



Security Council

Distr.: General
31 January 2013

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 29 of Security Council resolution 2010 (2011), in which the Council requested me to report on all aspects of the resolution every four months. The report provides an update on major developments that occurred in Somalia on the three major tracks of the United Nations approach — (i) political; (ii) security; and (iii) humanitarian, recovery and development, and human rights — in the period from 16 August 2012 to 15 January 2013. In pursuance of the implementation of resolution 2067 (2012), it also provides options and recommendations for the future United Nations presence in Somalia.

II. Political and security developments

Political situation

2. Somalia's eight-year political transition ended successfully, with the establishment of a new, leaner Federal Parliament on 20 August, and the selection of a new Speaker of Parliament, Mohamed Osman Jawari. The 275 Members of Parliament were selected by 135 traditional elders and vetted by a Technical Selection Committee. They then selected the President, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, in a process that was at times characterized by reports of intimidation and undue interference to influence its outcome, but which nevertheless turned out to be the most transparent and representative election in Somalia's 20-year crisis, and the first to be held inside the country.

3. On 6 October, President Mohamud appointed Abdi Farah Shirdon ("Saacid") as Prime Minister-Designate, through a consultative process. He was overwhelmingly endorsed by the Federal Parliament and subsequently appointed a 10-member Cabinet that includes two women. Parliament endorsed the Cabinet and its action plan on 13 November. On 13 December, Prime Minister Shirdon completed his Cabinet by appointing 5 State ministers and 20 deputy ministers. Somali commentators generally expressed optimism and confidence in the new authorities, although some were concerned that the lean Cabinet would not accommodate all interests and that major portfolios like health and education would not have dedicated ministries.

4. Upon assuming office, President Mohamud outlined the priorities of the administration in his six-pillar policy framework, including stabilization,



peacebuilding and reconciliation, economic recovery, collaborative international relations, the delivery of services to the people, and unity and integrity of the country. The Government and Parliament pledged to support this agenda. International partners welcomed the new administration's vision for the country and reaffirmed their continued support to Somalia, including during the mini-summit that I convened in September on the margins of the General Assembly.

5. Parliament, for its part, has now developed its rules of procedure and a four-year strategic plan. The newly inaugurated Cabinet also issued its programme of work, which is focused on strengthening security sector institutions, reinforcing governance structures, promoting national reconciliation, building good-neighbourly relations and consolidating socioeconomic infrastructure.

6. Meanwhile, the authorities in Somalia have started developing plans for the establishment of regional administrations in areas recovered from Al-Shabaab. President Mohamud indicated his intention to take a "bottom-up" approach, whereby local administrations would be formed first and involved in the selection of regional actors. The Government plan is to deploy local parliamentarians into their constituencies to assist with the setting up of interim, 90-day administrations that would be replaced, in due course, by locally elected bodies.

7. However, with regard to the Juba and Gedo regions, an initiative led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has been under way to form a "Jubbaland" regional administration. Efforts were made to harmonize these approaches, including during the visit of the Executive Secretary of IGAD to Mogadishu on 16 October, where he met with President Mohamud. On 6 December, the IGAD Joint Committee on the Grand Stabilization Plan for South-Central Somalia, which now includes the Somali authorities, issued a statement in which it committed itself to ensuring effective coordination in the implementation of the IGAD stabilization plan, which includes establishing local administrations and promoting reconciliation. The Committee developed a draft memorandum of understanding that provides a framework for the implementation of the Plan; this was submitted to the Somali authorities for consideration. Meanwhile, a Government delegation travelled to Kismaayo and consulted with local players on the formation of local and regional administrations in southern and central Somalia.

8. The situation in the regional State of Galmudug remained uncertain following the absence of its president, Mohamed Ahmed Alin, for health reasons and the emergence of rival claimants to the presidency. The new administration in Mogadishu has been consulting with the rival factions in an effort to resolve the impasse, but the problem remains unresolved.

9. In Puntland, President Abdirahaman Mohamed "Farole" sought a one-year extension of his five-year mandate, justifying it as being enshrined in Puntland's new Constitution to allow for the continuation of the democratization process. This generated internal opposition in the autonomous region. At the same time, in an attempt to usher in a multi-party system, Puntland enacted a municipal electoral law on 2 September, as well as a political parties associations law.

10. During the period under review, "Somaliland" reiterated its willingness to resume talks with the Somali authorities on several occasions. In its effort to consolidate democratic governance, it held local council elections on 28 November, the second to be held in the past decade. Two political parties and five political

associations competed across “Somaliland’s” regions, except for the far eastern districts of Sanaag and Sool and Buhodle District in Togdheer region, which could not do so owing to security reasons. Through that process, three of them became the official parties in “Somaliland” for the next 10 years.

Security situation

11. The security situation remained unpredictable in Mogadishu. While the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somali National Security Forces maintained their hold on the city, Al-Shabaab attacks occurred frequently, including targeted killings and hand grenade attacks, with an increase in outlying districts. While there were fewer incidents of the use of improvised explosive devices, periodic suicide attacks, such as those carried out on 12 September against the Jazeera Hotel while President Mohamud was present, and at the Village Restaurant on 20 September, demonstrated the group’s persistent infiltration of the city. Increasing abuses by undisciplined elements within the Somali Government forces against civilians and each other reflected the lack of a centralized command. This indirect threat left a United Nations employee wounded by a stray bullet from a likely intra-militia clash in October.

12. In southern Somalia, the capture of Marka (Shabelle Hoose) and Kismaayo (Juba Hoose) by AMISOM and the Somali National Security Forces were the most significant territorial gains during the reporting period. These increased the pressure on Al-Shabaab and reduced its income sources. However, the withdrawal of Al-Shabaab from Kismaayo left a political vacuum in the city, leading to the reignition of complex clan dynamics. Guerrilla and terrorist tactics were frequently used in the recovered areas, including weekly in Baidoa (Bay) and Kismaayo and almost daily in the Afgooye and Merka areas. Al-Shabaab killed a United Nations employee on 27 August in Marka and issued threats against and harassed other aid workers in southern Somalia. Continued abuses by undisciplined elements of the Government forces in Shabelle Hoose were reported. During the night of 11 January and on 12 January, the French military launched a failed operation to rescue a French hostage held by Al-Shabaab in Bulomarer, resulting in the death of two French soldiers and reportedly of 17 Al-Shabaab militants and eight civilians.

