By Dr. Mahamud M. Yahye

In my previous article, last month, I talked in detail about the current status of Somalia’s ruined economy. I pointed out that the civil war that has started almost 15 years ago has dealt a catastrophic blow to our economy which is now in shambles. This senseless civil strife has also resulted in total destruction of the Somali State and all its public institutions; and this is something unique in the annals of the history of war-torn countries, because in all these other countries, e.g., Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Cambodia, Columbia, etc., the central government remained almost intact, despite the on-going conflict. Not unlucky Somalia. The collapse of the state, which together with its different organs, both civil and military, and autonomous agencies (para-statals) used to be the main employer of the local labor-force, has resulted in extreme hardship for our Somali people. As a natural consequence of this devastating civil war, the country’s basic infrastructure, factories, hospitals, schools, and the single university were all destroyed or taken over by armed militias or destitute squatters.

Having said that, I also pointed out that the breakout of the civil war, and the subsequent collapse of the Somali State, was a lose-lose situation; we all lost dearly, despite what some tribal-minded fanatics may think, because we were all benefiting, directly or indirectly, from the destroyed state and its services; and no particular group, clan or region has really gained from its disappearance. Prior to the terrible disaster that began in the late 1980s, we at least lived in peace and harmony. Moreover, I reminded the Somali readers that, contrary to what some misguided warlords and faction leaders have been propagating for the past 15 years, tribe “X”, “Y” or “Z”, is not our real enemy. Our real enemy is: abject poverty, wide-spread ignorance and disease, very low level of economic development, total destruction of our state and a seemingly intractable civil war which Somalia has been experiencing for almost two decades now.

Somalia’s civil strife has now taken the form of a protracted local fighting that sporadically erupts into serious violence, particularly in the southern one-third of the country. In this regard, we must admit that we, all Somalis – both in the North and South - have recorded a colossal failure and our name and honor, as a nation, have also been dragged in the mud. The logical impact of these extremely negative factors has included a considerable reduction in livestock export – the country’s main export commodity and foreign exchange earner (because of Saudi Arabia’s politically motivated ban under the pretext of a non-existent Rift Valley Fever that is said to have afflicted Somali livestock); decline in agricultural production, leading to a huge decrease in banana exports, the country’s second major export commodity; a large scale cutting of trees, and the export of resulting charcoal to neighboring Arab countries, with its debilitating environmental consequences; the depletion of Somalia’s fisheries by foreign fleets; and the dumping of chemical, industrial (and even nuclear waste according to reports by some international organizations) on the country’s long, unprotected sea coast. Absent a strong central government, this coast has now become one of the most dangerous high seas in  the world terms of piracy.

On the other hand, the total disappearance of a functioning central government, and the destruction of the economic facilities, have resulted in petty trade becoming the main economic activity now going on in Somalia. Here again, the situation is very bleak, because, absent a central authority that regulates the economy, both in terms of monetary and fiscal policies, the only economic policy is the following simple motto: Sell anything you can, i.e., expired foodstuff and medicines, drugs and narcotics  (foremost among them being the harmful qat), weapons, forged passports, anything goes!  In addition to that, any warlord or regional leader can print any quantity of money he wishes, thus resulting in the plummeting of the Somali Shilling to its lowest possible level vis-à-vis the US dollar and other hard currencies.

Nonetheless, in the view of some experts, despite these appalling outcomes, the disappearance of the central government with its inappropriate socialist policies, over-sized bureaucracy and unnecessary monopolistic restrictions, has resulted in some positive economic achievements brought about by an active private sector. This is particularly true in areas where relative peace and security prevail, such as northeastern and northwestern regions (or Puntland Autonomous Region and self-declared Somaliland Republic). These positive achievements comprise, among other things: Extensive telecommunications, including phone and internet connections in most big cities (at one of the cheapest rates in Africa); airline connections, both internally and externally; and money transfers through local agencies (Hawalas). 

As can be deduced from the foregoing discourse, Somalia is faced with an enormous challenge if she wants to achieve a rapid and meaningful reconstruction, because it has to realize peace, security and stability before it can begin the daunting task  of  rebuilding. These  immense  challenges  are  due, as indicated earlier,  to  the following principal factors: (a) comprehensive destruction of the economic infrastructure; (b) extreme poverty and widespread unemployment that force young men, with no other skills or means of livelihood, to resort to the gun as a source of economic  support;   (c)  widespread  displacement,  internally  and  externally; and (d) insecurity, lack of public institutions and periodic violence that lead, ironically, to the thriving of a few warlords and their armed militias; naturally, this anarchy constitutes a major constraint  to  successful  business  activities  in  many  parts of southern Somalia. (But even before the ruinous civil war, Somalia was one of the poorest and least developed countries in Africa).

