is not entirely clean of the Somali nomadic tradition of intertribal forays over water sources, pastures and camel dispossession raids. However, plainly this is not what the Wailers mean by their allegations.
If Isaac‟s crucial participation in the reclamation of Somaliland‟s independence on May 18,1991 and their immoveable determination to defend that independence forever more are capital sins, it only the disillusioned or
the thick of mind who would expect an apology or remorse from the vast majority of the Isaac for committing that particular offense. And all that the Wailers‟ smear campaign will achieve is further solidification—if indeed any more solidification is needed—of that unshakable conviction to stay free within our own known borders and to let others to their affairs. In short, we are determined to live our natural lives in freedom and dignity. By the same token, we are determined to let others live their natural lives in whichever way they choose.
Now if I may stay some more with the debate of which tribe have been the bane of the Somalis as well as have been the most chauvinistic, I have a tale to tell:
The Club of Vandals
S
omalis, unfortunately, seem to be prone to disasters, both manmade and natural. However, in their rather unenviable history, three catastrophes that befell on them glaringly stick out. The ill-effects of these three cataclysms are still bedeviling Somalis everywhere with no dependable end of the hardships in sight.
The First Catastrophe: It began at the start of the last century and it did not come into a merciful conclusion until twenty one years later in 1921.
A man who had claimed to be a Somali Muslim Scholar (a Mullah of sorts) started what he had presented as a struggle to get rid the land of the British colonialism, which—at the time, for a quarter of a century before and for half a century hence—was Somaliland‟s disgrace and misfortunate to be the object.
His name was Mohamed Abdulle Hassan.
He might or might not have been a Mullah. But, without a doubt, his character, ethics and antics were decidedly un-Somali as well as un-Islamic.
On the face of it, the Mullah‟s proposition to free Somaliland of foreign rule seemed to have had the hallmarks of all a divine duty, a noble imperative, and an honorable undertaking.
It was inconceivable that any Somalilander of the time would have been contented with bondage of any kind. Thus the Mullah‟s proclaimed rebellion for independence gained almost instantaneous appeal, sympathy or support from almost every quarter of the society.
There is little doubt that if this insurgence were conducted in a principled manner and were directed exclusively against the British, it would have succeeded with flying colors. Somaliland could have thrown out the yoke of colonialism long before struggles for self-determination and freedom became fashionable with humanity‟s colonized peoples.
It did not take long, however, before the Mullah showed his true colors and his real intentions were exposed. He could not even contain his tyrannical instincts and brutal dispositions long enough to establish a sizable foothold in the country and consolidate his authority over large stretches of territory.
Within a short time, it became abundantly clear the Mullah‟s purported Jihad or war of independence was rather a means to a sinister end. His real purpose had been the establishment in Somaliland of an absolute sultanate or monarchy, which revolved around his tribe and, more ominously, around the cult of his personality. Moreover, his modi oparandi in realizing his objectives were distinctly unprecedented in the annals of Somali warfare.
Never before his advent were civilians targeted in Somali Warfare culture or rules of engagement as a matter of combat practice or policy. The Mullah had, on as yet mysterious grounds, harbored a predisposed mistrust and hatred against certain tribes. The subjugation of these tribes by means of unqualified slaughter and dispossession transpired to be the Mullah‟s officially guiding principle and practice of retaliation. It made no difference whether the victims were armed or unarmed or whether they were combatants or civilians or whether they were British collaborators or simply neutral bystanders. No distinction was necessary with regards to the age, gender or culpability of the victims.
Typically, one of the first casualties of this absurdity was a man who, through a poetic utterance, had thought he knew a foolproof way to escape the Mullah‟s wrath. After he had been informed of the Mullah‟s brutality, he famously said:
Geel iyo ninkii adhi leh; Buu Darwiishku kala tegeeyaaye;
Haddii aan tiro riyo uun ah dhaqdo; Oon aan tuuladan agjoogo;
Ma tunkuu isoo qaban; Haddii aanan timirlahaaba dhaafin?
It is he who possesses camels and sheep; It is he who owns camels and sheep; Whom the Darwish (The Mullah) dispossesses;
If I raise a hundred of goats only; If I raise a hundred of goats only; And stay in this township whereabouts;
Will he [the Mullah] grab me by the neck; Will he [The Mullah] grab me by the neck; If I do not even venture beyond that Palm Tree?
The Palm Tree, which he had referred to, was easily visible a short distance away to the east of Berbera. Knowing that the Mullah and his dreaded mercenaries, known as Dervishes, were active several hundred miles away in the eastern Sanag Region, he had thought that staying put where he was offered him the safest and most sensible course to follow in order to avoid harm.
A short time later, the Dervishes made a hit-and-run raid on Berbera. Unfortunately, our friend of the Palm-Tree fame became one of many civilians who met their untimely and undeserved demise in that raid.
The great poet of the time, Ali Jama Habil was perhaps the first perceptive visionary who saw—and did much to articulate—the unmistakable contradictions and the obvious inconsistencies between the Mullah‟s admittedly laudable proclamations and the realities of his detestably un-Somali, un-Islamic ethics and antics. In an especially fitting verse of one of his more memorable poems, the bard had this to say:
Muslinimo ninman kuu dhaqeen, Iyo mu Muslinimo niman kula daqmin; Minimo khaas ah;
Gaal maxasta kuu nabad gesha; Oo magansato baa dhaama
If a man treats you not in truly Islamic spirit; If a man treats you not in accordance with the Islamic spirit; And in genuinely God-believing manner;
An unbeliever who spares your vulnerable ones; An unbeliever who spares your vulnerable ones; And who offers you sanctuary is preferable
It is clear from this ode that the Mullah neither exempted the defenseless from harm nor extended refuge to a Muslim if he deemed or imagined either one to be in the way of—or if harsh treatment towards either one was useful to—his scheme of things.