13. In central Somalia, AMISOM and Government forces took over Jowhar, the capital of Shabelle Dhexe, in early December. Local antipathy to Al-Shabaab meant that Shabelle Dhexe suffered relatively few attacks. Attacks also decreased in Beledweyne (Hiraan), though they still occurred weekly, and there were continued reports of harassment of civilians and aid agencies in southern Hiraan. Al-Shabaab kept a low profile in Galguduud. Recurring clashes between clan militias in Beledweyne sometimes disrupted aid activities, as did infighting among factions of Ahlu Sunna wal Jama in Galguduud.

14. Al-Shabaab became more active in Puntland from late November onwards, undertaking several attacks. Killings and arrests of suspects, discoveries of ordnance and continued reports of troop movements demonstrated the insurgents’ enduring presence in the region and neighbouring Galmudug. Puntland and Galmudug also suffered from crime that, in Puntland, was partly linked to undisciplined troops brought in to fight the insurgents.

15. While local elections in “Somaliland” resulted in multiple incidents of civil disturbance and politically motivated violence, the dispute over Sool, Sanag and

Cayn remained the main destabilizing factor in “Somaliland”. Despite the August peace agreement with a former leader of Sool, Sanag and Cayn, Suleiman Haglatosiye, ambushes, shootings and attacks involving improvised explosive devices continued to occur in the disputed area of “Khatumo”. Related tensions with Puntland also spiked periodically.

16. A further 12 convicted pirates were transferred from Seychelles to “Somaliland” and 5 to Puntland, where they will serve their sentences. After 1,000 days in captivity, the 22 remaining seafarers from Ghana, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Sudan and Yemen of MV *Iceberg-1* were freed following a military operation by Puntland forces. Sadly, two of the hostages did not survive their captivity. Four sailors of MT *Gemini* from the Republic of Korea, who were held hostage by Somali pirates for nearly 19 months, were also freed.

III. Activities of the United Nations in support of peace consolidation

A. Support to the political process and governance

17. The United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) continued to provide good offices and political support to facilitate the end of the transition. The last months of the transition period revealed differences among the signatories of the road map on matters ranging from the selection and handling of the traditional elders to some provisions in the draft Constitution, the size of Parliament, the role and position of former warlords, and the selection and vetting of members of the new Federal Parliament. This required intense mediation by my Special Representative to ensure that the signatories maintained coherence and remained focused on the implementation of the agreement. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) complemented these efforts through technical advice to the National Constituent Assembly process and logistical and operational support.

18. Throughout the process, UNPOS promoted the principle of women’s participation in politics. Women’s representation in the National Constituent Assembly and the Federal Parliament reached 24 per cent and 14 per cent, respectively. These were unprecedented gains for Somali women’s involvement in the national decision-making process, though falling short of the 30 per cent quota required for both. The appointment of two women to the 10-member Cabinet, one holding the combined portfolios of Minister for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister, marked a milestone for Somalia.

19. UNPOS supported increased access to information during the critical months preceding the end of the transition, including through the unprecedented live transmission of the proceedings of the presidential election. This promoted transparency and helped dispel rumours of external manipulation and domestic malfeasance. The use of digital platforms supported a vibrant dialogue on the political process among Somalis both within the country and in the diaspora. UNPOS supported the coordination of messages from the international community around the end of the transition.

20. In preparation for the future electoral process, the United Nations engaged with the Somali authorities on possible support to the electoral framework for Somalia.

Working sessions were held with Parliament to set out the groundwork for the Oversight Committee, charged by the Constitution to present draft laws to Parliament.

Targeted sanctions

21. On 23 August, the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea decided to add one individual (Abubaker Shariff Ahmed) to the list of individuals and entities subject to the travel ban, assets freeze and targeted arms embargo imposed by paragraphs 1, 3 and 7 of resolution 1844 (2008). During its informal consultations on 3 October, the Committee was briefed by the Coordinator of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group and, also at its request, by a Senior Legal Officer from the Office of Legal Affairs. The Chair of the Committee delivered the 120-day report to the Council on 8 November, pursuant to paragraph 11 (g) of Security Council resolution 1844 (2008).

22. On 13 November, the Committee received a briefing by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs on the first report of the Emergency Relief Coordinator submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 2060 (2012). During the informal consultation of the Committee held on 14 December, the Coordinator of the Monitoring Group briefed the Committee about recent developments regarding the charcoal ban imposed by resolution 2036 (2012).

B. Immediate support to recovered areas

23. The recovery of new areas by Somali and AMISOM forces generated new demands on the new Government. It identified immediate priorities in recovered areas as the improvement of public safety and security, the re-establishment of local, district and regional administrations, the laying of the foundations for reconciliation and justice and the delivery of basic services. With the United Nations and AMISOM support, the Government started developing a plan for the stabilization of these areas and defining common stabilization principles and priorities with partners.

24. In support of efforts led by the Somali authorities, United Nations agencies provided programme support in areas of access, chiefly Mogadishu and Baidoa. UNDP supported the establishment of the Security and Peace Committee and a resource centre for peace in Baidoa to provide vital access, coordination and oversight on security issues for the local communities.

25. UNDP also conducted an assessment of policing in Baidoa and designed an immediate support package. In the meantime, formal policing resumed in the city with the redeployment of 122 UNDP-trained officers from Mogadishu. A further 650 former police officers in Baidoa underwent vetting to qualify them for a four-week refresher training course and reinstatement into the Somali Police Force.

26. In the continuing absence of a nationally agreed approach, the handling of disengaged former combatants of Al-Shabaab is an immediate concern for the Somali authorities and AMISOM. Pre-conditions for a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme are not in place, and the lack of a legal and policy framework continued to complicate progress. In November, the United Nations facilitated a meeting among major international stakeholders to develop proposals for international support to an immediate caseload of former fighters, while providing support to the development of a comprehensive policy framework.

