1. Introduction

No community has ever existed, let alone thrived, without an effective collective security. In the modern world, the locus of that arrangement has been and continuous to be the state. Those societies that fail to heed this dictum invariably live Thomas Hobbes's warning that the fate of their denizens is tantamount to “short, nasty and brutish …and war of all against all”. In short, the state, having the sole monopoly of force, is the only legitimate guarantor of order. The antithesis of that old wisdom is what has been the prevailing reality in Somalia in the last decade and half: privately organized violence, in the form of militias, has torn the political and social fabric into clanistic fiefdoms, underscoring the death of national governance.

The emerging dispensation from Nairobi has, at its best, a fleeting potential to reconstitute the state and national order. At its worst, is a hoax that can only usher in a new dimension of the nightmare. But such a gruesome future need not come to pass, for there are some real possibilities if only the Somali transnational leaders and people seize the moment and chart a competent, just, and peaceful course. We have already articulated the road map for such a future in our last essay [1] . Suffice, here, to repeat that the pitfalls are many. However, the way to salvation is contingent upon, first, categorical repentance and vision on the part of the leaders and, second, an upsurge and sustained public enthusiasm for beginning anew. The following brief remarks focus on the beckoning issues of disarmament and collective security.

II. An African Union Force WITHOUT Ethiopia

The Kenya-based phase of the Somali Peace Process has come to a close; and the selection of members of the Transitional Parliament and President, and the appointment of a Prime Minister and cabinet register the final steps in a two years journey. Key and regrettable features of the process have been the marginalization of Somali civic groups and the population, and a gerrymandering of the negotiations to deliberately empower certain warlords and favored clients of particular IGAD member states. The partisan nature of IGAD mediators has now produced a transitional authority that glaringly lacks legitimacy among the Somali public and is overwhelmingly made of unskilled individuals. Col. Abdillahi Yusuf, the newly selected Transitional President, recently paid a visit to Addis Ababa and met with the African Union and Ethiopian authorities to discuss recent developments. He made a request to the Union to send an African force of twenty thousand to Somalia to disarm the militias and the population in order to enforce the Nairobi agreement. The Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, in a joint press conference with the new Somali leader, stated that Ethiopia would contribute to a force for Somalia if the African Union submits such a request to his government.

The urgent need for a neutral force that would disarm the militias/population and enforce peace is apparent. However , we hold that asking for an interventionist force must come through a full parliamentary approval, and not just be an expression of the whim of the Transitional President. This will be primary evidence for a drastic departure from the odious Siyad Barre syndrome of one man unilaterally deciding the fate of our people and, therefore, the return of democracy to Somali politics [2] . The task that awaits such an African force will be arduous even under the most agreeable of circumstances, but it could be easily derailed, re-ignite the civil war, or help crown a new dictatorship if it is not gingerly planned. The AU would best serve the reputation of its newly created Peace and Security Council and the people of Somalia if it dispatches a neutral and credible force. To be sure, most Somalis know the truth about how IGAD”S frontlines states aggressively pushed their narrow agendas. This deficit is particularly pronounced in the case of Ethiopia:
First, Ethiopia militarily and financially supported certain warlords and faction leaders in contravention of United Nations Security Council Resolution 147 [3] .
Second, there is enough evidence to underscore that Ethiopia was deeply involved in the manipulation of the parliamentary and presidential selection process [4] .
Third, nearly all international human rights organizations agree that the regime in Addis Ababa has used violence to remain in power [5] . Our own research demonstrates that the Ethiopian authority does not respect its own federal constitution's sanctioned regional autonomy of ethnic groups such as Somalis, Oromos, the Afars and other nationalities [6].
Four, the Addis Ababa government did use all instruments at its disposal in its attempts to oust Somalia's former Transitional National Government (TNG) from the AU and other international bodies since its clients were absent from the TNG.
Fifth, there is the old age and frequent hostility towards Somalis and post-colonial Somalia.
Add together all of the above and one could easily imagine the potential flammability of a context in which Ethiopian troops are giving orders to Somalis in their own country. As many a Somali who have been watching the Nairobi Conference often say, our own failures can not be a license for others to humiliate and abuse us. In short, and given this negative history, Ethiopian forces can not be expected to play a neutral role, for their presence is likely to generate such a hostile reaction from most Somalis and many of the armed factions who are already antagonistic to Ethiopia .

The only IGAD country whose forces might be included into an African contingent force bound for Somalia is Uganda . But, alas, Uganda has its own violent conflict in the north and is not in position to spare some of its troops. Alternatively our recommendation is to look into convincing other major African countries who could provide the leaders and troops to stabilize Somalia . Here, Nigeria , South Africa , Botswana , Senegal , Tanzania, Ghana , Morocco and Libya come to mind.

If, in the challenge of constructing a democratic and effective transitional order, the new Somali leaders face their moment of truth, the African Union's own test is to see to it that, minimally, such a continental force is not only well prepared but represents countries that have no other interests except to aid their fellow Africans get a decent chance to build a peaceful and just Somalia.

[1] A. I. Samatar & A. Samatar. “ Somalia 's Worrisome Leadership: What Next? ( October 15, 2004 ). Posted in a number of Somali webpages namely Hiiraan, Goobjoog, Markacadey, SomaliSite, and others)

[2]Ahmed Samatar. 1985 "Underdevelopment in Somalia : Dictatorship without Hegemony," Africa Today, 32, 3: 23 -40.

[3]United Nations. 2003. Report of the Panel of Experts in Somalia Pursuant to Security Council Resolution number 1474 ( New York ).

[4]Senior official of Ethiopia 's Ministry of Foreign Affairs told significant number of transitional parliamentarians to vote for its candidate, Col. Abdillahi Yusuf, as a sign of their gratitude to Ethiopia 's help early in the civil war. Other sources have underscored that the cash used to bribe MPs to vote for the candidate came from Addis Ababa and one of its Somali allies.

[5]Siegfried Pausewang, et. al (eds). 2002. Ethiopia Since the Derg: A decade of Democratic Pretensions and Performance ( London : Zed Books).

[6]Abdi Ismail Samatar. 2004. "Ethiopian Federalism: Autonomy versus Control in the Somali Region," Third World Quarterly 25, 6: 1131 - 1154.

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