Hiiraan Online

by Muuse Yuusuf
Monday, April 06, 2009

Peace is an elusive concept that has been missing from Somalis’ political dictionary for sometime. Millions of ordinary people have been desperately praying for it for a very long time. In the past, politicians, analysts, intellectuals, artists and ordinary people, who dared to predict the return of peace to some parts of the country, had their hopes dashed and were disappointed in many occasions. 

However, peace may finally be revisiting Somalia, and the year 2009 will probably be remembered as the year when Somalis, having exhausted all venues of violence and retaliatory actions as means of settling old scores and historical grievances, have decided to resolving their differences through dialogue hence allowing the word peace to be re-encrypted in the political vocabulary, replacing the often cited but much hated worlds of violence, conflict, and war.

So let us read through the lenses of the history of the civil war, highlighting its main phases, missed opportunities and mistakes, actions taken by different communities to deal with injustices and grievances, world events that have shaped the conflict, to see how the civil war (major conflict) is finally coming to an end, and that for the first time there is a glimmer of hope for real peace and unity in Somalia.

Early symptoms of a civil war

It was in April, 1978 when disgruntled military officers, led by Colonel Mahammad Sheekh Osman, executed a failed coup against the military regime. Most of the officers except one were from a one clan. They were executed except few ones such as Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, former president of Transitional Federal Government (TFG), who escaped to neighbouring countries. 

The military regime started systematically persecuting members of the clan of the officers involved in the coup as early as 1979. Although the atrocities were committed by a government, it could be argued persecution of a particular genealogical group in any society is a warning sign of a civil war. Therefore arguably it was 1979 when Somalis saw first symptoms of a civil war. I say arguably because generally it is accepted the civil war started in early 1990s, and that atrocities before that were committed by a government fighting against rebels. 

The formation of the Somali Salvation Front (SSDF) in 1981 was an action taken by the leaders of that community to overthrow the military government, and probably as an expression of their anger and rage over atrocities. However, to be fair on history, the formation of SSDF and its association with Ethiopia, which at the time was at war with Somalia, was and still seen by many as a betrayal of Somaalinimo, Qarannimo – statehood -  because anyone who sides up with the enemy during war is a traitor. Therefore the government was right to have crushed traitors and collaborators. From this logic, the formation of the SSDF has ignited the flames of a civil war and since then it was a Somali against his fellow Somali.

A turning point in that conflict was in 1988 when the two regimes in Addis Ababa and Mogadishu decided to end hostilities between them. This meant Mengistu expelling some members of the SSDF, and closing its camps and radio station inside Ethiopia.

Due to an in-factional fighting, some members joining the military regime, the crackdown by Ethiopia, SSDF activities ceased, and leaders of that community had to wait until 1998 to assert and achieve their political identity and aims. The formation of Puntland as an autonomous state at a later date in 1998 was probably one of the ways in which the community had coped with and came to terms with the civil war. For the first time since the birth of the state in 1960s, they have their own autonomous state; perhaps dream came true because such a thing would have been unthinkable during the collapsed unitary state when power was in the hands of the central government in Mogadishu or even in Villa Somalia!

While the conflict with the SDDF was under way, persecution of another clan in the northwest of Somalia by the military regime was another early warning of a civil war. Civil unrest and revolt in the north led to the military regime’s oppressive campaign against a particular genealogical group.

The formation of the Somali National Movement (SNM) was a high point in that conflict. That action by the community was a reaction against tyranny and injustices. A no turning point in the conflict was when SNM forces captured Burco. The then government air-bombed major cities. Thousands of people killed and thousands displaced.  At the time – the talk in the town was a government at war with its people, and the media was full of stories of atrocities and war crimes perpetuated by the regime.

In 1991, after an inter-factional fighting (pro-unity and pro-independence forces) and after the collapse of the central government and the subsequent power struggle in the south, the SNM, though its original aim was to overthrow a dictatorship, declared  northwest region as an independent state from the rest of Somalia.
 
Arguably, declaration of independence, although rejected by other genealogical groups, was SNM leadership’s decisive action against what they saw as a southern dominance over the affairs of the state, and in particular their grievances and anger over the atrocities in 1980s. For them, to reclaim Somaliland as an independent entity was the only way to come to terms with the hurt and bad feelings. However, to be fair on history, that action was and still seen by many Somalis as a treacherous act by some leaders of a particular genealogical group in order to dismember the country. Even as you read this article the threat of dismemberment has not gone away yet even though it seems the international community has categorically rejected the possibility of that ever happening.