S
omaliland was not only the Somali territory where the Mullah‟s lunacy cut short the lives of unsuspecting innocents. When he went to the lands of the Rahenweyn and some Hawiye clans, he was said to be in the habit of rounding up the locals and demand of them:
“Berito Af Muslin ama Af Gaallo miduun ii la kaalaya”
“Tomorrow, you must come up speaking to me either in a Language of Muslims or of Unbelievers.”
Though they were Somalis to the bones and notwithstanding that they were genuinely Muslim folks, these tribesmen‟s unforgivable sin, in as far as the Mullah was concerned, amounted to no more than a harmless happenstance that had been no fault of theirs: The venerable Mullah could not readily understand the Somali Dialects these unfortunate people were speaking.
Incredible as it should have been at the time or in hindsight, “Tomorrow”, of course, brought death and destruction on the poor folks whose vocals had displeased the holy Mullah‟s ears. This was because, lo and behold, the speakers could not rectify the sin in time.
One last shocking discovery demonstrated the Mullah‟s unusually odious character and the exceptional repugnance of his wartime exploits: When eventually he was evicted from his fort in Taleh, human skeletons were found hanging from trees all over the place.
No doubt these human remains were victims who had been unfortunate to fall out of the Mullah‟s favor for one reason or another or perhaps for no reason at all. If, at any rate, they were criminals to whom punishments had been deservedly administered, then what humanity was it to leave their remains hanging from trees until nature decomposed them to their bare bones?
What inevitably defeated the Mullah‟s ungainly project was that it never had been a war of liberation in the first place. It was a tribally driven and religiously disguised hostility that had been designed to advance the Mullah‟s sinister ambitions. More than anything, what reduced his venture into an exercise in futility were the unprecedentedly un-Somali and un-Islamic wartime strategies and tactics, with which the Mullah had chosen to conduct his infamous campaign.
After all, to paraphrase Abe Lincoln, one can only fool some of the people only some of the time. And in the end of the day right triumphed over wrong as always it does.
Waxuu na baday, waxuu na baray baa nagaga daran
Rather than what [the suffering] he caused to us, what [the misbehavior] he taught us is more harmful
The above is a Somali adage that is as old as the Language itself. Its essence is that once someone sets a bad precedent in a society, it could be replicated. The bad precedent could give ideas, aspirations and encouragement to naturally vicious individuals to engage in similar misconduct and worse still strive to do better at it than their predecessor.
How unerringly and eloquently graphic the maxim is of the spiteful precedent, which the Mullah had instituted into his country. Already the ugly legacy of that precedent has haunted Somalis twice since then. And there is no certainty that it will not do so yet again.
The Second Catastrophe: October 21, 1969—arguably, the darkest day in the history of the Somalis.
In the beginning, hardly a Somali expected that day to attain that unenviable distinction. Instead, it was a day most Somalis, with relief and hope, thought was the dawn of a second chance for Somalia; an opportunity for national renewal.
Nine years had elapsed since the Union of the Somali Republic came into existence. Nearly all the expectations, aspirations and hopes for better times, which the country‟s citizens had thought independence and unification would bring about, evaporated into the thin air. It was clear to the man in the street and the initiated alike that the country had been on a wrong course. The nation‟s politics had been in disarray; its economy in tatters; corruption and nepotism had been shamelessly rampant.
So when on that day some two dozen armed forces officers took over the business of governing the country—by the pullet and not by the ballot, mind you—nearly no one raised a finger in protest or voiced a word in criticism. As a matter of fact, most citizens welcomed this turn of events.
Nor could one argue with the pressing problems the officers had cited as the amble justifications for taking their unconventional action or with the remedies they had proposed to undertake in order to overcome these failures. The program, which they professed was as admirable as it had been to the point: good governance; eradication of tribalism, corruption and nepotism; equal opportunity and justice for all under the law; focused policies to turn the economy around; the recovery of the missing Somali territories expeditiously so that Somalis everywhere would be under one single flag for once and all; etc., etc….
Could there have been promises that sounded as sweeter music to the ears of the public as the very ones the good officers have so generously given?
Above all, the officers solemnly pledged that these objectives would be achieved in a speedy manner. Therefore, in few years‟ time, the officers assured the nation, they would step down and genuine democracy would be restored through truly free and fair elections.
The officers‟ preliminary acts did not provide any I-told-you-so ammunition to visionaries (and there were some) who might have harbored intuitional suspensions of the officers true intentions or to those who were wary of the inherent risks of coup d‟états per se. As for the more acquiescent citizenry, well, were not these initial good actions proof enough of the officers‟ commendable integrity and their worthy seriousness in turning into deeds what they had said in words?
Again, as in Mohammed the Mullah‟s initial proclamations, the officers‟ preliminarily avowed goals were dandy stuff on the face it. Alas! Again, like Mohammed the Mullah‟s grand betrayal, what actually materialized was, for the Somali Nation, an incalculable catastrophe. Enter the profile of the second catastrophe in my tale.
What went wrong? One day, Somali historians will—objectively, professionally and comprehensively—document exactly what, how, when and why things unexpectedly went so abysmally wrong.
