Monday February 1, 2016
By ELIUD OWALO
focused: Kenya Defence Force soldiers patrol Tabda village, 80km from the Kenya-Somalia border, on February 20, 2012.
The Kenya Defence Forces rolled into Somalia in 2011 and were later absorbed into the framework of the African Union Mission to Somalia. The core objectives of Amisom are threefold: First, decapitate and degrade al Shabaab’s ability to launch attacks from across the border; Second, create the right environment for the establishment of a proper functioning government and governance institutions, including security agencies, in Somalia, and; Third, provide space for the provision of humanitarian assistance and start the process of state and livelihoods reconstruction.According to the Constitution of Kenya 2010, national security is subject to the authority of the constitution and Parliament, and security organs are subordinate to civilian authority. The constitution also provides that national security shall be pursued in compliance with the law and with utmost respect to the rule of law, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms. Under Article 95 (6), the National Assembly approves the declaration of war and extension of states of emergency. This provision is in light with Parliaments’ oversight role over the Executive, which is also provided for under Article 95 (5) (b) of the constitution. A proper construction, therefore, of the principles of national security as read with the oversight roles of Parliament that include the approval of declaration of war leads to the inescapable conclusion that the decision to send Kenya military to Somalia was supposed to have been debated and authorised by Parliament. This was not the case.To inform the approval decision, Parliament would have been provided with a detailed plan, clear benchmarks to be attained and specific timelines set before KDF was sent to Somalia.
The plan would also have provided a clear monitoring, evaluation and reporting framework with clear performance indicators, and a results matrix. There should also have been an elaborate risk management strategy, with commensurate proactive mitigation measures. Astonishingly, to date there has never been a comprehensive situational audit and analysis report on the Kenyan military activities and achievements in Somalia, if any, presented to Parliament.
In the wake of the terrible attack and death of Kenyan military personnel in El Adde, Somalia there is need to institute thorough investigations. Parliament should conduct an independent inquiry into Kenyan military presence in Somalia and make specific recommendations. The military leadership should take these two issues very seriously. Is there an enemy within the military? How can such an attack happen? There must be something that went terribly wrong. Hard questions must be asked and answers provided to Parliament on military command and control, operations strategy and intelligence gathering. An independent professional panel must also be constituted to review and assesses military structures, leadership, resourcing, capabilities and capacity.
Second, a country cannot have its military engaged in war without providing a comprehensive audit status to the citizens.
There has to be a feasible cost-benefit analysis and plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement, because the Kenya military is not an occupier force. It is against this background that there is need for the establishment of a parliamentary select committee to inquire into not only the deployment of our security forces in Somalia but also the internal threats we have faced in the last three years, including but not limited to KDF's response to such internal threats such as the Westgate Mall and Mandera University College terror attacks.
The writer is a management consultant based in Nairobi.