The early symptoms of the civil strive in the south was in late 1980s when the military regime alienated the biggest clan family in central and southern regions. It conducted ruthless assaults on that genealogical group. It was reported atrocities were considered comparable in magnitude and severity to those in the northern regions.

The formation of the United Somali Congress (USC) in 1989 was the community leaders’ opposition to and rejection of repression and injustices by the regime. Torture and extra judicial killings by the regime became common in Mogadishu. It is worth mentioning the slaughter of 400 and injury of 2,000 civilians who were demonstrating against the arrest of their religious leader. It was at that time when the regime sentenced 46 prominent members of the Manifesto Group, a body of 114 prominent leaders that had signed a petition calling for elections and improved human rights, to death. The regime dropped the charges because of massive upraising by the people of Mogadishu.

The collapse of the state could have been prevented had the regime agreed to implementing Manifesto group’s proposals. But the regime, paranoid and overwhelmed by increased pressures from all rebels group, was in no mood to capitulate and decided to put up a fight to the end. Indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas in Mogadishu was the regime’s last brutal action before it was chased out of Mogadishu by the USC and other forces in January 26, 1991.

The removal of Siyad Barre from Mogadishu was that clan family’s decisive victory over what they saw as a dictatorship and tyranny by a ruling clan. Mogadishu, which in terms of Somali politics, is the country’s political power base, was under that family’s control.

However, one of the mistakes by some leaders of that genealogical group was when its militias started massacring members of Siyad Barre’s clan family, which the USC accused of supporting the falling military regime. The massacre was a no turning point in the civil war because it was at that time when the civil war in the south got nastier, i.e. neighbours and friends killing their neighbours, and when the divisive clan politics and sectarian hatred unfolded in Mogadishu. Whether the violence was triggered by clannish sentimentalism against the clan family’s perceived support of the regime in its final days in Mogadishu, or whether it was manipulated by politicians with sinister agenda, the action was a strategic error because it had alienated other communities and set the stage for what had to come. The violence has derailed any efforts (e.g. the Manifesto group) to resuscitate the then collapsing and disintegrating state as animosity between communities grew bigger and wider, or as Dr Abdishakur Jowhar, commenting on what happened wrote:

“........The first genocide unfolded in its ruthless streets in 1991 right after the fall of the Siyad Barre regime.  In that year Hawiye militia burned, raped and killed any person of Darood origin regardless of age, regardless of gender and regardless of their role in the defunct regime. It was enough to be Darood to be massacred in Mogadishu’s first days of infamy. The Darood who has lived in the city for hundreds of years were totally cleansed out of it, their property confiscated and their blood spilled. This is a horrible tragedy of Somali political life that has deeply wounded the self identity of the broken nation. This first genocide has become the driving force and the central reason for the intractable failure of the Somali state. It is not much spoken about in polite circles but it is the poisonous undertones of any dialogue between the members of the Hawiye and Darood tribes.  Somalis who belong to other tribes find it convenient to ignore and forget this first tragedy because the curse of the blood they allowed to flow without protest has haunted them all these years....”

Thousands of people, feeling hurt and angry, were forced to flee from their beloved homes in Mogadishu, seeking refuge and shelter in their clans’ hinterlands as far away as Bosaaso, Gedo, and Kismayo.

Thought it might not have been possible to prevent the atrocities because of the confusion and chaos as the regime was driven out of Mogadishu, had USC leaders prevented the massacre by restraining and reigning in their militias, the civil war could have taken a different direction and the solutions to the then disintegrating state could have been found earlier. 

It was not that long before members of the genealogical group that supported USC, turned their guns against each other. Having liberated and cleansed the city, USC had split into factions, vying for power. Again the city witnessed one of its worst violence. This a big mistake as it prolonged the conflict and it

Also, the armed opposition groups’ (SNM, SSDF, USC etc) failure to come up with a comprehensive political and governance plan after the fall of the military government was one of the biggest blunders by the Somali leadership because their organisations disintegrated into clans, leading to  anarchy and civil war. 

As the armed groups e.g. Somali National Front (SNF), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Somali National Alliance (SNA)/USC, fought over the control of Benadir, Bay, Bakool, Lower Juba regions etc, anarchy and chaos had spread to most regions in the south. Agriculture failed and food supplies disrupted, and in 1991-1992 300,000 people died of starvation and diseases, arguably the worst humanitarian crisis in the height of the civil war. Unfortunately, most people who lost their lives were from inter-riverine communities, population groups who had not taken part in the civil war and had nothing to do with the inter-intra-clan power struggle. 

