Eurasia Review
Analysis
Sunday, August 25, 2013
At the start of the month the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu was the
target of a suicide car-bombing. A Turkish policeman lost his life in
the attack and three others were wounded. The extremist movement
al-Shabaab (The Youth), an off-shoot of al-Qaeda, claimed responsibility
for the attack.
The attack raised a number of questions about why the
Turks had been targeted. For several years now, Ankara has played a very
important role in attempts to alleviate the human tragedy in Somalia
caused by the civil war and drought. So what could have enraged the
assailants? What is the message they were trying to send to Turkish
decision-makers?
1. Attacks in Somalia and the Turks.
An examination of the security record in Somalia over the past year
and a half reveals that this is not the first attack targeting Turks.
The recent report of the UN Secretary-General’s office, S/2013/326
issued on 13 May 2013 shows that one of the Turkish aid convoys was
attacked by a vehicle driven by a suicide bomber. In October of last
year, Mustafa Haşimi, head of Africa operations in TIKA (the Turkish
International Aid Agency), was attacked by armed militias in central
Somalia near the town of Galkayo and slightly wounded. According to
Somali media, there had been fierce clashes between the militia and
units attached to the Puntland police escorting the TIKA official.
During the clashes one of the militants was killed and three others were
wounded. Earlier still, in March 2012, Muhtar Abu Zubayir, the leader
of the al-Shabaab movement attacked the Turkish state in a recorded
message he sent out via a radio station, accusing Ankara of being the
gateway through which Western colonialism enters Somalia. Sheikh Mahmud
Ragi (Ali Tayri), the official spokesman for al-Shabaab threatened to
carry out more attacks on Turkish diplomats.
These incidents are evidence that Turkey’s Somalia policy has now
entered a new stage, and that the turmoil inside the country and its
repercussions abroad will have adverse consequences on Turkey’s work in
the country. Ever since the Somali state went bankrupt at the start of
the 1990s it has experienced a series of complex security challenges.
Security, political, tribal, clan, and religious issues are entangled
with one another, and a steady rise in foreign involvement has further
complicated the picture.
Bearing this complexity in mind enables us to better understand the
remarks of Mohammed Mirsel Sheikh, Somalia’s ambassador to Turkey, to
the Anatolia Agency in Ankara earlier this month. The Somali ambassador
alluded to the confused state of affairs in his country when he remarked
that “the machinery of the state is weak in Somalia, including its
security apparatus.” The ambassador continued, “the fact that al-Shahaab
al-Mujahidin has claimed responsibility for the attack on the Turkish
embassy in Mogadishu is not by itself sufficient. It is essential that
we work together with the Turkish government to identify those
responsible for the attack.”
2. The Turkish-Somali Military Agreement: A Turning Point?
The attacks on Turks appear to have started early in 2012. The
attacks have not been continuous but appear to be occurring at intervals
and, as such, are reminiscent of the attacks on the African forces in
Somalia. In addition to the strategic aspect of Somalia’s relations with
Turkey, it’s important to remember that after the war with Kenya and
before the recent attack on the Turkish Embassy, al-Shahaab had itself
been subject to attacks in the areas of southern Somalia that it
controlled. [1]During al-Shabaab’s war with Kenya, the Somali government
had also been involved, despite an initial delay. In order to
strengthen the combat capabilities of the weak Somali government forces,
Ankara and Mogadishu signed a military training agreement on 13 April
of last year. It included training programs, exchanges, visits, and
discussions between the Turkish and Somali armies. There’s little doubt
that the al-Shabaab movement blames its defeats (particularly the loss
of Kismayo Harbour in September 2012) on the foreign powers which had
fought directly against it and those who were indirectly involved by
training Somali government forces. Turkey falls into this latter
category.
The war waged against al-Shahaab by Kenya, Africa, and the Somali
government forces came onto the international agenda at the same time as
the Arab Spring. Libya’s former leader, Muammar Gaddafi devoted a lot
of effort in his final years to playing a key role in Somalia and
channelling weapons to the various factions and groups there. Eritrea
has also been accused of arming various Somali groups, among them
al-Shabaab, though it has persistently denied these accusations.
Nevertheless, Eritrea’s president Isaias Afewerki lost his biggest ally
when Gaddafi was overthrown and now finds himself facing a much bigger
challenge.
The clashes taking place in the Middle East have been strikingly
reflected in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia. [2] Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and Israel all regard this region as important to
their national security. There have been a lot of reports published
recently which mention a gradual increase in Iran’s presence in the
area, in parallel with the crisis in Yemen and escalating Western
opposition to Teheran. Indeed, Iran has been accused many times of
supplying weaponry to al-Shabaab by sea. Leaving aside the veracity of
the accusations, and regardless of whether the Somali government
currently appears more stable than it did in previous years, Somalia is a
prime candidate for an arena where increasing tensions from regional
and international conflicts will be expressed.
3. Oil? Now What?
Somalia has recently witnessed a number of important developments
with economic and strategic consequences. From the start of last year,
there have been increasing signs that international petroleum and
natural gas companies have renewed their interests in Somalia. Reports
indicate that Somalia has rich reserves of petroleum, natural gas, and
uranium. If this is the case, Somalia could become one of the world’s
largest energy producers. However these developments have led American,
Italian, and British companies to compete and jockey for position, much
like they did in the 1990s. There are those who argue that this
competition was responsible for the failure of “Operation Hope”, the
joint U.S.-UN intervention in Somalia of the early 1990s. There are
accusations that Italy had supported Muhammed Farah Aidid, the clan
leader who was the main enemy of the American military. As Somalia’s
former colonial master, Rome argues that Washington knew nothing about
the social fabric and tribal structure of Somalia, claiming that this
was the cause of the mission’s failure. More recently, in October 2012,
the government of Somaliland (the territory which unilaterally
proclaimed its independence from Somalia in the early 1990s) signed an
agreement with General Energy. Turkey has since also joined the line of
investors interested in Somalia.
There are other questions which could be asked about the details
mentioned above. Is the Turkish government aware of all these
complications in Somalia? Does it have the capability to deal with
increasing attacks on Turkish targets and interests in the country? In
Turkish role, was it only targeted at the need for humanitarian
assistance- maybe it was done in way that it worked for a political
stability that helped the interests of oil companies and traditional
powers be in Somalia or Horn of Africa-? It appears that Turkish
decision-makers are feeling the need to review their regional policy,
partly with regard to checking the degree of acceptance for their roles
in Somalia and partly to further their understanding of tribal and
political relations in the country and their impact upon its domestic
and foreign policies. The military forces now being trained for the
benefit of the Somali state could quickly turn into an anti-government
force if political and tribal interests prevailed over loyalty to the
state. They could even also turn against the foreign country training
them. What applies to the Somali government is equally applicable to
al-Shabaab: all these armed groups are either being organized within the
government or splitting off from it—depending on their interests and
their tribal links. This fact creates potential internal and regional
weaknesses which reflect the fluctuations already mentioned. Therefore,
Turkish decision-makers determining Somalia policy should take these
weaknesses into consideration.