I cannot emphasize enough that peace and security should be accorded top priority and should actually prevail over economic reconstruction when charting post-conflict state policies in our homeland.  In this connection, two crucial factors have to be taken into account. First, the specific circumstances of Somalia should be analyzed and the political as well as economic root causes of its civil war should be discussed.  For instance, many observers of the Somali political scene blame former Gen. Mohd. Siad Barre’s military/communist regime  for the enormous calamity that has befallen Somalia. But others point their fingers at Gen. Mohd. Farah Aideed and his extremist United Somali Congress (USC) faction for igniting the tribal conflict that they led  country to for the ultimate purpose of ascending to power. Unfortunately, this kind of honest and objective analysis is not what has been taking place in the last 14 Somali peace and reconciliation conferences over the past 15 years; what was usually happening was the acrimonious haggle, at times lasting more than two years, over positions in a proposed new central government, as if being a minister is not a public service but the distribution of a bounty or spoils of war, normally along tribal lines. Second, the new Somali leadership should also remember that the conclusion of a formal peace does not necessarily imply the return to normality, as the fragile peace may easily be shattered by recurrent rounds of violence, often initiated by some disgruntled warlords. In other words, the causes of the civil strife often persist even  during the reconstruction phase and must be carefully kept in mind.  Claude Ake was right when he said in his book “The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa” that: “…the state has to be seen as something that belongs to all, something that deserves support for the service it renders, not as fearsome exploiter or as an exploitable resource.” (Emphasis added).

In our peace and reconciliation conferences, it would have been better, in my opinion, to adopt the South African model of "Truth and Reconciliation Commission" whereby both the Somali warlords and  their victims could have been seated in the same hall, each confessing – having been given total amnesty – about the wrongs or crimes they had committed or were subjected to and why; then, each person repents and asks for forgiveness while, at the same time, pledging – under a solemn Koranic oath - never to repeat the past crimes or resort to violence to further his own political agenda or that of his tribe.

Considering the above important points and bearing in mind the reality on the ground in our unlucky country, I think that Somalia’s new President, Mr. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and his Prime Minister, Mr. Ali Mohd. Ghedi, have taken the right decision when they rejected to re-locate their fledgling administration to Mogadishu, mainly for security reasons; and have, instead, decided to temporarily settle in the more peaceful city of Johwar (about 90 km away from the capital).  In this regard, it is very disheartening to note that twice when Mr. Ghedi paid a brief visit to Mogadishu – from which, incidentally, he hails – there were two attempts to assassinate him.  Fortunately, both attempts failed, but dozens of innocent Somalis had lost their lives in these “barbaric” and “cowardly” acts, as Mr. Ghedi has rightly described them.

The question that immediately jumps to mind is this: Who is behind these ruthless, inhumane and un-Islamic acts of violence and what do they gain from them?  The answer is very simple. There are some Somali warlords, particularly those stationed in Mogadishu, who benefit, both economically and politically, from the current mayhem and, thus, have no desire, whatsoever, to witness a functioning central government in that country. Most of them are semi-illiterate  former drivers, petty traders or simple ex-police sergeants who have no any experience in government work. Consequently, they will always sabotage its installation, as they had done to the previous administrations of Mr. Ali Mahdi and Mr. Abdiqasim Salad. On the other hand, in its last report on Somalia of October, 2005, the UN’s Security Council has confirmed that the above warlords do not want a central government, period. It has also dealt at length with the considerable quantities of lethal weapons that the above-mentioned warlords are now amassing in order to fight through naked force, and not through a peaceful, civilized dialogue, against the new national government of Somalia in which they hold, ironically, important ministerial positions.

This reminds me about a story that I had heard from Mr. Hassan Abshir Farah, the well-known former Mayor of Mogadishu and ex-Prime Minister of the previous Somali government headed by ex-President, Mr. Abidqasim Salad, while the former was visiting Saudi Arabia a few years ago. Mr. Hassan Abshir told us that he asked one of the renowned Mogadishu warlords, to transfer to the government the natural airport that he has near the Somali capital. According to Hassan’s testimony, this ruthless warlord simply and very candidly replied: “ListenHassan, I get a net income of US $2,000 per day from this airport. So, if you want me to hand it over to the government, you should kill me first.” Likewise, in a recent article, titled “Mogadishu Warlords Have Exhausted the Nation’s Patience” and posted on some leading Somali websites, former Prime Minister Mr. Abdirizak Haji Hussen of the 1960s – arguably the closest to a statesman that Somalia has ever produced, apart from the first President of the country, Mr. Aden Abdulle Osman - has revealed that one of these warlords earns as much as $170,000 per month from the airport that he now illegally controls near Mogadishu, and more from his extortion roadblocks on the country's main roads in addition to reported drug peddling. Thus, they cannot accept any central government which they do not preside over or control so as to further their personal, selfish economic interests, and not to serve the Somali public at large. But it may be worth noting here that the Kenyan government has recently decided to ban its national airlines from calling on two airports near Mogadishu, at the request of the new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, because drug trafficking and other illicit activities are confirmed to be going on in these areas.