Building on the Youth for Change programme of UNDP, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations also began work on a joint programme to manage disengaging combatants from Al-Shabaab and other armed groups. In parallel, the United Nations helped AMISOM to develop a strategy for handling disengaging fighters encountered in the course of their operations, and to develop training modules for AMISOM personnel.

C. Security sector

27. The United Nations initiated consultations with the new authorities on emerging challenges in the security sector and the development of national security forces. Pending an agreement between the Government and the international community on the coordination mechanism to succeed the Joint Security Committee, subordinate technical working groups continued to meet on a regular basis and to take forward work on the basis of the plan of implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan.

28. The United Nations continued to support the activities of the Somali Police Force, including the formulation of a strategic development plan. UNPOS facilitated the procurement of equipment and furniture for 10 police stations in Mogadishu and police headquarters and provided training to 38 Somali Police Force drivers and 5 fleet managers. UNDP continued to pay police stipends to 5,388 Somali Police Force officers on duty in Mogadishu, Baidoa and Galmudug, courtesy of the Government of Japan and the European Union. A total of 4,463 Somali Police Force officers were registered in Mogadishu using the biometric registration system, completing the registration for the capital. In "Somaliland", 362 new recruits graduated from the Mandhera Police Training Academy and training for 150 women recruits is under way.

29. UNPOS, jointly with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), continued to support the Government in developing a national maritime strategy and a programme to enhance maritime law enforcement capacity in line with the National Security and Stabilization Plan. The programme includes the establishment of a new coast guard as part of the National Security Forces, building upon the existing UNODC programme with the "Somaliland" coast guard. To better coordinate various capacity-building efforts by the United Nations and multilateral partners, the Maritime Security and Counter-Piracy Working Group was established under the lead of UNPOS.

30. Between 15 August and 31 December, Somali Police Force explosive ordnance disposal teams, trained by the United Nations Mine Action Service, identified and secured 15 improvised explosive devices and collected or disposed of 225 items of unexploded ordnance in Mogadishu and Baidoa. The teams also began battle area clearance of the new seaport in Mogadishu in September. The United Nations Mine Action Service began training for two additional Somali Police Force explosive ordnance disposal teams from Bay region in Mogadishu on 1 October with a view to deploying a Somali capacity to address explosive threats in and around Baidoa.

D. Logistical support to the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM

31. AMISOM reached its full authorized strength (17,731) following the completion of deployment by the Djiboutian contingent in November. Two formed police units from Uganda and Nigeria deployed in September and October, respectively, while the Sierra Leone contingent commenced deployment to replace a similar-sized battalion from Kenya in Sector 2. The increased number of uniformed personnel enabled AMISOM to increase its area of operations across southern and central Somalia, and to take control of several key strategic towns, including Marka and Balaad in Sector 1 and Kismaayo in Sector 2.

32. The expanded area of operations posed a logistical challenge as supply lines were stretched. The United Nations, through the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), continued to train and equip AMISOM transport, signals and engineering capability in order to address this challenge. However, poor infrastructure, weather conditions and continued Al-Shabaab activity between Mogadishu, Baidoa and Beledweyne exacerbated the challenge.

33. The AMISOM concept of operations envisages the deployment of force multipliers, specifically air and maritime assets, to enhance effectiveness. While the African Union is yet to deploy the helicopters authorized in resolution 2036 (2012), the United Nations deployed two helicopters to provide casualty evacuation and logistical support as part of the support package to AMISOM. Given the increasing territory the troops must cover, additional capability is urgently required from troop-contributing countries.

34. The United Nations continued to support 17 AMISOM civilian personnel in Mogadishu, pending the deployment of an additional 50 civilian personnel authorized on a temporary basis by Security Council resolution 2073 (2012) to be deployed to areas recently recovered from Al-Shabaab. AMISOM intends to deploy these personnel at the Sector headquarters in the near future. UNSOA is exploring options to support the additional personnel in Kismaayo, Baidoa and Beledweyne, which will initially be a challenge until permanent sector hubs are built to provide appropriate offices, accommodation, communications and all general support facilities.

35. UNSOA continued to provide the range of support facilities and services to AMISOM mandated by the Security Council. The second phase of the AMISOM permanent headquarters was completed. UNSOA had provided medical support, including 79 medical evacuation, transfer, redeployment and repatriation flights, involving 128 AMISOM personnel as at 17 December. Training of AMISOM personnel remained a priority, with emphasis on pre-deployment and in-mission training. During the reporting period, 892 personnel were trained. UNSOA also supplied diesel kitchen trailers and burners, which significantly reduced charcoal use by AMISOM. The United Nations continued to provide explosive ordnance disposal training, and during the reporting period, AMISOM explosive ordnance disposal training teams safely destroyed 2,399 unexploded ordnance and 17 improvised explosive devices. UNSOA also delivered 24 armoured personnel carriers to AMISOM police and 2 armoured personnel carriers to the Somali Police Force.

36. Following the announcement of a “provisional” guard force of 300 troops, the United Nations undertook to provide the required equipment. UNSOA had previously provided 12 armoured personnel carriers that were used for other duties

owing to operational imperatives. It secured an additional 14 armoured personnel carriers, which are expected to arrive in Mogadishu shortly. A review of the guard force strength, concept and support may become necessary, given the expected deployment of AMISOM and United Nations civilian personnel outside Mogadishu.

E. Human rights and rule of law

37. The United Nations continued to monitor the human rights situation in the country. During the reporting period, 157 civilian casualties were caused by improvised explosive devices. Journalists continued to be targeted, with a total of 10 journalists killed. On 24 October, my Special Representative issued a statement condemning these attacks and offered UNPOS support to facilitate their full investigation.

38. Military operations by allied forces in southern and central Somalia also resulted in civilian casualties, highlighting the continued importance of tracking and taking measures to mitigate civilian casualties by AMISOM and allied forces. The United Nations started consultations with recipient entities on the implementation of the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, which guides United Nations support to non-United Nations armed actors.