But here is where one could start with: The person who—by a divine fate or by his canny premeditation; by an unfortunate default or by unforgiveable dereliction of duty on others‟ part; due to ordinary respect for seniority or due to unjustifiable submission to rank; by or due to whatever else—well, the person who emerged at the helm and who had the golden opportunity—nay, the obligation—to lead the officers‟ new regime on the right course happened to be the nation‟s top military officer at the time.
His name was Mohamed Siad Barre.
He turned out to be a Fascist par excellence. Without a doubt, his character and antics were decidedly un-Somali as well as un-Islamic.
The personalities and the regimes of Mohamed the Mullah and Mohamed the Fascist contained stunning similarities. In as far as their personalities were concerned, both possessed tyrannical instincts. Both aspired to establish absolute dynasties. Both were sadists who knew no mercy. Both loved the trappings of cult of personality. Both harbored deep-seated and inexplicable malice towards certain unsuspecting tribes. Both were treacherously untrustworthy, unreliable and deceitful. For both, a friend or a colleague or a subordinate was so for only as long as the friend or the colleague or the subordinate was useful for their scheme of things. After that, the friend or the colleague or the subordinate was expandable without a second thought. For both, the end always justified the means and no exceptions to that rule needed apply.
As for their regimes, both stood on foundations and pillars of tribalism. Both chose brute force to create, consolidate and maintain their authorities. Both were evil dictatorships. Brutality, oppression, corruption, nepotism, the dispossession and the disenfranchisement of others were the trademarks of both their policies and principles.
But unlike Mohamed the Mullah, Mohamed the Fascist had two crucial advantages that eventually allowed him to wreck more far-reaching havoc on his direct victims in particular and on Somalis at large. One, he had taken over the levers of state in an intact, strong and effectively working form. Second, the modernity of the time of his
reign of terror had placed at his disposal advanced instruments of death and destruction that enabled him employing them far more effectively and comprehensively.
Thus while the Mullah was the mentor who distinguished himself by being the first Somali „leader‟ to introduce hitherto unheard of, alien and unethical wartime antics and politics into the Somali conflict culture, the Fascist not only proved himself to be a true disciple of his predecessor, but also was more notable than his idol at the unmatched scale and reach of the calamities and horrors, which he had managed to inflict on his fellow Somalis.
It was during the Fascist‟s reign that widespread genocide, ethnic cleansing, and dispossession of one singled-out tribe was attempted and was nearly pulled off.
Never before were entire cities leveled to the ground by tanks and artillery pieces that had been deployed on the said cities‟ overlooking hills. It hardly bothered the bombardiers‟ and certainly not their commanders‟ consciences that the residents of these cities were trapped within the walls of their homes as the barrages rained on them.
Never before were those cities‟ residents who had managed to flee these cities alive—some of them wounded; most of them with children in tow; nearly all of them with nothing except the rags on their backs—subjected to strafing by warplanes. No irony was seen in the fact that the planes had taken off from the same cities‟ local airports.
Nor was any incongruity discernible in the fact that the upkeep of the regime that was committing this mayhem and the lethal assets it was using to perpetuate it were being financed through the victim‟s tax treasury.
It is not necessary to chronicle here all Mohamed Fascist‟s horrific actions and policies and their unspeakable consequences. However, it is utterly revealing and an indisputable testimony of his evil character that the Fascist, himself no less, was fond of warning anyone who would listen, that when and if he ever left power in a manner that was in contrary to his own terms and wishes, he would leave neither a country nor a people intact behind.
Unfortunately twenty odd years after his downfall, that expressive, though heartless, “No People No Country” motto of Mohamed the Fascist‟s prophesy still holds true hardly unabated.
The Third Catastrophe: December, 24, 2006—another day of infamy in the history of the Somalis.
It was the day the unthinkable actually took place. It was the day that the great city of Mogadishu unbelievably, in point of fact nonetheless, fell into the hands of an invading foreign army. It was the day that, in the annals of nations, Somalia joined the short list of countries where a nation‟s sovereignty was effectively transferred to—and exercised from—the capital of another country as a result of a conquest.
The incongruity, the shock, the disbelief and the lingering dismay that this event inflicted on every Somali worth his/her salt were rendered all the more agonizing by the fact that the invader had not initiated and declared war on Somalia. Instead, the invader‟s takeover of the nation‟s capital and most its territory had come about at the express behest and pleasure of the “president of Somalia” at the time.
The name of that “president of Somalia” was Abdillahi Yusuf Ahmed.
He ended up to be a Traitor without equal anywhere and at any time. Without a doubt, his character and antics were decidedly un-Somali as well as un-Islamic.
Unlike Mohamed the Mullah and Mohamed the Fascist, Abdillahi the Traitor had not even felt the need to employ initial discretion, stealth or lofty proclamations to ascend to the station that eventually allowed him to commit the crimes his “Traitor” tag so aptly denotes.
Abdillahi the Traitor was a man terminally crazed by love for power and crazily still, he never made any secret of that affliction. From the time in the late 1979s when he staged a failed coup d‟état against Mohamed the Fascist‟s regime to his days as the head of the grossly ineffective SSDF insurgency in 1980s; from his super-warlord tenure in Puntland following the Fascist‟s downfall to the day of his selection as „president‟, Abdillahi the Traitor left no stone unturned in his tireless quest to become the ruler of Somalia. Moreover, his obsession was mostly characterized by violence.
Eventually, two years prior to the invasion, his dreams had come true when he was installed as “president of Somalia” in Nairobi, Kenya, by—oh! No need to say by whom again. Everyone knows where Somali „presidents‟ are installed these days and more importantly by whom. It is a sad saga by itself, but let us proceed with the tale of the tale.