It was in December 1992 when the United Nations Security Council authorised the deployment of a peace keeping forces under the mandate of securing and protecting food supplies and alleviating the famine. The UN forces, led by the USA under its Operation Restore Hope, landed in 1993.   

The mission gave the conflict an international dimension as the international community, appalled by the mass starvation, decided to do something about it. Although the mission was mainly for humanitarian reason, it could have helped restore order and stability in the south had the mission not been bogged down by America’s determination to capture a warlord that it saw as an obstacle to peace. The mission turned to a man-hunt project, and the violence that ensued killed thousands, including 31 Americans and 24 Pakistani soldiers in Mogadishu.

Though huge resources were allocated, the mission failed for the lack of comprehensive political commitment and plan. The death of few American soldiers was enough to force the American administration to withdraw its forces. Compare that failure of policy with another post-cold conflict namely former Yugoslavia and you will see how these conflicts were treated differently. A long term political commitment was given to one, while the other was left to rot, forgotten. In the Balkan conflict, when the Europeans failed to resolve it peacefully, it was the USA-led NATO military intervention, which brought the conflict to an end. The international community stayed put in the Balkan even after the end of the hostilities. The point here is that: which country would want to politically commit itself to a poor, black and Muslim country like Somalia with no or little natural resources; Somalia that has lost its strategic importance once the cold war was over? And unfortunately, from the beginning the Somali conflict was seen as a humanitarian crisis and not a political one that needed a political solution supported by a long term political commitment. Arguably that misunderstanding of the genesis of conflict is what has made the conflict linger longer.

The UN mission left Somalia in March 3, 1995, having failed to restore order and stability in the south.
 
Another crucial point in the civil war was when the Somali National Alliance (SNA) militias, having “defeated” Americans as they claim, invaded the Bay region on 17 September 1995 and captured Hudur in Bakool region. That action triggered the establishment of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) in March 1995, an organisation set up by genealogical groups in the south western regions as a counter-act and defence mechanism against marauding clan militias. As of 1996 the RRA was engaged warfare with they saw as occupying forces. In 6 June 1999 it had successfully liberated Baidoa, the regional capital of Bay, and was fighting against Somali National Alliance  (SNA) forces in lower Shabelle region.

Even though the RRA later on disintegrated into factions like other clan-based organisations, the establishment of this organisation and subsequent declaration of the South-Western State of Somalia as an autonomous state was that community’s victory over dominance by other clans, hailing as far away as the central regions. In other words by declaring its  own state and army, the community had asserted itself as a formidable political entity in Somalia, a country which was already being divided into many entities “Somaliland, Puntland, Jubaland” etc. In a way this historical action was the way in which the community had coped with the impending civil war.

Reconciliation conferences

Arguably, the much often talked 16 or so reconciliation conferences, the last three ones in Kenya and Djibouti were the most crucial ones, which paved the way for reconciliation. Because other conferences were more or less forums for reconciling Mogadishu warlords, and were mainly attended by mixture of politicians, intellectuals, warlords and leaders who as mentioned earlier, thought the control of the state apparatus was in their hands as long as they control Mogadishu. Also, those earlier conferences took place at the height of the civil war and some leaders of other communities e.g. northeast were probably not yet ready to participate maybe because they had yet to come to terms with the atrocities inflicted on them. 

It was in Arta when over 2,000 politicians, intellectuals, civic groups, traditional leaders gathered in the largest conference held since the start of the civil war. Appreciated, Djibouti did its best to bringing all prominent leaders and notables together. The conference produced the Transitional National Government. Unfortunately that government failed for reasons that are beyond this article. However, some argued it had failed because of interference by Ethiopia – which did not approve the Art project, while others argued it did not work because of opposition by some warlords. 

Though criticised by some for being a conference manipulated by Ethiopia, the second reconciliation conference, which was held in Kenya, was another a step forward towards reconciliation for two reasons. First it was attended by those politicians that boycotted the Arta conference, and this meant main character leaders were willing to participate in the talks. Secondly it produced a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and a charter in 2004, which, though not perfect tried to articulate a political vision for the disintegrating state. Although symbolic, the word “federal” has undertone of political federalism, designed to accommodate those regions with secession tendencies. This is very important for the preservation of the Somali unity and good news for unionist communities.