In the opinion of many experts on the subject, the sine quo non condition for the economic reconstruction of Somalia is resorting peace and security first, because, as we have alluded to earlier, peace, security and the possibility of making a living are the essential prerequisites for the Somali citizens’ transition back to a productive life. As such, no real public institutions and services can be rebuilt, and no meaningful economic reconstruction can jumpstart without securing the country’s peace and tranquility, preferably with the help of well-equipped troops from African countries, excluding Ethiopia, the archenemy of Somalia. Moreover, most of the country’s experienced and educated talents, who number millions, have either been displaced internally or live now in the diaspora. They will not come back to their homeland without seeing the minimum level of peace, security, the existence of a reasonable degree of respect for basic human rights and the prevalence of  law and order.

In their last report, titled “Somalia’s Economic Reconstruction, Institution Building and Resource Mobilization”  (2003), a special panel of experts – mostly educated Somalis - has opined that restoration of peace and stability should be the first order of the day for the new Somali national government. They also recommended that, as the coffers of this fledgling administration are currently empty, and it would take years to restore a meaningful tax collection, the number of ministries for this new administration should not initially exceed 20 line ministries.  Compare this to the 91 members that Mr. Ghedi’s cabinet now consists of. It is the height of folly to base the number of ministries on the number of clans and sub-clans of the country and not Somalia’s real needs at this very critical phase of its troubled recent history. It is also laughable to talk about ministries of tourism, petroleum, and the like, for a lawless country like Somalia that nobody in his right mind would visit and has never produced a drop of oil in its history. (I gather, the USA, the only superpower at present, that also boasts the biggest economy in the world, has 15 ministers only in its federal cabinet!) The above-cited report has also proposed a budget of around US $1.13 billion to re-build the public institutions of the country and to rehabilitate its basic infrastructure for the first two years of reconstruction. In the view of some other experts, Somalia would need around $5 billion in order to re-build the country and, thus, reach the level of economic development it was passing through at the start of its civil war. Besides, the country now owes an external debt totaling approximately $2.84 billion that, sooner or later, has to be repaid or forgiven.        

Naturally, this will require a large scale mobilization of financial resources from the international community. Unfortunately, however, the serious rift that currently bedevils the TFG, which is based in Jowhar, and the opposing minority of  Mogadishu war-mongers, does not augur well. It constitutes one of the main excuses that most foreign governments are presently using to justify withholding their promised help to the emerging Somali state. To sum up my proposals, restoration of permanent peace; neutralization of the opposition warlords (led by the naive Speaker of the Parliament, who often dispenses meaningless platitudes); demobilization of the armed militias and finding lawful jobs for them; rebuilding of the state’s main organs and institutions; repatriation of the internally displaced/exiled Somali talents; and the mobilization of sufficient funds from abroad are the quintessential pillars that Somalia’s reconstruction and revival could firmly stand. (The other recommendations, which some other experts, particularly foreigners with no profound insights into Somali affairs, have been making over the years do not, in my view, constitute top priority at this stage). Otherwise, we would go back to square one and remain, God forbid, where we have been in the past 15 years (or it would be as Somalis would say: “Jugjug meeshaada joog.”)

                                                                References

(1)           Ake, Claude, The Feasibility of Democracy in Africa  (Dakar, Senegal: Codesria, 2003).

(2)          "Somalia's Economic Recovery, Institutional Building and Resource Mobilization", 2nd Draft Report, February 2003. [A report prepared by a 29-member special panel of Somali and foreign experts sponsored by the UNDP Office for Somalia, held in Nairobi, Kenya].

(3)           Carbonnier, Gilles "Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and the Economy: A Critical Review of the Literature."  War-torn Societies Project Publications,  Occasional Paper No.2 [March 1998].

(4)           International Labor Organization "Employment for Peace in Somalia", In-Focus Programme, Crisis Response  & Reconstruction (funded by the Italian Government).  [ILO, June 2003].

(5)           Fagen, Patricia Weis "After the Conflict: A Review of Selected Sources on Rebuilding War-torn Societies",  United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, undated.
 
(6)           Center for Research & Dialogue,"High-Level Dialogue with the Somali Business Community,  Djibouti,  July 21-22,  2004: A Summary Report."  [Organized  by  the  late  Mr. Abdulkadir Yahya Ali, a well-known Somali peace activist, who has recently been murdered in Mogadishu in cold-blood]

(7)           "Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means?"
                International Crisis Group, ICG, Africa Report No. 88 [December 2004]

(8)           "Somalia: Country Profile, 2005" and "Somalia: Country Report, August, 2005"
                The Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU, London, United Kingdom.
               
(9)           Samatar, Abdi and Ahmed "Transition and Leadership [in Somalia]: An Editorial"
 Bildhaan, an International Journal of Somali Studies, vol. 5  [October 2005]

                       
Mahamud M. Yahye,  Ph.D.
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
E-mail: [email protected]