39. Arbitrary arrests and detentions remained a major concern. In Mogadishu and in the newly recovered areas, security swipes resulted in mass arrests and detention. In January, the Somali police detained a journalist for writing an article about rape in internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps, as well as a woman who reported that she was raped by members of the Somali National Security Forces. In Puntland, criticism of the decision to postpone presidential elections resulted in arbitrary arrests and detention.

40. The United Nations continued to monitor the situation of detainees. UNPOS and UNICEF officials visited Maslah Camp and asked for clarifications on the legal status of the former fighters held there. Capacity-building of the military and civilian justice system remained a priority for the United Nations. In Puntland, UNODC opened an extensive new capacity in Boosaaso prison, along with a new prison academy, custodial corps headquarters and a new Ministry of Justice building in Garoowe. UNPOS and UNDP engaged with the military justice system in southern and central Somalia to promote better accountability of members of the armed forces and to discuss limitations to military jurisdiction involving civilians. In September, the President of "Somaliland" referred to the Constitutional Court a case in which the military court had sentenced 23 civilians to death or to life imprisonment.

41. UNDP continued to support the training of legal professionals. It supported 22 legal aid offices, which provided legal aid to 3,065 persons, of which 873 were IDPs and 1,244 were women. The case management systems were expanded in both Garoowe and Hargeysa courts, which resulted in the expedition of trials and disposal of case backlog. Codes of conduct for judicial staff were adopted in "Somaliland" and Puntland and judicial inspectors were appointed.

Sexual and gender-based violence

42. Lack of access to southern and central Somalia continued to impede the systematic verification of information and provision of services. In Mogadishu and

the surrounding areas, over 800 rape cases were registered between September and the end of November. The increasing trend of survivors seeking services resulted in an increase in documented cases. The majority of survivors were internally displaced women and girls. Perpetrators came from a wide range of backgrounds and included armed men in uniform. In most cases, survivors were unable or unwilling to identify the perpetrators or link such perpetrators to a specific security and/or armed group for fear of reprisal. In the course of 2012, the military court opened 13 cases on charges of rape. The United Nations assessed that the phenomenon requires urgent intervention by the Government.

Child protection

43. From August to the end of December, a total of 1,506 violations were reported: 100 killings (84 boys, 16 girls); 192 maimings (138 boys, 57 girls); 575 recruitments (564 boys, 11 girls); 86 incidents of sexual violence and rape (1 boy, 85 girls); 528 abductions (489 boys, 39 girls); 13 attacks on schools; 1 attack on a hospital; and 11 denials of humanitarian access. While Al-Shabaab continued to commit the highest number of violations, many cases of sexual violence are attributed to the Somali National Security Forces and its allies. The majority of incidents were reported from southern and central Somalia. Engagement with Al-Shabaab and related armed groups on the protection of children was not possible during the reporting period. The new Government reiterated its commitment to the action plans signed in 2012.

44. UNICEF worked with the Government and AMISOM to develop procedures for disengaging child combatants. The standard operating procedures were agreed to in October by the Government and the first batch of combatants associated with Al-Shabaab (seven boys) was released to UNICEF in early November. These children are currently undergoing a rehabilitation and reintegration programme supported by UNICEF.

F. Humanitarian situation

45. The United Nations continued to monitor and respond to Somalia's complex humanitarian emergency. Of the 3.8 million Somalis in need of assistance, 2.1 million require life-saving aid, while the remaining 1.7 million could easily fall back into crisis if livelihood support is not sustained. Mortality and malnutrition rates remain high, with global acute malnutrition rates exceeding 20 per cent in parts of southern and northern Somalia. However, recent figures indicate an improvement in the food security situation, with a 16 per cent reduction of people in need of life-saving assistance compared to the previous reporting period. The improvements are mainly attributed to sustained humanitarian interventions and improved food stocks following the main harvest in June.

46. Conflict in southern Somalia continued to lead to displacement. Ahead of the military takeover of Kismaayo, more than 15,000 people fled to nearby towns inside Somalia. Seasonal flash floods also led to temporary displacement in Beledweyne, "Somaliland" and Puntland in September and October. There are over 1.1 million IDPs in Somalia and 1 million Somali refugees in neighbouring countries. Although between August and December over 1,000 IDP families returned to their places of origin, mostly in Bay and Shabelle Hoosa regions, conditions in areas of origin were not generally conducive to safe and sustainable return.

47. With increased accessible areas in southern and central Somalia, humanitarian partners were able to provide assistance in Baidoa, Marka, Xudur, Afmadow and Kismaayo. UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO) and their NGO partners reached over 1 million children with health and immunization interventions throughout Somalia, prioritizing newly accessible districts, including Kismaayo, where they carried out polio vaccination campaigns for the first time since 2009, vaccinating 17,000 children in November. WHO established new health facilities and strengthened existing ones. Education programmes targeting 90,000 children in newly accessible areas also resumed. The World Food Programme (WFP) assisted 1.5 million people throughout the country and, after regaining access to Kismaayo, conducted the first rapid food security assessment in three years. This showed that nearly 50 per cent of households in Kismaayo are food insecure, while 38 per cent are moderately food insecure. On the basis of these findings, safety-net wet feeding and supplementary feeding programmes were initiated, prioritizing the vulnerable minority areas and groups. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) vaccinated livestock and distributed fertilizers and improved seeds to farmers in Bay and Shabelle regions. Mine risk education activities also reached more than 127,000 people throughout southern and central Somalia, contributing to a safer environment for children and livelihood activities.

48. Despite these improvements, assistance delivery continued to be challenged by insecurity, lack of Government interlocutors where regional administrations were still being developed, and Al-Shabaab's tactics of asymmetric warfare. The killing of a United Nations employee in August demonstrated that Somalia remains one of the most dangerous operating environments, with nine humanitarian workers killed in 2012. The United Nations priority remains safeguarding and expansion of humanitarian space to assist all vulnerable people throughout the country, based on need, and in accordance with the humanitarian principles of neutrality and independence.