After a lot of bickering, the new government was re-located in Baydhabo as it seat. This was a good gesture to the peoples of that region whose leaders (e.g. the late Abdulqadir Zobe), advocated for a federal structure at the early stages of the inception of the republic. People and those leaders who are old enough to remember the days when the state was being constituted in 1950s felt their long waited dream had finally come true! Though in name and ineffective, that community welcomed the first federal government in the political history of Somalia on their soil.

The rise of the Islamic Courts Union and Ethiopian invasion

The politics of Bush administration’s war on terror made the conflict linger longer for two more years. The Somali factions, that were already divided, found themselves being torn apart by the politics of the new world order. By supporting the infamous Mogadishu warlords and then using Ethiopia as a proxy, the USA used Somalia as testing fields for its global war on terror.

The defeat of the infamous Mogadishu warlords by the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 was a major development in the history of the civil war. It was at that time when a resemblance of law and order was enjoyed by the peoples in the south. However, that success story short lived because of mistakes by (i) the leaders of that revolution for provoking Ethiopia/TFG and not concentrating on governance building, (ii) the West/Ethiopia determination to remove a “terrorism” threat from the Horn and (iii) leaders of the TFG particularly former president who did not shy away from using military power in order to subjugate the south to his rule even if that meant using foreign forces. It was not that long before the drums of war were being beaten by all sides.

With the approval of the USA, Ethiopia invaded and occupied Somalia illegally in 2006. It brought an unpopular and weak TFG in Mogadishu. The stage for the second genocide in Mogadishu was put in motion by Ethiopia/TFG forces against the insurgency. Unfortunately again the politics of sectarian hatred was not avoided, and some leaders used the moment to settle old scores. Overwhelmed by the brutality of the violence, here is how Dr Abdi Ismail Samatar described the Mogadishu atrocities by TFG/Ethiopian forces in his article Somalia’s Radical Hutus and the Bloodbath in Mogadishu:

“........The Ethiopian occupations and the TFG and its militia is tantamount to supporting the murderous Interahamwe of Rwanda, the Hutu radicals which perpetrated Rwanda’s genocide. One of the features of the Rwandan Hutu radicals was the categorical demonization of moderate Hutus and all Tutsis. This is exactly the language used by the TFG president and his prime minister. Mr. Yusuf has often repeated that certain genealogical groups oppose his sectarian and clanistic agenda. Among those he singles out are those population groups who constitute the majority in certain regions. In one instance, he refers to taking revenge in such a way that some of the victims of the 1991/2 killing fields becoming today’s killers. This threat has materialized as the destruction of neighborhoods in the capital over the past few weeks demonstrates. In addition to Mr. Yusuf’s call for revenge, the TFG’s prime minister and the deputy minister of defense have subsequently convened a meeting in which they called on “their clan” to assist the Ethiopian troops in cleansing the city of the opposition genealogical groups. This language is quite similar to those of the radical Hutus before the Rwanda genocide ensued. Lastly, the combination of this rhetoric, the destruction of health facilities, the closure of the seaport in order to cut off new food shipments to the city, and the denial for humanitarian agencies access to nearly half a million people who fled the city points to a calculated strategy to decimate all opposition, even if this is the whole population.”

Read the above statement in conjunction with the earlier statement by Dr Jowhar, and you will see how Mogadishu witnessed another round of vindictive sectarian aggression against other genealogical groups that were associated with the first genocide in Mogadishu in 1990s. The only difference this time was foreign forces (Ethiopia) and terrorism was used as justification to settle old sectarian scores and grievances.

Civilians fled the city, seeking refuge as far away as central regions. This created the worst humanitarian crises in Africa. Around 6,000-16,000 civilians were killed, and 600,000 were displaced in violence in the south and central regions.

That violence could have been prevented had all sides given the failed Khartoum talks a chance to succeed. The talks could have produced a national unity government (UIC+TFG). Unfortunately, it seemed though all sides had already made up their minds, i.e. – Ethiopia/USA to remove “terrorism” threat and install a weak and unpopular government, USA to use Ethiopia as proxy on its war on terror, and the ICU – hijacked by its military wing – Al-Shabab - to wage its regional Jihadist war in pursuit of an Islamic Caliphate in the Horn. 