In the inaugural address at his coronation ceremony—in Nairobi, where else?—Abdillahi the Traitor made no secret of his desire and determination to see foreign troops to be the bedrock of his “presidential” authority. Without mincing words, he begged his foreign sponsors to put their Armed Forces at his disposal!
The Traitor was so bold—some might say so foolhardy—as to appoint the number and the time. He wanted twenty thousand soldiers and he wanted them now!
No legitimate, semi-legitimate or even illegitimate Somali head of state before him, even those struggling under similar circumstances of powerlessness, even if adorned with grandiose titles, had ever contemplated—much less had called for—such monstrous treason against his own country.
But, of course, Abdillahi the Traitor was only joking. He was just being characteristically bombastic. He was merely exercising his penchant for hyperbole and indulging in the normally harmless fantasies that his super-warlord illusions of grandeur had inflicted to his frame of mind. Yes, ladies and gentlemen, don‟t worry, Abdillahi the Traitor was, of course, only joking.
This was because it was unthinkable that a Somali—much less one who, after a long quest, had at last laid claim to the highest office of his country; never mind the murky circumstances and the dubious legitimacy of his ascension to that exalted station—well, I was saying it was unthinkable that a Somali would entice foreign troops to occupy so much a square inch of his own country‟s territory. No personal ambition or no tribal interest or no national exigency, however so overwhelming and pressing, or no circumstance of any definition would justifiably drive a Somali to call for such so extraordinarily heinous and traitorous action.
And was there anyone who doubted that Abdillahi the Traitor, in spite of all his obviously frightening shortcomings, was a Somali indeed?
Nonetheless, for the third time in less than a century, a Somali „leader‟, senseless with boundless avarice for self-aggrandizement and brimming with tribal vendetta, has managed to visit on fellow Somalis yet another catastrophe of monumental proportions.
It turned out that Abdillahi the Traitor had not been joking about shepherding foreign troops to invade and occupy his country after all. He did not flinch a moment or waste a second when the first feasible opportunity in realizing his wish presented itself.
Thus in mid December 2006, at Abdillahi the Traitor‟s express behest and pleasure, a foreign army matched from several fronts into Somalia. In less than two weeks, much of southern Somalia, including the nation‟s capital, fell firmly into that alien army‟s hands. Yet another gruesome „first‟! Yet another indelibly ugly stain was embossed into the lore of Somali body polity!
Utter incredulity, unbearable dismay, intolerable humiliation, excruciating disgrace and paralyzing agony could naturally only be the sorry lot of every Somali worth his/her salt as this cataclysmal turn of events unfolded before him/her.
Worse still and adding insult to injury, the occupying army happened to be none other than that of Somalia‟s neighbor, Ethiopia.
The longtime and somewhat irrational enmity between Somalis and Ethiopians had ebbed somewhat, at least in its naked form, in later years. Nonetheless, every Somali worth his/her salt would only consider an Ethiopian army occupying any part of an independent Somali territory—that be Somalia, including the so-called Puntland, or Somaliland or Djibouti—as nothing less than a doomsday.
And indeed nearly a doomsday it was. The invasion and subsequent occupation was a doomsday—a doomsday, a time of cataclysmic destruction and death; a doomsday, which matched the two catastrophes that Mohamed the Mullah and Mohamed the Fascist had visited on Somalis in their times.
Nobody knows exactly how many Somalis died in this Abdillahi the Traitor-promoted aggression, but knowledgeable observers say the number was well over hundred fifty thousand. Hundreds of thousands more were wounded or maimed. Over a million yet others were forced to flee their homes or were generally displaced or dislocated by the fighting. The loss in properties and of livelihoods was incalculable.
For the second time in Somali history, cities and their civilian residents were bombarded with artillery barrages, tank and other heavy weaponry shells which had been fired from positions within these cities‟ environs. For the second time in Somali history, cities and their civilian residents were bombed and strafed by warplanes, which had taken off from these cities‟ airports.
The ill-effects of this invasion and occupation went well beyond the immediate physical human sufferings it had caused, abhorrent as they were. The invaders also succeeded in uprooting the only indigenously inspired and owned semblance of effective governance that had emerged in Somalia in over a decade and half.
Six months prior to the invasion, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) managed to eliminate the notorious warlords who had been bedeviling the country and its unfortunate citizens since the fall of Mohamed the Fascist‟s regime in 1991. For the first time since then, the denizens of Mogadishu and most of Somalia were able to enjoy and cherish some precious peace, tranquility and rule of law—any law. Besides, it was obvious that UIC have, since their emergence, been steadily earning relative legitimacy and somewhat the consent of the people.
Now, as another direct consequence of the invasion, the UIC was no more. The fate and destiny of southern Somalia and the Capital city of Mogadishu reverted to the hands of foreigners and their Somali stooges.
Worst of all, the occupation and the understandable resistance that it inevitably stirred in countering it also motivated the birth of the phenomenon of Al-Shababism. Today, not only is Al-Shababism the biggest menace that all Somalis and their entities face, but also it poses a credible threat to the security of many other nations; not least of which is Ethiopia and other countries that either overtly or covertly colluded with the invader in its ignoble enterprise on Somalia.
In the end, Ethiopia could not long sustain its occupation. It dawned on that country, fairly soon enough, that it had bitten more than it could chew. Moreover, it is much too uncertain that Ethiopia achieved any of the objectives, whatever they were, for which it had sustained—and to Somalis had inflicted—immense sacrifices.