49. For the first time, humanitarian partners launched a three-year strategy in Somalia to address the protracted nature of the crisis in the country. The 2013-2015 consolidated appeals process aims to ensure a linkage between life-saving assistance and interventions aimed at strengthening livelihoods and communities' resilience to shock. Operational planning around resilience rapidly progressed, with the three most concerned agencies (FAO, UNICEF and WFP) aligning their programmes and operations in Dolow, Burao, Oodweyne, Iskushuban and possibly peri-urban Boosaaso. The US\$ 1.33 billion required in the first year of the consolidated appeals process will fund projects that address the needs of 3.8 million Somalis. It will allow humanitarian organizations to scale up their presence in Somalia and to increase programming and enhance monitoring. One of the strategic objectives of the consolidated appeals process is to strengthen the capacity and coordination of NGOs, affected communities and local, regional and national level authorities to prevent and mitigate risks and implement effective emergency preparedness and response.

G. Socioeconomic recovery and development

50. Low levels of capacity in both the public and the private sector, as well as the lack of enforceable regulatory frameworks, continued to constrain recovery and development in Somalia. The United Nations continued work with Government

counterparts and partners such as the World Bank and bilateral donors to support capacity development, but the overall scale of the needs outweighs the current response.

51. The United Nations worked with line ministries in Puntland and “Somaliland” to strengthen their institutional capacities to utilize environmental and natural resources in a sustainable, equitable and gender- and conflict-sensitive manner. The United Nations and partners developed strategic sector plans for education and promoted the allocation of increased Government funds into social services. To support improved nutrition, it established the innovative Learning, Training and Development Unit, which focuses on ensuring that partners have the necessary skills to implement quality programmes.

52. During the reporting period, the United Nations supported the Somali authorities to access the quality data they need for planning and development. Together with the Government, the United Nations developed a framework to monitor progress on poverty, the Millennium Development Goals and annual development plans throughout southern and central Somalia, Puntland and “Somaliland”. On 28 September, UNDP launched *Somalia Human Development Report 2012* on empowering youth for peace and development. It demonstrates the extent to which conflict has become a formidable barrier to addressing the multiple exclusions faced by youth.

53. In parallel to work on capacity development, the United Nations continued to support the direct provision of basic services; for example, through the rehabilitation of strategic water supplies and an extensive community-based Infant and Young Child Feeding programme in Mogadishu. At the community level, through its joint resilience strategy, the United Nations supported economic, development and livelihood initiatives to enhance resilience to shocks and seasonal vulnerabilities, rebuild household food security, and protect and improve household assets. The United Nations supported improvements in the productivity of small scale farmers by transferring knowledge and skills, introducing new equipment and rehabilitating irrigation infrastructure. It also worked to improve the sustainability of fishing in Somalia by increasing the quality and the value of fish and fish products. ILO supported the formulation of employment strategies for consultations with civil society, including the private sector.

54. In late 2012, the United Nations developed a joint programme on sustainable charcoal production and alternative livelihoods in response to Security Council resolution 2036 (2012), aimed at mobilizing key stakeholders in the region and building institutional capacity across Somalia for the effective monitoring and enforcement of the charcoal trade ban, the development of an enabling policy environment for energy security and the promotion of alternative export products. It will also support the development of alternative energy resources and facilitate transition towards livelihood options that are sustainable, reliable and more profitable than charcoal production.

H. Relocation of the United Nations in Somalia

55. The United Nations presence in Somalia averages around 1,100 international and national personnel daily, concentrated in the five hub locations of Hargeysa in “Somaliland”, Boosaaso, Garoowe and Gaalkacyo in Puntland, and in Mogadishu.

Humanitarian partners continued to increase their presence inside the country, particularly in southern and central regions. The biggest concentration of United Nations staff is in Hargeysa, accounting for around a third of the international staff in Somalia, as well as around 50 per cent of nationally recruited staff. As at 31 December, out of a total of 99 personnel, UNPOS had deployed 42 national and international personnel inside Somalia, including 4 personnel of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: 16 in Mogadishu; 13 in Hargeysa; and 13 in Garoowe. The international staff ceiling for Mogadishu remains at 110, with a daily average presence of 84 international staff, of which around 70 per cent of this figure are permanently assigned to the capital. In early December, the UNDP Country Director formally relocated to Mogadishu. Four United Nations Mine Action Service and one United Nations Secretariat Department of Safety and Security international personnel are deployed in Baidoa.

IV. Coordination

A. Coordination of international efforts

56. President Mohamud confirmed the intention of the Government to engage in the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States, during meetings between Emilia Pires, Chair of the Group of 7 Plus, and the Somali Government on 20 December. In advance of that decision, discussions continued under the auspices of the Coordination for International Support to Somalis Executive Committee, comprising the United Nations, the World Bank, donors and NGOs, on how to streamline and strengthen international coordination and aid effectiveness of the international community.

57. To respond to the request of the Somali authorities for better international coordination and greater Somali ownership in decision-making, UNPOS and its regional and international partners continued to review the operational modalities of the International Contact Group on Somalia.

Cooperation among the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union and the United Nations

58. My Special Representative continued to work closely with regional partners, the African Union/AMISOM and IGAD. In addition to meeting with the representatives of the two institutions under their tripartite arrangement, he conducted regular missions to the capitals of the region for high-level consultations and attended the Third High-level Retreat of the African Union Representatives and Special Envoys on the Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa, in Cairo, on 5 and 6 November. The United Nations also worked closely with the African Union and IGAD during its strategic review process in order to better coordinate the organizations' approaches post-transition. At the time of reporting, the African Union review of AMISOM was expected to be completed shortly.

B. Resource mobilization

59. In support of the implementation of the road map, the Peacebuilding Fund provided US\$ 995,100 in critical gap-filling and catalytic funding to UNPOS and UNDP, of which US\$ 374,500 was administered by UNPOS for priority security-

related tasks and the balance by UNDP to support the convening of the National Constituent Assembly. All contributions received have either been fully committed or are earmarked for specific activities, including to support the implementation of the residual follow-on tasks in the post-transition period.