The appointment of Nur Hassan Hussein (Adde) as primate minister was a big breakthrough, giving the peace and reconciliation process a new momentum. It was this man who, with his soft tone and humility echoed the quest for peace by millions of people in the south. Having understood the suffering of Mogadishu residents, this man articulated the need for a political reconciliation, and that there would be no need for foreign troops provided Somalis were willing to settle their differences peacefully. Nur Cadde’s tone of reconciliation, although it alienated some factions within the TFG and the Asmara group, has allured some member of the ARS, led by the current president to accept and join the peace process. Also, it must be said Sheikh Sharif’s decision to engage in political dialogue was a very important because he articulated that the enemy (Ethiopia) could be defeated by both force and dialogue.  

The fall of Mr. Yusuf, and the withdrawal of Ethiopian forces, made possible by factors, including the insurgency’s relentless attacks, ARS/TFG Djibouti agreement, change in USA administration, Ethiopia’s need for a face saving strategy exit, was the final chapter that has ended the new waves of violence that started in 2006. The international community support of Mr. Nur Adde with his power struggle with Abdulahi Yusuf was the right thing to do because the last was seen by many as a divisive figure and an obstacle to peace.

Conclusion

In conclusion, having highlighted the main phases of the civil war, missed opportunities, atrocities committed by all sides, mistakes made, actions taken by different communities to deal with and settle old scores and historical grievances, I must say that there is a glimmer of hope for real and a long lasting peace in 2009. There does not seem any logic or reason for perpetual violence because all communities had already played their cards, and the only way out is to opt for peace.  Somalis must seize this opportunity and must not mess it up again by repeating past mistakes including, among other things, the military regime’s rejection of the Manifesto group’s initiative, armed opposition groups’ (SNM, USC, SSDF etc) failure to come up with a comprehensive political plan to replace the collapsed military, TFG/UIC’s failure to seize peace opportunity in the Khartoum conference, which has led to the violence that ended recently.    

There is now a government of national unity supported by the international community and most Somalis, including Somaliland’s vice president’s courageous statements on the inevitability of Somali unity. There is an opportunity for a new politics - the politics of the young – a generation in their 40s who has the intellect, skills, and education to understand how and why things went so badly in Somalia, and if given chance can put things right. A generation that has not participated in the collapse of state. This is an opportunity to depart away from the politics of the old divisive and visionless. The young leadership should be given a chance, and the old should have a listening ear, giving advice to the young wisely and freely.

Internationally, the end of the war on terror and the marginalization of the extreme political Islam are at sight because of changes in the US administration; the tone of the new administration is hope and dialogue between all nations. This will impact on Somalia as it will affect other countries. The international community particularly the west should not use Somalia as an experimental ground for any future new policy on terrorism as this will only inflame the situation.

It must be said that Ethiopia was implicated in setting up treacherous traps for Somalia in particularly the conflict in the south where she has used warlords as a proxy in protecting its national interest in Somalia. It is the only country that has tried hard to divide and rule Somali-lands, by having a commercial attaché/embassy in the northwest of Somalia. So Ethiopia’s fall from the grace and humiliating defeat it suffered, having achieved nothing tangible, is a great victory for all Somalis. Ethiopia should not be allowed again to spoil the peace thorough its divide and rule politics.

The end of the culture of impunity

Throughout the civil war, thousands of innocent people have been killed, and as always is the case perpetrators of some of the atrocities seem to be untouchable and beyond the reach of the law. In order to bring the culture of impunity to end, as articulated by the UN Special Representative to Somalia Mr. Ould Abdalla, the international community should investigate war crimes and crimes against humanity and refer cases to international tribunals. This is in order to deter spoilers of peace and others, who would use any opportunity to incite sectarian hatred. From now on, the international community should keep a list of all those who encourage, promote and incite sectarian or religious violence in view of bringing them to justice either locally or internationally.
For the “religious” community whether moderate, hardliners, Jihadists, Sufis, Salafis and Wahabis, rather than beating drums of war and sectarian hatred you should take the lead in organising National Prayer Days or memorial services for the souls of hundred of thousands of citizens who lost their souls throughout the civil war. This would be an appropriate and a fitting role for the mullahs if they want to keep the moral high ground they claim, if any!!
As they say, time is healer, and after 30 years of bickering, suffering and bloodshed, I can only hope that a hurts and bad feelings caused by the civil war have now been healed, and that it is high time for peace and unity.
Muuse Yuusuf
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