Quite on the contrary, Ethiopia might have lost more than it gained from its Somalia misadventure. Certainly it weakened whatever mutually beneficial rapport and goodwill that had been in the making between the Somalis and the Ethiopians after ages of senseless enmity and mistrust between the two peoples. Besides, the emergence of inherently violent groups, such as the Al-Shabab, in particular and the continuation of the turmoil in Somalia in general, proved that the ultimate outcome of the Ethiopian fiasco turned out to be decidedly counterproductive for all concerned—not least of them all, this debacle‟s primary promoter, Abdillah the Traitor.
This is because for Abdillahi the Traitor, though it conferred no solace to the direct victims of the invasion in particular and to Somalis at large, his unmatched treachery towards the country he was supposed to serve and protect inevitably led to his dishonorable political demise—and so deservedly too. And in a posterity sealed in notoriety, Abdillahi the Traitor joined his soul-mates, Mohamed the Mullah and Mohamed the Fascist as the third exalted member of their exclusive Club of Vandals.
Furthermore, so fearful was Abdillahi the Traitor for his personal safety that he could not even trust to find safe refuge in his tribal enclave of Puntland. He had to flee to Yemen to be under the protection of a kindred betrayer of his own people, namely the uncivilized and ignorant tyrant of Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh.
(Abdillahi the Traitor may these days be worrying about his personal safety anew. His protector, Saleh himself, is presently facing the final days of his political and perhaps mortal life.)
Nonetheless, there is a six million dollar question that begs for an answer: What, in God‟s Name, had impelled Abdillah the Traitor to commit such so capital treason against his own country? How could he had been so cruelly un-Somali and so patently un-Islamic?
Though most Somalis—inattentive and imperceptive as they are wont to be most of the time and to their regret later—dismissed them of no consequence Abdillahi the Traitor, himself no less, had on numerous occasions publicly provided sufficient clues to the answer of the six-million question.
Characteristically tactless—or perhaps senselessly arrogant—and displaying sickening tribal vendetta, he openly avowed, and not too infrequently, to avenge retributions, both real and imagined, which he believed his tribe had suffered in Mogadishu and in other locations in southern Somalia following the fall of Mohammed the Fascist.
Typically incapable to disguise his tyrannical disposition and exhibiting his disdain for fellow Somalis‟ intelligence, Abdillahi the Traitor had been heard to have famously opined that it was only through terrifying fear of—rather than earned respect for—authority and the holders of the levers of power that Somalis could be governed in a meaningful way. Trepidation, Abdillahi the Traitor had emphasized, was the only language that Somalis could understand where government and the exercise of its authority were concerned.
On both counts, i.e. Abdillahi the Traitor‟s ingrained tribal hatred and his tyrannically autocratic bend; do they not ring a bell? Will not Mohamed the Mullah and Mohamed the Fascist come to mind?
All three gentlemen—Mohamed the Mullah, Mohamed the Fascist and Abdillahi the Traitor—shared an immensely fateful distinction. Each was responsible for one of the three major life changing catastrophes that were Somalis‟ undeserved misfortune to suffer.
Finally, there is one other attribute they had in common: All three hailed from the same tribe. In case the Wailers may be inclined to identify the tribe in question, here is one clue: it is not the Isaac.
That is the end of the tale.
Chauvinism Addiction
T
he post-Siad Barre era has, indeed, been a tumultuous period for Somalis everywhere. The persistence of this turmoil is fueled by two stubborn legacies of his regime.
The first caustic legacy is that his metaphorical avowal to “leave neither a country nor a people intact behind” had been no mean joke. It was for real. Before he was forced out of power, he had made absolutely certain that there would be no national cohesion; no national institutions; thoroughly shattered inter-communal customs; erosion of the traditional authorities of clan elders, clerics and statesmen in the society and ingrained mistrust as well as ill-will between all sectors of the society upon his departure. This is in addition to the unspeakable physical human suffering which he caused to so many whom he had been supposed to serve and protect.
People and especially Somalis are, by nature or necessity, resilient. They are bound to strive rebuilding their personal lives as best as they can. However, rebuilding a national life (that is reconstituting a state) is entirely another matter. Attempting to accomplish such an intricate task is a tall order at the best of times. In the absence of national cohesion, institutions, goodwill and trust, respect for leadership both modern and traditional etc. it is a devilishly monumental undertaking.
Then, there is another crucial factor that the country‟s systematically broken state has brought into more ubiquitous and complicating play. Now, devoid of the conventional national defense mechanisms and a unified representative authority to speak on its behalf, Somalia‟s foreign meddlers have become like hyenas living in the same encampment as the sheep.
For the second Siad legacy that continues to sustain the Somali disorder, revisit the veracity of the previously mentioned Somali adage, “Rather than what [the suffering] he caused to us, what [the misbehavior] he taught us is more harmful”. More than twenty year after his downfall and under entirely different circumstances, there are still those Somalis who still adhere to—and strive to replicate—some of his perspectives and/or practices.
One of the crucial pillars of the dictator‟s regime had been the manipulation of tribalism. As a matter of policy, he had persecuted certain tribes in more ways than one. He used all means that had been available to him to disadvantage these tribes. Among those, for instance, he had employed his autocratic powers to redraw the country‟s regional borders in order to dilute the political influence and otherwise disenfranchise those who had been in his disfavor.