60. There were no contributions made to the trust fund in support of Somali transitional security institutions since my last report and all of the funding received has been fully committed.

61. The AMISOM Trust Fund received GBP 85,000 from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to support the welfare of AMISOM troops and its outreach activities. In the course of 2012, UNSOA committed approximately US\$ 31.7 million, mainly for ground transport equipment, Radio Bar Kulan and public service broadcasting, medical supplies for AMISOM troops and support to AMISOM civilians and police. The uncommitted balance of the fund stands at US\$ 2.6 million, mainly earmarked for outreach activities. UNSOA has requested additional funding under the AMISOM Trust Fund for supplementary equipment to support AMISOM, senior advisers to AMISOM in areas such as international humanitarian law and security and stabilization, outreach activities and support to AMISOM civilians.

62. Out of the US\$ 1.17 billion required for the 2012 consolidated appeals process, US\$ 673 million were received, covering 58 per cent of the needs. In 2012, contributions to the Common Humanitarian Fund amounted to US\$ 95 million, for 173 projects.

V. United Nations strategic review

63. Security Council resolution 2067 (2012), which welcomed the proposed inter-agency review of the United Nations presence in Somalia, emphasized the need to develop an integrated strategic approach to all the activities of the United Nations system in Somalia, in close partnership with the Somali authorities, the African Union and international partners, and requested me to provide options and recommendations on the future of the United Nations in the country.

A. Methodology

64. The strategic review was conducted from September to December, in a process led by the Department of Political Affairs through the Somalia Integrated Task Force, which includes representatives of all relevant departments, offices, agencies, funds and programmes. It comprised an analysis phase, followed by a field mission in which a United Nations integrated team held consultations with the Somali President and Speaker, representatives of the Government and civil society, the African Union, IGAD and regional and international partners. Findings and recommendations were finalized at United Nations Headquarters.

B. Major findings

65. The end of the political transition has ushered in a period of opportunity and great optimism in Somalia. The coming interim period (2012-2016) is widely seen

as the best chance in a generation for sustainable peace and development. Yet the coming years will see great uncertainty. Recent security gains are real, but remain incomplete and could be reversible. Much of the country remains under the influence of Al-Shabaab; areas recovered from the insurgency are especially volatile. There is little accountability for human rights violations. The humanitarian situation remains dire.

66. While there are great opportunities ahead, the road will not be smooth. State-building itself may drive conflict as well as peace, as stakeholders struggle to build new institutions and clarify federal relations between Somalia's centre and regions. The new approach of the United Nations should offer the new authorities of Somalia coordinated support simultaneously to: (i) consolidate security gains and support civilians in the current environment; and (ii) invest in the future of the country, through comprehensive support to Somali-led peacebuilding and State-building around the New Deal Compact.

67. The African Union stabilization operations are vital in creating the security required, until Somali security institutions (potentially with the support of United Nations peacekeepers) can assume full security responsibilities. United Nations logistical support to AMISOM and planning advice to the African Union Commission has effectively enhanced the African Union capacity for this role; however, new funding is urgently needed to ensure the sustainability of AMISOM operations. Enhanced efforts are likewise urgently needed to develop the Somali National Security Forces. In this regard, the Security Council may wish to consider the repeated request by the Government for lifting the arms embargo.

68. There is a strong appetite for an enhanced United Nations role in peacebuilding. The Somali authorities have requested strategic and policy advice, as well as unified United Nations support, to build national institutions, including in the areas of security, justice and governance, and to coordinate international assistance. They have called for a new United Nations approach, characterized by full respect for Somali ownership of peacebuilding; enhanced physical presence of the United Nations in Mogadishu and beyond; a long-term strategy for the development of the Somali people and institutional capacity; and support to accelerate the transition from humanitarian aid to economic recovery and development, noting the need for a differentiated approach across the country. During the review and in his letter to me of 9 January 2013, the President called for the United Nations to ensure a coherent, integrated effort, providing "one door to knock on". These views on the future United Nations role were widely echoed by the African Union, regional and international partners.

69. Noting these views, it is no longer viable to run the United Nations Somalia strategy from Nairobi. Somalia's nascent federal and regional institutions require timely and tailored support, which can be delivered only through greater physical presence of United Nations staff in the field and enhanced coordination among United Nations entities in Somalia while ensuring humanitarian space. During the interim period, the United Nations will need to expand its presence in Mogadishu and in areas recently recovered from Al-Shabaab, stepping up efforts to obtain humanitarian access and to assist the Government to consolidate precarious gains. This should complement assistance to other parts of Somalia.

C. Next steps and options for the future United Nations presence in Somalia

70. Based on the findings of the review, the following elements will form the basis for a new integrated strategic United Nations approach to Somalia: (a) full commitment to Somali ownership of the peacebuilding and State-building agenda; (b) support for AMISOM and for building the capacity of Somali security forces, within the framework of the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy; (c) support to national reconciliation and outreach, the stabilization priorities of the Government, and peacebuilding and State-building initiatives, in cooperation with key partners, including support for the finalization of the constitution and the conduct of national elections by 2016; (d) sustainable capacity and institution development, taking into account different needs in different locations; (e) expanded, secure physical presence of United Nations actors inside Somalia; and (f) resilience-based assistance addressing short-term needs while reducing dependence on humanitarian assistance over time.

71. To support this approach, United Nations entities currently engaged in Somalia will immediately establish a joint plan for relocation inside Somalia, transferring Nairobi-based staff on the basis of programme criticality. The plan will prioritize the immediate relocation of Heads of country offices and, within 6 to 12 months, of other key senior programme staff.

72. However, the current United Nations configuration, with its limited capacity for peacebuilding, is inadequate to meet current needs. Accordingly, the review recommended immediate planning for the liquidation of UNPOS, which has completed its mandate, and the establishment of a new special political mission in Somalia, as an interim measure until conditions permit a peacekeeping operation. The new mission would require enhanced resources and appropriate management and backstopping arrangements to provide: (a) good offices and political support; (b) strategic and policy advice on matters of security, peacebuilding and State-building, including a substantially strengthened security and rule of law capacity, and support to coordination in these areas; (c) monitoring, reporting and technical advice and capacity-building on human rights, including on sexual, gender-based and conflict-related violence and on violations against children; and (d) coordination and support to Government efforts to manage international assistance, with particular attention to security sector reform.