Conversely, he used to openly confer undue and conspicuous favors to other tribes. These indulgences traversed all corners of the state assets and institutions as well as employment and business opportunities. Nothing was off limits in dispensing this gigantic generosity. Where, for example, he had interfered with the regional borders at the expense of the disliked tribes, he had created new regions in order to empower the favored ones beyond their actual numbers and traditional habitats. As the backbone of both his grassroots support and ruling establishment, the main beneficiary of this limitless largesse was, of course, his own tribe: the Darod.
Having been uninterruptedly enjoying these lopsided privileges for long, the beneficiaries have in due course come to take them for granted. Then they saw the favors as their unalienable right. Then they developed
untoward behavioral attitudes such as offensive arrogance, shallow superiority complex and reinforced clannish chauvinism among others. They saw their role as the country‟s natural rulers and first claimants of its resources. All others were their subjects and the scavengers of the leftover crumps. That their easier circumstances were only possible at the expense of fellow Somalis was forgotten long ago if, indeed, it had registered with them in the first place.
The regime that had instituted this unsustainable environment inevitably collapsed in 1991 like a house of cards. However, the spoiled brats, the elites of all tribes would not shake off their acquired chauvinism addiction and adapt to the new circumstances.
After their initial shock at the loss of the goose that had been laying the golden eggs, the spoiled brats regrouped. They decided that, in any entity or governing authority that might replace the erstwhile Somali republic and/or the fallen regime, most if not all of their exclusive privileges of the old should be maintained in the new. This is because these privileges, in case you have forgotten—stupid!—was their inalienable right. Nothing less would suffice. They had their own plans and intrigues to insure that this happened. Besides, whenever or wherever an arrangement which would not be amenable to their wishes was contemplated, it should be frustrated until it was rendered undoable.
The cornerstone of the chauvinists‟ strategy transpired to be the revival of most elements of the old Siadist order—in substance if not in style—in any new Somali entity or governing authority. Where any of their demands could not be realized directly, it would be ingeniously (or may we say disingenuously?) repackaged and sold to Somalis and the International community at large as a new and appropriate idea that should contribute to the Somali reconciliation and state- rebuilding processes.
In this regard, consider the following selection of maneuverings, among many others, which could not escape any perceptive scholar of the Somali political dynamics in the last two decades:
Ø The Darod has left no stone unturned in putting wedges between the sub-clans of the Hawiye tribe especially the two main sub-clans, the Abgal and the Habr Gidir, at every opportune instance. The purpose was obvious: A divided Hawiye was a week Hawiye and as such could be more easily manipulated by playing one sub-clan against another whenever the need or the desire arose. This would confer more power and influence to the Darod than should be fairly its due.
Ø In 1988 the Darod sub-clan, the Mejertan, established what they so-called the Puntland State of Somalia. This scheme had two primary objectives.
a) The first was to create a large expanse of territory that would be effectively outside the jurisdiction of any central authority which was likely to emerge in Mogadishu—essentially handing them veto powers or disproportionate influences over the form and shape of potential national entity and/or governance that might eventually materialize.
b) Somaliland was direct target of the second objective of the „Puntland‟ theatrics. Its castle-builders declared that certain regions of Somaliland were part and parcel of Puntland. The only justification they forwarded as the basis of their strange assertion was even stranger: These regions were home of kindred clans of the Mejertan (the Mejertan of Somalia along with the Dhulbahante and the
Warsangele of Somaliland collectively make the Harti, a sub-tribe of the Darod). It was the first time ever in Somali history that a Somali entity was not only proposed to be constituted on purely clannish foundations, but also the proposers did so with a straight face without the slightest trace of shame, irony or incongruity discernable. (This was yet again another Darodist precedent. From that time to this day, purely clannish xxxxxx-State-of-Somalia enclaves à la Puntland have cropping up in Somalia like weeds in an unkempt garden. One or two have been also attempted in Somaliland. At least give the Isaac credit for protesting the Wailers‟ assertion that Somaliland is a one-clan entity). What blinded them from seeing this absurdity was the other purpose of the „Puntland‟ creation: It was an attempt to deny Somaliland one of the fundamental tenets of statehood i.e. its territorial integrity within defined borders. If successful this would have rendered Somaliland neither feasible nor viable.
Ø The fiendish 4.5 power-sharing mechanism was the brainchild of the Darod and others with similar chauvinistic interests or aspirations. The system bestows the Darod the lion‟s share of power, which in reality is not commensurate with their numbers and other defining attributes. With the Ogaden, by far the most numerous of Darod‟s sub-clans mostly found in Ethiopia and Kenya, the other Darod sub-clans—the Majertan, the Dhulbahante, the Warsangale and the Merehan—can at best rank as the fourth biggest tribe in the erstwhile Somali Republic, behind the Hawiye, the Rahanwein and the Isaac. At any rate, the overriding purpose of the 4.5 invention was the malicious marginalization of the Isaac. In the process, other undeserving tribes, such as the Samaroon of Somaliland and the Dirs of Somalia were also adversely shed in bad light numerically speaking, that is.
Ø The addicted chauvinists have been behind the defeat of every post-Siad national authority not to their liking, which was attempted to be established in Mogadishu. Count them with me if you may: Ali Mahdi, Aidid, the Abdiqasim TNG, and the Sharif/Farmajo TFG (though Farmajo is a Darod, he was not a diehard addicted chauvinist; rather, he was their black sheep). When they succeeded to be at the helm of a government in Mogadishu, they could not have made a worse choice than Abdillahi the Traitor as their candidate and eventual „president‟. Thus his subsequent demise reserved them right. But that was a temporary aberration. The grand plan is back on track. These days, they are more amenable to the Sharif/Abdiwali TFG since it is more acquiescent to the grand plan.
Ø If one reads between the lines of the so-called Road Map, the Garowe I and Garowe II agreements, the drafts of the much-hyped Constitution, one would see that the elitist pork barrel special privileges are essentially and ingeniously (or may we say disingenuously) embedded in these documents. One telling point of this is the proposal to maintain the so-called 18 Regions that Siad Barre had imposed on the nation without legitimacy and whose sole purpose and outcome was the institution of the very elitist pork barrel special privileges that the addicted chauvinists are after anew.
There are those who argue, and not without substantial credence, that this chauvinism addiction and the tireless efforts to keep that affliction is the main driving factor behind not only the persistent intractability of the turmoil in Somalia, but also some recurring—though typically less successful—threats that Somaliland has been subjected to since its rebirth.
Of Tribalism‟s Scourge and Oddities
I
feel neither the need nor the desire nor the expectation to see the Wailers cease their habitual Somaliland and Isaac bashing. The dogmatism and naked hatred they employ in the practice of their trade are self-defeating enough and are likely to help their intended targets rather than harm them.
One thing, however, is an irrefutable and eternal fact: Tribalism is a highly destructive and an incalculably immoral vice. Its usage as a means to an end is equally a fundamental evil.
The thoughtful late Poet Abdillahi Tima‟ade so aptly hit the nail on the head when he described tribalism thus:
Dugsi ma leh Qabyaaladi; Waxay dumiso mooyee
Tribalism offers no shelter: It only destructs
How true.
What makes tribalism all the more abhorrent, agonizing and senseless is that, in the Somali context, one‟s tribalism-motivated wrath is, in all intents and purposes, more likely to affect adversely one‟s kin and kith, one‟s neighbor, one‟s friend and, in its all-embracing shadow, one‟s fellow countryman rather than one‟s real enemies.
Strangely, tribalism only acknowledges one‟s paternal, but not maternal, linage. Thus it could ostensibly allow one to slaughter relatives who belonged to his mother‟s tribe. A potential victim could be as close to a would-be offender as the offender‟s own uncle, cousin or nephew (i.e. the brother of one‟s mother, the son of that uncle, the son of one‟s aunt [i.e. the son of one‟s mother‟s sister] or the son of one‟s sister) provided that the potential victim happened to hail from the wrong clan in time of tribal conflict!
Another of tribalism‟s baffling absurdities is that one could never tell where exactly its practice should start and where exactly it should end. It could pit one tribe against another or one sub-clan of a tribe against another sub-clan of the same tribe or members of a same sub-sub-clan or even members of an extended family against each other.
Most distressingly still, for the Somalis, tribalism seems to be an inescapable doom. It is like a supper-maximum security penitentiary that is located in a remote island, which in turn is in the midst of a vast and impenetrable ocean. Obviously, not only is escape or release from this hellhole hopelessly impossible, but also it looks as if it is exclusively designed and built to incarcerate all Somalis either by choice or by default.
By choice? One simply needs be a tribalism-villain to be an inmate. By default? One could as simply be an internee on account of an act of legitimate self-defense. It appears that at any one time 50% of the Somalis are involved in the villainy and the other 50% are engaged in its resistance. Hence at all times, 100% of Somalis are mired as captives either way.
Moreover, it is not rather the more gullible ordinary layman or the nomad only who is thus affected. Somalis who are as well educated as rocket scientists and those who were exposed to non-tribal societies and cultures and consequentially, therefore, have had the opportunity to experience the beauty of the non-existence of tribalism in these societies and cultures have—as strangely as it may sound—not developed the immunity to avoid ending up in this godforsaken penal colony.
Tribalism is a depravity whose rules of engagement shift like desert sands. It can never be exactly definable or definitive. It spares no one. It defies all logic and human decency.
Tribalism, however, should not be confused with Tribal Affiliation. The former is a nasty vice while the latter is a harmless, if not perhaps an entirely a refined, attribute. Allah, the Almighty, created His people as nations and as tribes in order to enable them to know each other. The Almighty preaches us to be kind, to be caring to each other and, in times of need, to be of assistance to our kin and kith, neighbors, community and by extension to fellow nationals as well as to fellow human beings. In the eyes of Allah, belonging to a certain tribe and utilizing this membership within its permissible limits are acceptable.
It would be a divinely marvelous and memorable day when tribalism, in all its forms and hues, is simply not a factor in any discourse of Somali affairs anywhere, at any time and whatever the issue or circumstance that is under debate.
For all it is worth, I might be excused in making one or two points regarding my purpose in writing this piece absolutely clear. I am not wishing or calling for any retribution, God forbid, against any Somali tribe. Tribal vengeance or settling tribal scores only breeds vicious cycles of communal conflict without end and would leave all tribes and thus all Somalis to be nothing but miserable losers through a folly of no one but our own.
Whatever past injustices that were committed; however serious, pervasive, unfathomable these injustices were; whatever grievances that any tribe may hold against another and notwithstanding the power of the desire, urge and justification for revenge that any tribe might feel, forgiveness and reconciliation constitute the only sensible course for all concerned.
Forgive and reconcile? Yes. Forget? Never. Lest history (i.e. the events in our history that were horrendous and unacceptable) is repeated, history should first be based on solid facts alone. Besides, whenever attempts are made to rewrite history or to take it out of context or to selectivize it à la the Wailers, one would do us all a priceless favor in setting the facts straight.