73. Subject to the approval of the Security Council, a technical assessment mission would be immediately undertaken to develop specific tasks and modalities for the new mission in line with the recommendations of the strategic review and further consultation with the Somali authorities. The new mission would be headquartered in Mogadishu, with a presence in subnational centres, as required to fulfil its mandate and subject to adequate security measures. Based on comparative advantage, programmatic and operational tasks would be delivered chiefly by United Nations agencies, in close partnership with the mission. Measures would be developed to ensure strategic and operational coherence among United Nations actors and with AMISOM.

74. The effectiveness of a new mission will depend to a great extent on its ability to function in a volatile security environment. The technical assessment would review arrangements for secure movement and the accommodation of United

Nations staff inside Somalia, including outside Mogadishu, and establish adequate security arrangements that enable daily access for United Nations staff to key counterparts, within acceptable levels of risk. Consultations would be held with the African Union and AMISOM regarding the role of the African Union guard force; if necessary, the Council should consider additional measures to ensure staff security and mobility.

75. The structural configuration of the mission could take several forms:

(a) **Joint African Union/United Nations peace support operation.** Under this option, a Joint Special Representative would oversee separate military, police, political and support pillars. The African Union would lead the military and police pillars, maintaining their African Union character and operational modalities; the United Nations would lead civilian and support pillars. The coordination of United Nations agencies would remain separate from the mission, although linked through collaboration mechanisms. This option meets the needs of the African Union for consistent funding and operational flexibility for AMISOM. However, it significantly increases the identification of the United Nations with African Union active combat operations against Al-Shabaab, which could complicate political impartiality and, despite the structural separation of the United Nations country team, compromise humanitarian space. Achieving coherence across the United Nations system could be difficult, complicating progress towards a fully integrated United Nations presence. This option is not recommended;

(b) **Fully integrated United Nations peacebuilding mission.** Under this option, a structurally integrated United Nations civilian mission would operate alongside AMISOM, undertaking political, humanitarian and development coordination activities, and providing logistical support for AMISOM. This option meets the request of the President of Somalia for a single United Nations entry point, and enables full integration of the United Nations effort in Somalia. However, serious concerns remain about combining political, support and aid coordination functions during combat operations or in areas where territorial control by the central Government is limited or disputed. Full structural integration could exacerbate perceptions that humanitarian and recovery assistance has political objectives, jeopardizing the provision of aid to Somalis in crises. This option is not recommended;

(c) **United Nations assistance mission.** Under this option, a new United Nations mission would deliver political and peacebuilding support with a presence across Somalia. In terms of logistics support to AMISOM, a dedicated Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mission Support would report directly to the Department of Field Support in New York on delivery of the AMISOM support package, in order to ensure efficient delivery to AMISOM. At the same time, she or he would report to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on United Nations mission support issues and policy and political questions arising from the functions of UNSOA relevant to the mandate of the United Nations assistance mission. The United Nations country team would remain structurally separate, but would participate in enhanced mechanisms for strategic integration and operational collaboration, supported by an expanded office of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator. The scope for full structural integration would be reviewed annually, on the basis of progress in the political, security and humanitarian situation. Criteria for this review would be developed by the Somalia

Integrated Task Force. This option enhances the strategic integration of United Nations functions while preserving distinct reporting lines for different United Nations mandates at the current sensitive stage of operations. This option is recommended;

(d) **United Nations peacebuilding mission separate from UNSOA.** Under this option, the new United Nations mission would combine political, development and humanitarian coordination functions. A freestanding United Nations logistical support office would provide support as a service provider to both the United Nations peacebuilding mission and AMISOM. This option ensures the continuation of stand-alone United Nations support to AMISOM while meeting the Government request for “One UN” supporting political and assistance efforts. However, it increases the risk of perceived politicization of humanitarian and development assistance while risking inadequate support and capacity for support to political/peacebuilding functions due to the mission support component not being formally aligned to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. This option is not recommended.

76. Following extensive consultations and careful consideration at Headquarters and in the field, option (c) is the recommended option for the reasons highlighted above.

VI. Observations

77. The end of the transition in Somalia has opened a new chapter for its people, one that is full of expectations, optimism and hope. The people of Somalia have welcomed and embraced the change in their country. They now look to their authorities to transform Somalia from a war-torn State to a functioning one where they can prosper in peace. The federal authorities have made an impressive start. I am pleased to note that the Government developed a vision for the country through the six-pillar policy. This is the new era of national ownership we called for in September at the mini-summit and to which the international community pledged its full support.

78. The recent gains remain fragile, and major challenges lie ahead. Consolidating them will require great political skill from the new leadership. Outreach and national reconciliation, a process which should engage Somalis from all parts of the country, especially from the newly recovered areas, is critical. Completion of tasks left over from the road map on ending the transition, including finalizing the constitution, is equally essential. The new administration will need to deliver quickly on its priorities for peacebuilding, through the establishment of local administrations and services and institutions capable of upholding human rights and the rule of law, demonstrating to its people the difference between life under Al-Shabaab and the post-transition administration. To deliver this, the Somali authorities need coherent, coordinated support and partnership from their regional partners and the rest of the international community. We must be prepared to take risks for Somalia.

79. In this climate, both the African Union and the United Nations have undertaken reviews of our roles in Somalia. The report of the African Union Chairperson in this regard will be directly circulated to the Council. The main

findings of the United Nations review are described in paragraphs 64 to 76 of the present report.

80. In making recommendations, I wish first to recognize the importance of the strategic partnership between the United Nations and the African Union in Somalia. That partnership will be renewed and strengthened as we move to the next phase of support for stabilization, peacebuilding and more political coordination. The African Union, through AMISOM and its partners, will continue to play a critical role in Somalia. I pay tribute to them for their continued sacrifice and dedication to peace in the face of particularly dangerous conditions.