Every nation‟s past contains both dreadful and pleasant episodes. Whether we like it or not, our history is our heritage. At any rate, history should be on public record and should be told like it is; every and any part of it; the Good, the Bad and the Ugly of it.
Then and only then, could we learn the obvious lessons of our history. Only then could past horrific pitfalls be avoided to haunt again the Somali people in part or at large.
Of Dissent and Dissenters in Somaliland
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would like to reiterate in no uncertain and unequivocal terms that Somalilanders‟ irreversible decision to withdraw from the union with Somalia as well as that their immovable determination to remain a sovereign country in its post-colonial borders are not driven by any hatred or malice whatsoever towards other Somalis wherever they may be. Quite on the contrary, only peace and prosperity are all that Somalilanders would wish for all other Somalis, including those with whom they had shared that dreadful union.
Rather Somalilanders took this course because, for once, they had learned from the follies and the consequences thereof of their history. Somalilanders firmly believe that, all things considered, this is the only practical, viable and equitable option open to them in order to ensure their freedom and wellbeing. It was taken and is being maintained at no one‟s expense within Somaliland or to disadvantage others without.
It would be disingenuously dishonest to claim that everything in Somaliland commands the absolute unanimity of all Somalilanders. Absolute unanimity is something that is associated with autocratic countries. Somaliland definitely neither has been one of them nor has the need or the desire to join them now or in the future. Therefore, there have naturally been, still are and will always be dissenters and dissentions in the affairs of the country.
The dissentions stem from two main issues. One is the fundamental principle of Somaliland‟s Re-independence. The other pertains to concerns with Somaliland government‟s policies and/or actions.
In either case, the misgivings are attributable to various reasons. The reasons are, as usual, a combination of the real, the imagined and the facades behind which sinister motives lurk.
Some Somalilanders are apprehensive of political and economic marginalization that might in particular disadvantage their tribes, or communities or regions. Others disagree with the course and means the country has adapted towards achieving its objectives and aspirations. And then, there are the Somalilander remnants who still not only adhere to the concept of Pan-Somalism, but also still are doggedly determined to stay the course hitherto taken to achieve that ideal regardless…
Whatever the reason, the validities of the dissent on the two issues are different. On the one hand, the issue of the Re-independence was firmly settled in the Burao Conference resolutions—resolutions that were endorsed by the overwhelming majority of a leadership, which represented all the tribes of Somaliland. It was further reaffirmed in subsequent equally representative meetings, the most prominent of them being the Borama Conference of 1993.
Above all, the Independence and Sovereignty of Somaliland was finalized and solemnized by the introduction—and its over 90% approval of Somalilanders in a referendum—of the country‟s constitution. Thus, as in all nations of the world, any open and active opposition to Somaliland‟s Independence and Sovereignty would amount to treason by law. And no nation in the world tolerates treason. Period.
On the other hand, dissension pertaining to governmental policies and/or actions is legally permissible. Actually, it is an unalienable right of the country‟s citizens. And dissenters can be open and active not only in fearlessly expressing such dissension, but also in vigorously seeking appropriate changes that could reverse their discontents.
Whether the dissenters in Somaliland is driven by fears or by dissatisfaction or by holding unpopular, though honest opinions or by adhering to far-fetched principles, the integrity of these groups and their overall goodwill toward Somaliland do not raise contentious issues. Remedies could be and should be found to address these concerns in an atmosphere of goodwill, dialogue, flexibility and compromise by all concerned.
Perceived fears, for instance, can abate as time, in due course, exposes the false and unjustifiable foundations for their existence all along. In other words, imagined fears die a natural death. If, on the other hand, fears reflected facts on the ground, then appropriate redresses should be put in place in order to remove them. The ones thus affected, indeed, should be excused if they raised hell in pursuing the redemptions that should be fairly their due.
Dissatisfaction with governments or with their policies and/or actions thereof can also be legitimately overcome as well. One way that this task could ultimately be accomplished is—if all else fails—to change the governments themselves. After all, what are the elections for?
Constructive, though unconventional, viewpoints serve useful purposes in democracies if only as food for thoughts. And lastly, men of dogmatic principles are just that: men of dogmatic principles. They simply live and as simply die with that frame of mind.
Unlike all above groups, there is a tiny, and by far the noisiest, clique whose feral opposition of Somaliland‟s statehood and all that it stands for spring from motives and/or sentiments that could not withstand logic or civilized standards of decency. Reasoning or engaging in a meaningful debate with members of this faction is simply an exercise in futility.
The Wailers are the very embodiment of this last group.
Regardless the calibers and motives of the dissenters, the fact of the matter is that without the express wish, determination and/or consent of an overwhelming majority of its population in all its regions and demographic setup, Somaliland‟s cause and aspirations could not have endured for as long as they had. Its existence, de facto independence and self-reliance could not have been sustained for 20 odd years. It could not have gone from weakness to strength and then from strength to strength.
Neither Here Nor There
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n conclusion, it is highly inconceivable that Somalilanders would so much as contemplate any fundamental changes in their status quo in the foreseeable future—least of all changes that are likely to remotely lead
them back to a political re-association of any form with the other party of the erstwhile Union. It is even more inconceivable that Somalilanders would relinquish one square inch of its territory as defined by the borders that the British left behind on June 26, 1960.
In their unshakable adherence to these convictions, the issue of political recognition or lack of it thereof by the International Community or by anybody else is decidedly secondary.
And neither is it here nor there whether the Wailers‟ weeping continues and intensifies. As a matter of fact, we need the entertainment.
Ahmed I. Hassan