81. In this regard, I urge Council Members to consider all possible approaches to ensure sustainable and predictable funding for AMISOM operations, whether or not under United Nations assessed contributions. The lack of such funding for the rest of 2013, particularly for troop allowances and the outstanding need for enablers and force multipliers, is a matter of serious concern. Recalling the difficult and dangerous conditions faced by AMISOM in pursuit of the mandate granted by the Security Council, it is our shared responsibility to ensure reliable support. I thank those currently providing voluntary funds, and urge others to help share the burden. I recall to Member States the option to contribute through the AMISOM Trust Fund.

82. I also encourage the Council to give serious consideration to the African Union request for an AMISOM maritime component, which remains critical to consolidate control over southern and central Somalia, in particular wresting control from Al-Shabaab of the remaining coastal towns. It could also contribute to the training and mentoring of the Somali coast guard and maritime police to help develop national capacity to eventually take over these responsibilities. In this regard, sustainable support to the development and reform of the Somali security and justice sectors is critical to long-term stability and to an exit strategy for AMISOM.

83. Regarding the form and structure of the future United Nations presence, I note the intention of the Security Council, in its resolution 1863 (2009), to establish a United Nations peacekeeping operation for Somalia, and its adoption of the incremental approach recommended in my report of 16 April 2009 (S/2009/210). I also note the advice of the African Union, and its recommendation for a joint African Union/United Nations operation, which was also considered by the United Nations strategic review (option (a)). My advice remains that the time has not come for these approaches. In the current context of combat operations, the African Union has comparative advantage as a provider of military support. Rehatting forces as a United Nations operation would necessitate changes to the concept of operations and rules of engagement that would be likely to compromise effectiveness of the military campaign, potentially resulting in a backslide in security gains and undermining the environment for peacebuilding. A merger of African Union military and United Nations political functions in the current phase would create constraints to the effectiveness of both organizations. The option of United Nations or joint African Union/United Nations peacekeeping should be revisited, as conventional combat operations against Al-Shabaab end, in consultation with the Somali authorities.

84. Meanwhile, it is time to move beyond the United Nations “light footprint” envisaged in my 2009 report in a creative and flexible manner. In the medium term, and determined by the context on the ground, we should continue to work towards a fully integrated mission, as requested by the President of Somalia. However, while the strategic review considered options for structural integration (options (b) and (d)),

there remain good reasons for ensuring structural separation of the United Nations country team in the current sensitive environment. Coherence of political and peacebuilding efforts must be enhanced without compromising humanitarian priorities. The integration of support functions within one mission is important to ensure continued efficiency in supporting the United Nations operations.

85. I therefore strongly recommend that the Council endorse the creation of a United Nations assistance mission (option (c)) for the current phase, while noting the need to move towards full structural integration as soon as appropriate, and to keep the option of a United Nations peacekeeping operation under review for the future. Taking into account the complex situation in Somalia, and after extensive consultation with stakeholders, I believe this is the right approach, which maximizes the scope of coherence internally within the United Nations, and with the African Union, while respecting the distinct roles and mandates for which we are responsible. Mindful of the established track record of UNSOA in providing logistics support to AMISOM, I want to underscore that the dual-hatting of the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General in this model recognizes the two very distinct roles that she or he will play in the mission. She or he will work directly with the Department of Field Support on all tactical financial and logistics questions regarding delivery of the AMISOM support package, which will not be the responsibility of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. But, by reporting to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on strategic matters and on issues related to support of the assistance mission, we will provide a more coherent, integrated United Nations presence that will serve our delivery and help address the concerns of the Government of Somalia. I am convinced that this structure preserves what is best about UNSOA while correcting some of the identified weaknesses in current United Nations structures in Somalia.

86. Detailed integrated planning for the deployment of a new United Nations mission should take place as soon as possible. New functions and responsibilities must be matched by adequate resources if the new mission is to effectively fulfil its role. Relocation inside Somalia will require new approaches to staff security and mobility in a very volatile environment. Based on the guidance of the Council, we will look at models for security, and deploy a technical assessment mission to define the practical modalities of our new engagement.

87. Although security has improved considerably in Somalia, the struggle is far from over. The insurgents continue to carry out their attacks using terrorist attacks and targeted assassinations. I call on the Somali authorities to investigate thoroughly these incidents and bring perpetrators to justice. The development of professional and capable Somali security and justice institutions is essential; the integration of such forces and of the disengaging Al-Shabaab fighters into society can also be instruments of political reconciliation. Support to these efforts will require resources from Somalia's partners, including logistical, equipment and technical support, delivered in a coordinated way. I call on Member States working in this area to urgently agree on appropriate new mechanisms for collaboration, which the United Nations stands ready to support.

88. The improved security situation in Somalia should help in the fight against piracy by denying the perpetrators safe havens both on land and along the coast. I encourage the new Government to develop a comprehensive national maritime economic and security strategy and a supporting legal framework, including

declaring Somalia's exclusive economic zone, working closely with all stakeholders. The resources that the maritime environment brings would contribute to financing the changes that are necessary for Somalia to recover from the last two decades of conflict. In this regard and as part of the wider security sector support, assistance should also be mobilized and delivered to the justice and corrections services. I have emphasized that the international community must address the root causes of piracy — instability, lawlessness and a lack of effective governance in Somalia — and therefore continue to intensify its engagement to link the counter-piracy approach with development and State-building goals (see S/2012/783).

89. While the change in Somalia has been widely welcomed, there remain elements, both inside and outside the country, that are opposed to the new political dispensation. These spoilers will seize any opportunity to reverse the gains made so painstakingly in the peace process. We must continue to stay alert and deny them the space they seek. We should continue to explore the measures already identified, such as travel bans and asset freezes, as we determine when and to whom these must be applied.

90. I express my gratitude to my Special Representative for his continued commitment to advancing peace and national reconciliation in Somalia. I also pay tribute to the men and women serving with the United Nations and its partner organizations, often under difficult conditions.



Map No. 3690 Rev. 10.1 UNITED NATIONS
January 2013

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section